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Preface 
 
 
 
Since the 1990s, impressed by the Danish success, “flexicurity” has 
become an important strategy of the European social policy. Labour 
market flexibility combined with security for employees seemed to be 
the best solution to fight unemployment in Europe. The concept of 
flexicurity focuses on the idea of combining flexible and reliable 
contractual arrangements with comprehensive lifelong learning 
strategies, effective active labour market policies and modern social 
security systems. In particular, the active labour market policies and 
social security systems should support people in their transitions and this 
research focuses on the relationship between activation and benefits, to 
which the unemployed can have access. 
Thus, the essays collected in this e-book offer a multifaceted insight into 
methods and strategies of active and passive employment policies meant 
to implement aspects of the flexicurity principle in selected Member 
States of the European Union. Tania Bazzani, Italian researcher in the 
field of Labour and Social Security Law, invited young researchers to the 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, where she currently conducts research 
as a Marie Curie Fellow, to discuss the current state of employment 
policies in selected European countries. 
 
Nicola Gundt, Assistant Professor at Maastricht University (The 
Netherlands), analyses the protection of the unemployed in the 
Netherlands. She describes how the strict system of activation and work 
before welfare pursued by the Dutch legislator lost its balance due to the 
fact that it over-emphasises coercive measures while too little has been 
done to actively enable those that are dependent upon unemployment or 
social welfare benefits. The author illustrates in depth, that the rigorous 
Dutch “flexicurity” policy, based on coercion and duties of the 
unemployed, could not prevent the devastating effects provoked by the 
2008 financial crisis, such as a dramatic surge of unemployment, 
reaching levels previously unknown to the Dutch, as well as an increase 
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in precarious employment among those that are not considered to be 
“mainstream” workforce. 
 
Similar effects of the 2008 crisis are described by Agata Ludera-Ruszel, 
Assistant Professor at the University of Rzeszów (Poland), when 
painting the post-crisis picture of the Polish labour market. She points 
out that the current legal situation led to a segmented labour market 
where pseudo self-employed workers, civil-law contract workers and 
fixed-term employees enjoy no protection whatsoever against dismissal 
or contract termination. Furthermore, the author notes deficits as 
regards the activation of unemployed persons and proposes a number of 
measures to improve existing instruments and their organisation. She 
rightly criticises the fact that unemployment benefits are calculated on 
the basis of region, age and family situation instead of past remuneration 
or the national minimum wage. While the period of notice for fixed-term 
and permanent employment contracts has been unified in 2015, 
following a decision of the European Court of Justice, fixed-term 
contracts can still be terminated without reason. 
 
Tania Bazzani investigates the protection of the unemployed in Italy. She 
concludes that the flexicurity concept led to an increase of atypical forms 
of employment and a deregulation of traditional employment contacts in 
the Italian labour market. For example, fixed-term employment contracts 
up to 24 months can be concluded without any specific reason 
whatsoever, even longer, if provided for by an agreement of the social 
partners. Considering the position of unemployed workers, Tania 
Bazzani criticises the normative fragmentation of the Italian benefits 
system, especially an excess of laws and different measures. Furthermore, 
compared to other Member States, such as Denmark, the amount of the 
benefits is, at best, modest. Regional differences and bureaucratic 
obstacles also lead to grave inefficiencies and the failure of employment 
promotion measures. Consequently, her proposals aim at increasing the 
efficiency of employment offices. In addition, she promotes the newly 
created national agency (ANPAL) which, in theory, has the potential to 
streamline and unify the application of labour policies. It remains to be 
seen, however, whether the rejection of constitutional reforms by the 
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Italian people in the 2016 Italian constitutional referendum will affect 
this centralisation of competences. 
 
Effrosyni Bakirtzi, Legal Research Associate at Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main (Germany) and Doctoral Fellow 
at the Cooperative Graduate School on Social Human Rights of the 
University of Kassel (Germany) and the University of Applied Sciences 
Fulda (Germany), examines passive and active labour market policies in 
post-crisis Greece. She criticises a generally outdated legal environment 
as regards the protection of the unemployed suggesting the inadequacy 
of labour policy measures. Not only has the level of unemployment 
benefits been lowered to worryingly low amounts, but, in addition, 
administrative inefficiencies and frequent changes of legislation lead to 
insufficient protection in terms of active and passive employment 
policies. She argues that public resources have been unjustly distributed 
and she indicates that the Greek welfare regime can be regarded as dual 
and unequal, offering protection to those who work under conventional 
employment contracts and have an advantage compared to atypical 
workers who are effectively unprotected. In her concluding remarks she 
highlights that the comparably weak position of social partners in the 
Greek labour law system renders desirable adjustments more difficult. 
 
María Salas Porras, Assistant Professor at the University of Málaga 
(Spain), describes the implementation of the flexicurity concept in Spain. 
She contends that the massive liberalisation of the Spanish labour law 
did not have a positive influence on the dismal employment statistics. 
The author holds that one could therefore conclude that greater 
flexibility of the labour market alone does not lead to satisfactory results 
as regards the level of employment; on the contrary, it will lead to an 
increase in unemployment. Thus, she calls for increased efforts to create 
jobs as well as appropriate actions to ensure adequate support for the 
unemployed. Furthermore, she indicates that unemployment benefits, 
which are effectively expressions of social solidarity, are nowadays 
undermined by individualism, resulting in people choosing not to seek 
employment as soon as the amount of benefits reaches a certain level. 
While this explains why passive policy measures are to a growing extent 
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conditional on the fulfilment of certain duties, the author criticises a 
narrative prevalent in Spanish labour policy according to which 
unemployed individuals are deemed responsible for their situation. This 
would explain two underlying premises of the Spanish labour policy, 
namely that active employment policies will reduce unemployment while 
passive measures will lead to an increase thereof. María Salas Porras, 
finally, concludes that the aforementioned concept would foster a 
tendency to actively assist unemployed people who receive public 
assistance benefits to a greater extent compared to other people who do 
not receive state support, which, in turn, leads to discrimination against 
young unemployed people and those that have never worked or have not 
worked sufficiently in order to benefit from social security benefits. The 
author, inter alia, recommends that labour market policies should focus 
on the support of groups that were hit hard by the recent waves of 
unemployment, in particular the youth and people aged over 55. She 
suggests that Spain could “learn” from the experience of other countries 
where labour market policies managed to cope with the 2008 crisis in a 
better way. 
 
This suggestion allows us to return to the objective of the workshop 
which was drawing comparisons between European countries as well as 
between the different routes taken in terms of employment policies. 
Based on the findings, it may be possible to identify best practices, but 
also some preconditions without which certain policy options are bound 
to produce suboptimal results or, in the worst case scenario, fail. The 
growing discontent of groups that feel deprived of their rights and the 
rise of populistic parties and nationalistic leaders should be considered a 
warning that worries of certain social strata cannot be ignored any 
longer. One can only hope that the many constructive proposals 
submitted by the authors offer the EU and the Member State officials 
food for thought on future employment policies. 
 
Berlin, 28 December 2016 
 
Prof. Dr. Reinhard Singer 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Due to the economic crisis, unemployment has become a major issue in 
many countries. Different paths are used in order to tackle the rising 
numbers and to conserve the financial sustainability of the system. In the 
first place, labour law has been deregulated in order to provide easier 
access to work. Secondly, benefit conditions like eligibility criteria, 
maximum duration and amounts of benefits have been tightened. In the 
third place, activation has become an important tool.  
 
Here, we can distinguish several aspects, a focus on insertion in the 
labour market through employment services, but also the activation duty 
linked to the right to unemployment or social assistance benefits. One 
core question with all of this is whether this flexibilisation and “de-
securisation” coupled with responsibilisation of the (unemployed) 
individual does not lead to a loss of security. Therefore, this book aims 
at providing an overview of the development in five countries, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Spain and Greece, focussing on the question 
of security.  
 
Security is understood as one of those conditions, which support the 
unemployed in their transitions from an unemployment situation to a 
job. In this perspective, both unemployment benefits and activation 
measures are worth to provide “security”. 
 
The Member States here analysed belong to three main social security 
systems: the Dutch system, considered a best practise example in 
activation and a pioneer in having adopted a flexicurity perspective; the 
Polish system, within the East European system, which legal 
development depends also by the transition from the communist regime 
to the democratic one; the Mediterranean system, in their different 
versions, i.e. the Italian, the Spanish and the Greek one. 
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Both at the EU and the domestic level, the relationship between 
unemployment benefits and activation duties is linked to the concept of 
transition from passive to active policies, which has been promoted in 
the first pillar of the Luxembourg process and included in the 
employment guidelines since 1998. The idea of an active society is 
supporting a further transition, from welfare to workfare: welfare to 
work, in which the benefits should support individuals to be placed in a 
job through activation measures and services. Effective activation 
policies and adequate benefits are also relevant for being key elements of 
the flexicurity strategy. 
 
The flexicurity concept is based on four main elements, which are 
described in the Communication of the Commission on the common 
principle of flexicurity (Com(2007) 359 final): flexible and reliable 
contractual arrangements, comprehensive lifelong learning, together 
with, as aforementioned, effective active labour market policies and 
modern social security systems. 
 
Europe 2020 re-launched the goal of achieving flexicurity in order to 
address the new challenges in employment/skills/fighting poverty for 
the new decade and to enable “people to acquire new skills to adapt to 
new conditions and potential career shifts” (Com(2010) 2020). 
 
Within the Flagship Initiative “An Agenda for new skills and jobs”, the 
EU should implement the second phase of the flexicurity agenda, to 
“manage economic transitions and to fight unemployment and raise 
activity rates”. At the same time, Member States are requested to 
implement their national pathways for flexicurity, even by reviewing “the 
efficiency of tax and benefit systems so to make work pay with a 
particular focus on the low skilled, whilst removing measures that 
discourage self-employment”. Furthermore, still according to the Europe 
2020 strategy, short-term unemployment supports should be kept until 
an achievement in GDP growth and in employment, and structural 
unemployment should be reduced through an increasing labour 
participation. 
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The economic crisis at the end of 2008 highlighted the need for changes 
in the domestic regulation of the EU Member States in order to cope 
with unemployment. In doing this, Member States had also to deal with 
limited public expenditure due to the European austerity policy. Thus, 
the need for economic sustainability was particularly stressed in adopting 
initiatives and benefits to address unemployment. 
 
At the same time, if we look at the development of the flexicurity project 
in the last decade it is possible to highlight that the flexibility side seems 
to have been more developed in comparison to the security part. 
Furthermore, the security side, which is the unemployment benefits 
provided by Member States, have been increasingly linked to specific 
activation duties. Nevertheless, the conditionality of unemployment 
benefits, which links them to the activation measures, was introduced 
even before in many Member States. 
 
At the EU level, the need for conditionality was particularly pointed out 
since the end of the Nineties.  Thus, activation initiatives and services 
could be seen as a relevant way to avoid the unemployment trap, and the 
benefits should also be able to make work pay. Conditionality soon 
started to be envisaged for assistance supports, too, as a path towards an 
active society. 
 
The relationship between unemployment benefits and activation 
measures can also be analysed under the perspective of the 
contractualization of social rights, which was introduced according to the 
New Public Management and the new ideas in managing public services. 
Thus, often Member States introduced specific types of “contract” 
between public employment services and the unemployed, linking 
expressly the right to access certain services or benefits to specific duties. 
These different influences, together with the particular domestic features 
and developments, conditioned the implementation of the security side 
of the flexicurity concept in the Member States. 
 
8 
 
How much “security” has been achieved, until now, in these Member 
States? Each author will draw a picture on the last reforms in the field – 
i.e. passive labour market policies and activation initiatives addressed to 
the unemployed - and current pending issues, trying to propose some 
remarks on the security side of flexicurity, which is achieved at domestic 
level. 
 
Apart from the insurance unemployment benefits, the analysis will also 
take into consideration those assistance and subsidies, from which the 
unemployed can benefit while searching for a job. This includes short-
term earnings replacement benefits, when relevant for contributing to 
create a security net in order to support the workers, who are losing their 
job or who are confronted with a temporary lack of work. These consist 
of unemployment benefits/assistance subsidies/short-term earnings 
replacement benefits which provide the unemployed with economic 
support while searching for a job or while training or attending 
activation initiatives on the one hand and, on the other hand, activation 
measures intended enable the unemployed to reach an adequate 
professional profile according to the labour market needs. 
 
The structure of all the national reports is the same: every report will be 
introduced by a short description of the latest flexibility regulation. This 
part will enable the reader to understand better last developments in the 
domestic regulation and its impacts on the unemployed. Then, a part will 
focus on the passive labour market policies supporting workers in case 
of lack of work. A further part will highlight the activation measures 
addressed to the unemployed. Specific pending issues will be taken into 
consideration in both the fields. In the conclusive part, each author will 
propose some remarks in looking at the regulation and the level of 
protection – in both meanings of economic and pro-activation supports 
– in the domestic system. 
 
The idea of this book comes from a workshop, which was held at the 
Faculty of Law of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin in June 2016, 
within a Marie Curie research project granted to Dr. Tania Bazzani, with 
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supervisor Prof. Dr. Reinhard Singer, and funded by the European 
Commission.  
 
We are really grateful for the collaboration and the network, which are 
developing with the colleagues, who are the authors of this book, 
together with all the participants, who joined us during the discussion. 
 
 
Berlin, 28 December 2016 
 
Prof. Dr. Reinhard Singer 
 
Dr. Tania Bazzani 
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The protection of unemployed persons in the Netherlands: 
Fördern und Fordern in the Polder 
 
Nicola Gundt 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This contribution aims at offering an analysis of the protection of unemployed persons 
in the Netherlands. The term ‘protection’ is understood very broadly here and includes 
measures regarding income support as well as measures concerning the activation and 
re-integration of unemployed into the first labour market.  
After the introduction, which paints the general picture of the socio-economic situation 
of the Netherlands, the first part of the contribution starts off with the moment where 
unemployment usually starts, the rules on dismissal. As flexible or atypical 
employment has become a quite normal route to circumvent the applicability of 
employment protection legislation, the possibilities of flexible work will also be 
discussed briefly. The narrative will focus on the key developments, being the Act on 
Flexibility and Safety of 1999 and the very recent Act on Employment and Security 
(2015). The second part discusses forms of income support that are potentially 
available to unemployed persons. Therefore, this will not only include unemployment 
benefits as such, but will also touch upon the possibilities for other benefits including 
benefits for elderly unemployed and social assistance. In the third part, activation 
measures and policies in the field of unemployment legislation and – where relevant – 
other social security and social assistance legislation will be analysed. Here, a 
distinction will be made between enabling measures like individual counselling and 
guidance on the one hand and more ‘coercive’ measures like the duty to look for 
suitable work and accept that suitable work. Finally, a critical assessment of policies 
concerning (the prevention of) unemployment will take place.  
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Summary: Introduction. - 1. Prevention of unemployment.  1.1. Dismissal law. 1.2. 
Flexible contracts. 1.3. The Act on Flexibility and Security. 1.4. The Act on 
Employment and Security. Changes in the field of flexible employment. Changes in the 
field of dismissal law. 2. Income protection of unemployed persons. 2.1. 
Unemployment benefits. The right to benefits. Duration of benefits. Amount of 
benefits. 2.2. Short-time work and calamity unemployment benefits. 2.3. Extra 
allowances (Toeslagenwet). 2.4. Social assistance. 3. Activation measures. 3.1. Enabling 
measures for employees: training, counselling and re-integration. Young persons. 
Persons above school and training age. Unemployed. Social Assistance. 3.2. Enabling 
measures: Incentives for employers. 3.3. Coercive measures. Unemployment legislation. 
a. Reprehensibly becoming unemployed (verwijtbaar werkloos worden). b. Reprehensibly 
remaining unemployed (verwijtbaar werkloos blijven). 3.4. Sanctions. 4. Assessment. 5. 
Conclusion. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the Netherlands, activation policies in labour and social security law 
can be traced back to the 1980s. Back then, the Netherlands were 
Europe’s sick man with about a million individuals getting (partial) 
invalidity pensions. It became clear that, in order to keep the social 
security system affordable, things had to change.1  From then onwards, 
Dutch policies have concentrated on reducing the number of persons 
that are eligible for social benefits or social assistance. In order to reach 
this goal, several policy strands have been developed. Initially, during the 
1990s, the core idea was the so-called flexicurity approach.2 By that time, 
the Netherlands had accepted the OECD’s and ECB’s views on how to 
combat unemployment.3 OECD and ECB promoted a rather orthodox 
economic understanding of the labour market, stating that once the 
rigidities concerning hiring, firing and payment were abolished, 
                                                
1 Speech “Nederland is ziek” by Minister president R.F.M. Lubbers, Nijmegen, 5 
September 1990. 
2 For a general discussion on the concept of flexicurity as understood and 
implemented in the Netherlands see e.g. A.C.J.M. Wilthagen, (1998) Flexicurity: a new 
paradigm for labour market policy reform?, (1998), WZB Discussion Paper: 
https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/43913; S. Bekker, (2011), Flexicurity: 
explaining the Development of a European Concept, Nijmegen, Ipskamp Drukkers 
3 D. Ashiagbor, (2005), The European Employment Strategy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, p. 36; K. Jacobssohn, Soft regulation and the subtle transformation of 
states: the case of EU Employment policy, (2004) 14(4), Journal of European Social 
Policy, p. 360. 
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unemployment would decline. 4  Flexibility, reduction of employment 
protection legislation, active labour market policies and the 
modernisation of social security systems thus became cornerstones of 
Dutch national employment policy.  
By the middle of the 2000s, the Dutch labour market seemed to be 
doing fine. When the European economic and financial crisis became 
visible in 2008, the immediate results on the Dutch labour market were 
moderate. Unemployment initially rose only marginally, but rocketed 
from 2011 onwards, reaching 8,5% in 2014.5 For a country used to 
figures of less than 3%, this was a huge shock. Moreover, it became clear 
that the Dutch employment market had become rather segregated during 
the twenty years of flexicurity policy.6 While on the one side, fulltime 
permanent contracts with good employment conditions and protection 
against dismissal still existed, many young, elderly or otherwise “not 
mainstream” employees experienced great difficulties reaching that stage, 
and often had to accept successive offers of precarious employment in 
order to get a job at all.7 Being underprotected, persons in precarious 
employment rely on social security much more frequently, leading to 
problems with social security budgets and public spending. The crisis 
thus became the long-awaited catalyst for necessary changes to the 
Dutch labour law and social security system.  
Core ideas were taken over from EU employment policy as defined in 
the Europe 2020 Agenda. For the EU, access to employment must be 
made easier, e.g. by deregulation of rules regarding termination of 
employment contracts and a (wider) acceptance of atypical forms of 
employment such as agency work or fixed-term contracts. Secondly, 
active labour market policies, which include training schemes and 
employment subsidies should be promoted.8 Finally, States are urged to 
                                                
4 D. Ashiagbor, (2005), The European Employment Strategy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, p. 37. 
5 CPB (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Analysis): Road to Recovery: available at: 
http://www.cpb.nl/publicatie/roads-to-recovery, p. 14. 
6 Kamerstukken II, 2013/14, 33 818 nr. 3, p. 4, 10. 
7 Whether or not the changes in social security and social assistance law also added to 
this development, will be discussed later in the paper. 
8 Council Decision of 21.10. 2010 (2010/707/EU), OJ L 308/46, Guidelines 8 and 9.  
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implement or keep activation requirements in unemployment legislation, 
preferably within the framework of a ‘mutual responsibilities approach’.9 
All these policy aspects can be recognised in the Dutch reforms.  
 
1. Prevention of unemployment   
 
1.1. Dismissal law  
 
Prevention of unemployment can be a much more effective remedy 
against unemployment than activation out of unemployment. The first 
and foremost aspect of this prevention is protection against dismissal. 
Therefore, the paper will start with a brief overview of Dutch dismissal 
law. This regulation can best be characterised as intransparent, unfair and 
costly. There reason is that until the systematic changes in 2015, all 
changes that were made to the law on dismissal were merely additions to 
the existing rules rather than real changes. This led to several parallel 
systems existing next to each other. Their main feature was (and still is) 
the preventive test, meaning the employer cannot dismiss the employee 
lawfully without prior authorisation. This authorisation could be given 
by an administrative authority, in which case no severance pay was due, 
but a (small) risk of a review procedure on the grounds of obviously 
unreasonableness existed. The other option was to address the district 
judge and ask for dissolution of the contract. In this case, the employer 
had to pay a severance payment which could be substantial in case of 
older employees with high seniority or in cases where a dismissal was not 
possible, due to specific restrictions e.g. with respect to sick employees. 
The district judge’s decision was final, no appeal or cassation was 
possible. Obviously, these two possibilities that existed equally next to 
each other and were at the employer’s discretion, led to unequal 
treatment and incomprehension. It also made dismissal rather expensive 
and cumbersome. Hence, legal schemes to circumvent the applicability 
                                                
9 Commission Communication “Towards a job-rich recovery”, COM (2012) 173 
final, 10; see also Council Decision of 21.10. 2010 (2010/707/EU), OJ L 308/46, 
Guideline 7, first section. 
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of these rules, such as the use of contracts that terminate as of right or 
triangular employment relations became very appealing.  
 
1.2. Flexible contracts 
 
Another aspect of prevention of unemployment is access to the labour 
market. A more extensive recourse to atypical forms of employment can 
make this access easier. The use of flexible contracts became appealing 
for at least two more reasons. One is the inapplicability of rules on 
dismissal explained in the previous paragraph, the other is the fact that 
with contracts that terminate as of right the heavy responsibility of re-
integration of sick or partially incapacitated employees comes to an end 
with the end date of the contract as well. In the Netherlands, building on 
the idea that re-integration into work is easier while there (still) is an 
employer, the employer is responsible for (partially) incapacitated 
employees’ re-integration during the first 104 weeks of sickness.10 For 
the employer, this is costly as he will not only have to pay wages, but also 
re-integration costs and possibly the costs for a replacement worker. 
Fixed-term and agency contracts in particular offer ways to circumvent 
these obligations. Therefore, they were used also in situations in which 
the need for a worker was permanent. They were seen as a means to 
tailor labour costs to the precise production needs of the enterprise. By 
the end of the 1990s, fixed-term work and temporary agency work 
therefore had become an accepted part of Dutch labour law.11 
 
1.3. The Act on Flexibility and Security 
 
In order to offer employees in precarious employment situations more 
security, the Act on Flexibility and Security was introduced in 1999.12 
                                                
10 In 1994 the Wet terugdringing ziekteverzuim prolonged the duty to pay wages up to a 
period of 6 weeks, in 1996, the Wet uitbreiding loondoorbetaling bij ziekte made this a 
period of 52 weeks and finally, in 2004, the Wet verlenging loondoorbetalingsverplichting bij 
ziekte made it the current 104 weeks.  
11 H. Houwing, (2011), A Dutch approach to flexicurity? Negotiated change in the organisation 
of temporary work, eigen uitgave,  p. 147-151. 
12 Wet flexibiliteit en zekerheid, Stb 1998/300. 
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Flexible contracts of employment were seen as stepping stones, offering 
access to the employment market for those groups who usually had 
trouble entering the employment market. The idea was that, once the 
individual concerned had entered the employment market - using an 
atypical form of employment – a more secure employment position 
would develop with growing seniority and job experience. These ideas 
can be clearly seen in the changes the act brought about. Up to three 
consecutive fixed-term contracts that followed each other in a three-year 
period with breaks of no more than three months, could be agreed upon 
before automatic conversion into a permanent contract took place. 
Furthermore, rules on consecutive employership were developed in 
order to prevent revolving door constructions between different but 
connected employers.13 It is interesting to note that the Act on Flexibility 
and Security offered much leeway to the social partners to deviate from 
the legal standards in order to allow for even more flexibility. In many 
collective agreements, this leeway was used to its fullest extent, which 
effectively meant that only the flexibility part of the Act actually 
materialised, while the security part was gradually set aside.  
 
1.4. The Act on Employment and Security 
 
Ten years later, in 2009, when the economic and financial crisis finally 
reached the Dutch employment market, it became clear that the 
segregation between well-protected insiders on the one hand and 
precariously employed outsiders on the other side had become a real 
problem. Fixed-term and agency work, instead of providing stepping 
stones into more secure forms of employment had become a dead end 
for many. The Act on Employment and Security14 intends to rebalance 
the Dutch employment market. Excesses of flexibility left people in 
precarious employment during long periods without a prospect of 
growing into more secure forms of employment. 15 These employees do 
                                                
13 Art. 7:668a (2) BW). 
14 Kamerstukken II, 2013/14, 33 818 nr. 3, p. 4, 10. 
15 G.C. Boot, A.R. Houweling, M.J.M.T. Keulaerds, (2015), Parlementaire Geschiedenis 
Wet Werk en Zekerheid, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, Den Haag, p. 6. 
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not have the same access to training as employees working on indefinite 
term contracts, and consequently, their prospects of getting an indefinite 
employment contract deteriorate with time.16 Therefore, they must be 
given better prospects and more security.17 On the other hand, people in 
permanent employment had to be encouraged to move from one job to 
another to create more dynamism on the employment market and their 
sometimes excessive employment protection had to be reduced.18 
 
Changes in the field of flexible employment 
 
A first change is the reduction of the maximum period of fixed-term 
employment from 36 months to 24 months. 19  According to the 
government, this will result in a quicker offer of a permanent position.20 
Furthermore, the waiting period that breaks the chain of contracts is 
doubled from three to six months.21 This measure intends to prevent 
‘revolving door constructions’ between chains of fixed-term contracts 
and spells during which unemployment benefits are paid.22 With the new 
rules, the employee needs a longer employment history before he can 
bridge the gap between two periods of fixed-term employment. 23 
Obviously, he will also be expected to apply for jobs during these six 
months. If the employer wants to keep the employee, he will have to 
balance the risk of losing him against the risk of offering a permanent 
contract. Another form of protection and security for fixed-term 
                                                
16 Ibidem. 
17 Kamerstukken II, 2013/14, 33 818 nr. 3, p. 10-11. 
18 Kamerstukken II, 2013/14, 33 818 nr. 3, p. 21. 
19 Article 7:668a (1) (a) and (b) BW (revised). 
20 Kamerstukken II, 2013/14, 33818, nr. 3, p. 12. 
21 This applies to the same employer as well as to a “consecutive employer”, see art. 
7:668a (2) BW (revised). 
22 For an example, see: Rechtbank Amsterdam, 11 mei 2012, ECLI: 
NL:RBAMS:2012:BW6495. 
23 In the Netherlands, an individual who has been in employment for 26 out of 36 
weeks prior to unemployment has a right to benefits for three months. A 
prolongation of the benefit has to be earned in the sense that the individual must 
have earned wages during 52 days in four out of the five years prior to the year of 
unemployment, and for each year of working experience, a month of benefit rights 
is added. See for more detail paragraph 2.1. 
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workers is provided by article 7:668 Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek, 
BW). It states that the employer must notify the employee of his 
intentions concerning the prolongation of a fixed-term contract at least 
one month before the contract terminates. That way, the individual will 
know his future and can make arrangements.  
 
Changes in the field of dismissal law 
 
The second main aim of the new Act is to make the termination of 
contracts easier, more transparent, more just and less costly.24 In line 
with the new law’s focus on activation, employability and work-to-work 
transitions, the administrative authority as well as the district court judge 
will not only take account of the reasons for the dismissal, but will also 
inquire whether there really are no possibilities to keep the employee, e.g. 
in another job, after training if necessary.25 If any possibilities exist, no 
permission to terminate the contract will be granted.  
Another measure that shows the Government’s focus on preventing 
unemployment is the strong reliance on measures that guide the 
employee from work to work, like the abovementioned article 7:668 BW. 
The new severance pay is another example. The payment, officially 
labelled ‘transitory compensation’ is a lump sum payment due at the end 
of a (series of) contract(s) that lasted at least 24 months.26 According to 
the Government, the payment should be used to ease the transition from 
one job to another, e.g. by paying for training.27 The employer may 
deduct costs incurred for training during the job from the amount due at 
the end of the contract.28 The transitory compensation is meant to cover 
all disadvantages, and therefore, additional compensation will only be 
                                                
24 Kamerstukken II, 33 818, nr. 3, p. 25. 
25 Article 7:669 (1) BW. 
26 Exceptions apply for young persons of up to 18 years of age who work less than 12 
hours a week, as well as for employees whose contracts are terminated due to them 
reaching pensionable age and in case of summary dismissal. 
27 Kamerstukken I, 2013/14, 33 818, nr. A, p. 10-11. 
28 Article 7:673 (6) BW, Besluit voorwaarden in mindering brengen kosten op transitievergoeding, 
23 april 2015, Stb. 2015/171. 
19 
 
awarded in case the employer acts in a seriously reprehensible way.29 The 
government explicitly stated that these cases must remain the exception 
and that it will monitor the use of this possibility by judges very closely.30 
The 2015 Act clearly shows the policy aim of preventing (long-term) 
unemployment, preferably by guiding employees from work to work. In 
order to add even more weight to this line of thoughts, the Act on 
Unemployment Benefits was changed as well. As will be explained 
below, the maximum duration of benefits has been shortened from 38 
months to 24 months and the definition of suitable jobs to be accepted 
has been widened considerably. In the following paragraphs, these two 
aspects of social security legislation in the Netherlands will be analysed in 
greater detail. I will start with the traditional aim of social security - 
providing some income security - and discuss the activation measures 
afterwards. 
 
2. Income protection of unemployed persons 
 
2.1. Unemployment benefits 
 
The right to benefits 
 
The right to unemployment benefits depends on several cumulative 
criteria being fulfilled. In the first place, the individual concerned must 
be considered an employee to fall within the personal scope of 
application of the Act on Unemployment Benefits (Werkloosheidswet, 
WW31).32 Secondly, the individual has to be unemployed in the sense of 
art. 16 WW. This means that the employee must have lost at least five 
working hours and the right to wages over these five hours.33 Finally, the 
                                                
29 Article 7:682 BW. 
30 This is the so-called ‘mouse-hole’(muizengaatje): Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33818 nr. 
3, p. 34; Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33818 nr. 4, p. 15-16. 
31 Wet van 6 november 1986, Stb. 1986 nr 566. 
32 Art. 3-9 WW. 
33 See art. 1a WW. 
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ex-employee must be available for work.34 
The right to benefits does not come into being if an exclusion ground is 
present. These grounds are listed in art. 19 WW and include many 
different situations such as the employee’s imprisonment or residence 
outside the Netherlands. 35  The right to benefits can revive if the 
exclusion ground terminates within six months. 36  The benefits are 
terminated as soon as and as long as one of the exclusion grounds is 
present. Furthermore, the benefit is terminated, as soon as the wage 
earned in any new job amounts to at least 87,5% of the wages earned 
before.37 
 
Duration of benefits 
 
The employee who has lost at least five hours of work, including the 
right to wages over these hours and who is available for work must show 
a certain link to the employment market in order to qualify for 
unemployment benefits. This link exists if the employee can show 
employment during 26 of the 36 weeks directly preceding the 
unemployment.38 It is irrelevant how much work has been carried out 
each of these weeks, and in particular circumstances, different 
employment contracts can be taken into account.39 In certain cases, the 
reference period of 36 weeks can be prolonged, so the employment 
history before the 36 weeks can still be relevant. An individual who 
                                                
34 This is examined in the light of the concrete facts of the case by the UWV. A sick 
employee, for example, is not available for work, the same goes for an individual 
who receives a 100% invalidity pension. The individual’s behaviour can also lead to 
the conclusion that he or she is not available for the employment market, see CRVB 
29 december 1993, ECLI:NL:CRVB:1993:ZB2423. 
35 Since the most recent changes, the non-completion of the so-called fictious period 
of notice also became an exclusion ground. This basically means that 
unemployment benefits only become available after the legally applicable period of 
notice has ended, see art. 19 (3) and (4) WW. 
36 Art. 20 jo 21 WW. 
37 This interesting notion is due to the new rules on keeping a part of the income 
from a low paid new job, for further explanations see subtitle ‘amount of benefits’  
below. 
38 Art. 17 WW. 
39 Art. 17a (2) WW. 
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meets the requirements of art. 16 and 17 WW is entitled to three 
months’ unemployment benefits. 40 This minimal duration is prolonged 
when the conditions of art. 42 WW are met. According to this legal 
provision, the individual must be able to show that during the five years 
immediately preceding the year in which the unemployment occurred, in 
four years wages have been earned during at least 52 days / 208 hours 
per year.41 This is called the “arbeidsverleden-eis” roughly translatable as 
employment history requirement. Each full year in the individual’s 
employment history amounts to one extra month of benefits. The 
employment history is composed of the fictions employment history 
stretching from the individual’s 18th birthday to, but excluding 1998 and 
the real employment history which encompasses all years from 1998 
onwards in which during at least 52 days / 208 hours wages have been 
earned.42  Since the latest reforms, benefits are being built up more 
slowly. Concerning the first ten years, nothing changes, but after that, 
each extra year of employment history only leads to half an additional 
month of benefits after 2016. All rights accumulated until January 1st 
2016 will be completely respected, therefore amounting to one month of 
benefits per year of employment history. The maximum period during 
which unemployment benefits are available is reduced from 38 months 
to 24 months in steps from January 1st 2016 onwards for new cases. The 
reason behind this is twofold. In the first place, the Government 
explicitly said it wanted to save money43, on the other hand, according to 
the Government, shorter periods in which benefits are available lead to 
people looking for jobs more quickly, therefore remaining unemployed 
for a shorter period of time.44 
                                                
40 Art. 42 WW. 
41 Before January 2013 this used to be 208 hours of employment for which wages 
were due. 
42 To elucidate this with myself: If I become unemployed in 2016, my real 
employment history consists of the years 2002 (me starting my first job) to 2015 
(the year preceding the year in which I become unemployed). To this I can add the 
fictitious employment, encompassing in my case 1994, when I turned 18 until and 
including 1997. Until July 2015, this would have offered me a right to 18 months of 
benefits in total. 
43 Kamerstukken II, 2013/14, 33 818 nr. 3, p. 54. 
44 Kamerstukken II, 2013/14, 33 818 nr. 3, p. 54/55. 
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Amount of benefits 
 
Unemployment benefits in the Netherlands amount to 75% of the 
difference between the monthly wage of the job lost and any income 
from employment for the first two months and then 70% thereof. If 
there is no income from any kind of employment, the benefit therefore 
is equal to 75% and 70% respectively of the (maximised) monthly salary 
from which any income from work is subtracted. The formula for this 
can be found in article 47 WW. In order to make this subtraction 
mechanism understandable, let’s take the example of Jan.45 Jan lost his 
fulltime job completely. His monthly wage was 2.175 Euro. As long as 
Jan doesn’t work, the benefit is calculated as 75% or 70% of this 
amount, being 1.631,25 Euro and 1.522,50 Euro respectively. If Jan finds 
a job after four months, in which he earns 1.000 Euro, the monthly wage 
remains 2.175 Euro, but now the 1.000 Euro he earns is deducted from 
the monthly wage of 2.175 Euro = 1.175 Euro, and the benefit is 70% of 
this, being 822,50 Euro. Accepting a job will therefore lead to a lower 
benefit. However, as Jan already earned 1.000 Euro, his total income will 
be 1.822,50 Euro. Therefore, accepting work, even below the wage 
standard that the individual was used to before unemployment, will be 
rewarded in the present system. The employee will have more money 
with a low paid or part-time job than without and the public authority 
saves on benefits as they have to be paid over the difference between the 
lost wages and the actual wages only. One could therefore characterise 
this solution as a win – win at least in financial matters. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the employee may lose skills or that qualifications and 
experience become irrelevant, may be a disadvantage for the employee as 
well as for the economy at large. After all, the person in question may 
have been enrolled in costly subsidised university training, on the job 
training and so on and these qualifications may be lost or become 
obsolete once a lower-ranking job is accepted.  
 
 
                                                
45 Example taken from: S. Klosse, G.J. Vonk, (2015) Hoofdzaken Socialezekerheidsrecht, 
Boom juridische uitgevers, Den Haag, p. 136.  
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2.2. Short-time work and calamity unemployment benefits 
 
Although, technically speaking, short-time work is not the same as 
unemployment, in Dutch daily conversation, the benefit that is awarded 
in these cases is called an unemployment benefit46 by many, therefore it 
will be dealt with here.  
The calamity unemployment benefit will be available in situations in 
which an external, extraordinary event takes place during the 
employment relation and which lead to a situation in which the employer 
cannot make use of at least 20% of his employment capacity.47 Two 
main situations have to be distinguished here, which so far are regulated 
in different legislative measures. In the first place, the benefit is available 
in cases where continuous bad weather prevents the employee to do his 
work. 48  In other cases, the employer has to ask for permission to 
unilaterally reduce the employees’ working hours. 49 The aim of this 
measure is to shift part of the wage costs from the employer to the social 
security in order to prevent employers from going bankrupt in a 
situation that might not be more than temporary difficulties due to 
external factors. This instrument has been used in the meat industry 
during outbreaks of foot-and-mouth-disease, mad-cow disease and the 
like. During the 2009 crisis, in order to prevent large-scale dismissals 
which would have been even more disruptive to the national economy 
than the strain on social security systems, the admissibility criteria were 
widened and the regulation became known as part-time unemployment 
benefit.50 By now, the old, strict rules are back in place51 until the new 
calamity unemployment benefit enters into force.  
                                                
46 The regulation is called Regeling clalamiteiten WW, to be translated roughly as calamity 
unemployment benefit, and can be found at Stcrt 2013/20486. 
47 The more general decree (Regeling) was scheduled to enter into force by 1st of April 
2016, but so far it has not entered into force. Therefore, the old rules from 2004 
still apply. 
48 Regeling onwerkbaar weer, based on art. 18 WW. 
49 Beleidsregels ontheffing verbod op werktijdverkorting, Stcrt 2004/199, p. 13 ev;  For an 
extensive overview, see W.A. Zondag, (2001), Werktijdverkorting, Gouda Quint, 
Arnhem. 
50 Besluit deeltijd-WW tot behoud van vakkrachten, 31 maart 2009, Stcrt 2009, nr. 64. 
51 Regeling Calamiteiten WW van 7 July 2014, Stcrt 2014/20387. 
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2.3. Extra allowances (Toeslagenwet) 
 
If the benefit a person receives on the basis of one of the employee 
insurance systems does not amount to the minimum subsistence level, 
this person may have a right to an extra allowance (toeslag) on the basis of 
the Toeslagenwet52 which guarantees a minimum subsistence level. As it 
seeks to guarantee a minimum household income, any income of a 
partner will be considered relevant for the right to and the calculation of 
the benefit. In contrast to social assistance, however, assets are not taken 
into account. The social minimum is calculated according to art. 2 and is 
100% of the gross minimum wage for a married couple, 90% thereof for 
a single parent and 70% for a single person. In the last category, the 
individual’s age also matters. The extra allowance will never be more 
than the difference between any income and the social minimum 
applicable in the situation.53 In case the former income was already 
below the social minimum, e.g. due to working part-time, the ceiling of 
the extra allowance will be defined by that former income.54 
 
2.4. Social assistance 
 
For those who do not have any other source of income, including any 
social security benefit, reliance on social assistance is the last possibility 
to ensure a minimum subsistence level. The new act on social assistance 
entered into force on January 1st 2015 and is called “Participatiewet” to be 
translated as Participation Act (Pw)55. True to its title, the act not only 
provides a basic subsistence level assistance, but in the first place intends 
to get people out of the assistance system as quickly as possible.56 Social 
                                                
52 Wet van 6 november 1986, Stb. 1986 nr. 562. 
53 Certain income (30% of wages earned up to a certain ceiling) will be left aside in 
order to encourage work, see art. 7 TW. 
54 S. Klosse, G.J. Vonk, (2015), Hoofdzaken Socialezekerheidsrecht, Boom juridische 
uitgevers, Den Haag, p. 242. 
55 Wet van 9 oktober 2003, Stb. 2003 nr 375. 
56 S. Klosse, G.J. Vonk, (2015), Hoofdzaken Socialezekerheidsrecht, Boom juridische 
uitgevers, Den Haag, p. 220. 
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assistance is meant to provide the bare subsistence level, therefore all 
income and assets are taken into account.57 It is interesting to note that 
fictious wages, being wages which could have been earned in a job that 
was available, will be taken into account as assets that the individual can 
reasonably use and can lead to a reduction of benefits.58 Different basic 
norms apply according to the family situation. Furthermore, the actual 
amount of benefits depends on the composition of the household and 
decreases with every additional household member.59 Once a right to 
assistance is established, the assistance recipient has to fulfil strict duties 
and obligations in order to keep this assistance. In the first place, the 
individual must inform the authorities on every detail that may relate to 
the right to assistance. Non-compliance will lead to an administrative 
fine equal to the advantage the individual got. Furthermore, the 
individual must comply with any measures taken by the administrative 
authorities when implementing the right to benefits. This also includes 
the duty to accept an inspection of the place where the individual lives. 
Even though the law says that the benefit recipient needs to approve the 
inspection, a refusal to grant entry to the social services can lead to 
reduction or refusal of the benefit.60 
 
2.5.  Special regimes for elderly long-term and partially incapacitated 
unemployed 
 
After the right to unemployment benefits has finished, certain groups of 
persons have a right to specific benefits on the grounds of one of two 
laws which target the situation of elderly unemployed in particular. These 
laws are the IOAW (Wet inkomensvoorziening oudere en gedeeltelijk 
arbeidsongeschikte werkloze werknemers) 61 and the IOW (Wet 
                                                
57 This applies to partners’ assets only and not also to assets of mere house hold 
members.  
58 CRvB 14 juli 2009, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2009:BJ2763. 
59 The kostendelersnorm, meaning a possibility to profit from economies of scale in case 
more than two adults live under the same roof. See art. 21 and further Participatiewet. 
60 Art. 54 Pw, for case law under the previous Act on social assistance see CRvB 11 
april 2007, ELCI:NL:CRVB:2007:BA2447. 
61 Wet van 6 november 1986, Stb. 1986 nr. 565. 
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inkomensvoorziening oudere werklozen)62 respectively. The importance of both 
legislative measures lies in the fact that they offer exemptions to the 
harsh rules on assets in the Participatiewet while providing a minimum 
income. 
The IOAW intends to ensure a minimum subsistence level and is 
available to unemployed persons born before January 1st 1965 who have 
become unemployed after their 50th birthday. They must have consumed 
all rights to their (prolonged) unemployment benefits.63 The right to 
benefits comes into existence, in case the subsistence levels for the 
household laid down in art. 5 (3) to (6) are not reached. The benefit level 
equals the difference between the household income and the subsistence 
level mentioned in articles 5 and 6 IOAW.  This means that any income 
in the household is relevant for the right to and the calculation of the 
benefit. Benefits are available until the pensionable age, when the 
statutory pension replaces this minimum benefit. 
The IOW is a law that will expire in 2027. It was originally meant to 
mitigate the consequences of the reduction of the maximum period of 
unemployment benefits from 60 months to 38 months in 2006, but was 
prolonged in 2016, as that Act also reduced the period of unemployment 
benefits.64 The IOW offers particular benefits to those who become 
unemployed between September 30th, 2006 and January 1st 2020, who at 
that time are at least 60 years old and who fulfil the criteria laid down in 
art. 42 (2)(a) or (b) WW.65 Art. 3a IOW also opens the benefit to those 
becoming partially incapacitated between December 31st 2007 and 
January 1st 2020, who have a right to the so-called wage-related invalidity 
benefit (loongerelateerde WGA-uitkering) and are sixty years or older at that 
moment. The benefit is calculated according to art. 10 IOW and can 
never be more than 70% of the statutory minimum wage. As this is 
                                                
62 Wet van 19 juni 2008, Stb. 2008, nr. 340. 
63 Art. 2 IOAW. 
64 S. Klosse, G.J. Vonk, (2015), Hoofdzaken Socialezekerheidsrecht, Boom juridische 
uitgevers Den Haag, p. 243. 
65 See art. 3 IOW. Art. 42 (1)(a) WW contains the four-out-of-five requirement 
described in paragraph 2.1 that allows for a prolongation of the unemployment 
benefit after three months, sub (b) relates to the right of invalidity benefits 
immediately preceding the right to unemployment benefits.  
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substantially more than the subsistence level, the IOW is a more 
generous benefit than the IOAW. It is available regardless of any income 
of a partner or the individual’s assets.  
 
3. Activation measures  
 
Activation measures can be classified according to their main focus. In 
the first place, activation measures can have an enabling character, 
offering guidance to the unemployed, e.g. by individual counselling, 
tailor-made training opportunities or general (re)training of skills, like 
presentation skills. On the other hand, there are measures that aim not 
so much at enabling the individual to find and keep a job but to make 
them accept any kind of paid employment in order to keep benefit 
reliance at a minimal time space. Both types of measures will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
3.1. Enabling measures for employees: training, counselling and re-
integration  
 
Young persons 
 
Generally speaking, Dutch law contains many possibilities for training 
and education. Young persons are obliged to attend school or undergo 
training until the age of 18 at least. Up to the age of 16, this is called 
‘leerplicht’66 and means that the young person must be attending some 
kind of (secondary) education. If a young person between the age of 16 
and 18, has not yet achieved a final grade in secondary education, this 
duty is called the ‘kwalificatieplicht’.67 Students who leave school at 16 
without even a basic qualification will be monitored by the municipality 
and be offered either further education or practical training. In the 
branches of education that aim to qualify students for practical work, 
practical training, including internships is part of the study programme. 
Furthermore, there are forms of dual training and education in the form 
                                                
66 Art. 3 Leerplichtwet. 
67 Art. 4a Leerplichtwet. 
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of the beroepsopleidendeleerweg (BOL) and the beroepsbegeleidendeleerweg (BBL) 
linked to the lowest grades of secondary education. Both combine 
school and practical training in an enterprise by means of an (unpaid) 
internship. Theory is dealt with at school and relevant training is 
provided under circumstances that resemble actual work as much as 
possible, in an undertaking. The difference is that in the latter, the BBL, 
the practical part forms at least 60% of the training programme. The 
BBL usually takes two years to complete and it offers possibilities for 
tailor made solutions for each student according to his / her level when 
starting the trajectory. The BOL consists of at least 60% theoretical 
education, takes between two and four years and leads to higher 
qualifications. Furthermore, special regimes exist for students with low 
IQ and / or social and emotional problems. The aim is to lead them 
towards basic forms of employment or the lowest level of theoretical 
education. The age limit for these programmes usually is 18 years.68 
 
Persons above school and training age 
 
Training opportunities for older persons are less structured and – more 
importantly – much less generous. However, during the last years much 
attention has been paid on efforts to keep everyone in society 
employable. In labour law legislation, article 7:611a BW has been added 
to the general duty of good employership. It contains a duty for the 
employer to keep offering training and education which is necessary for 
the employee to remain able to fulfil his job. Furthermore, the employer 
must, as much as reasonably possible, offer training aimed at different 
jobs in case the employee’s job is no longer available or the employee is 
no longer fit to do the job. The costs incurred for this necessary training 
cannot be deducted from the transitory compensation that is due in case 
the employment contract is terminated.69 Costs relating to training not 
                                                
68 https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praktijkonderwijs. 
69 Besluit voorwaarden in mindering brengen kosten op transitievergoeding, 23 April 2015, Stb. 
2015/171. 
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related to the specific job may be deducted from the transitional fee.70 
 
Unemployed 
 
Persons receiving an unemployment benefit may enrol for training and 
education measures. The current Unemployment Act (Werkloosheidswet, 
WW)71, however, contains more enabling measures than just the right to 
training and education. To begin with, unemployed persons have a right 
to assistance concerning re-integration into employment.72 However, this 
right to assistance is not a hard and fast right. It is rather the 
administrative authority that decides the scope of the right to assistance 
in each individual case.73 The eventual decision about concrete measures 
is laid down in a so-called re-integration plan. This plan contains 
concrete steps and measures, rights and duties. Originally intended to be 
a mutual agreement, in practice, the plan is drawn up by the 
administrative authority and then discussed. However, in case of 
disagreement, the administrative authority decides. In practice, assistance 
in finding a new suitable job during the first three months of 
unemployment is limited to access to the administrative authority’s 
digital environment where employers post their job offers and 
unemployed can look for jobs. Only if the search for a job has not been 
successful during the first three months, personal coaching will take 
place. An advisor will then assess whether re-integration measures are 
necessary and if so, which ones.74 
In the second place, unemployed persons have a right to training and 
education if this is deemed necessary for their employment chances. 
According to art. 2 of the Policy Guidelines for training75, a necessity for 
                                                
70 Besluit voorwaarden in mindering brengen kosten op transitievergoeding, 23 April 2015, Stb. 
2015/171. 
71 Wet van 6 november 1986, Stb. 1986 nr 566. 
72 Art. 73 WW. 
73 S. Klosse, G.J. Vonk, (2015), Hoofdzaken Socialezekerheidsrecht, Boom juridische 
uitgevers Den Haag, p. 248. 
74 Ibidem, p. 250. 
75 Beleidsregels Scholing 2016, Stcrt 2016, nr. 24765, art. 2 sub a en b. 
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training is present if the training is relevant for the employment market76 
the training can be completed within a year and the individual in 
question has sufficient capacities for training (schoolbarheid). If these 
conditions are fulfilled, the individual may undergo training while 
keeping the benefits and being exempted from the duty to apply for jobs 
until the training is completed. 77  If the training is not considered 
necessary within the meaning of the Decree on education in 
unemployment, the unemployed may still enrol in training programmes, 
but will not be exempted from the duty to apply for and to accept 
suitable jobs. For this category, therefore, acceptation of paid work 
prevails over training and education, even if the latter may offer more 
stable prospects of work and a better long-term perspective. 
In the third place, according to art. 76a WW, an employee can be placed 
at an enterprise for an unpaid trial period for a maximum of 26 weeks in 
order to experience work (proefplaatsing). In order to prevent abuse, strict 
requirements have to be met, amongst which the perspective that after 
the trial period work for at least the same number of hours is available 
for at least half a year. A different possibility is the use of art. 77a WW, 
which offers the opportunity to start a business from unemployment by 
allowing the starter to keep benefits for 26 weeks after the business is set 
up and running.  
Finally, for persons who are extremely unlikely to find a job and who are 
categorised as impossible to re-integrate (niet bemiddelbaar) on the 
employment market at the moment, art. 78c WW offers the possibility to 
let them do unpaid work for a maximum of 2 years on a so-called 
participation place (participatieplaats). This measure is well known in social 
assistance, but now has also been introduced in unemployment 
legislation. The work that is done must be of an additional nature and 
must not lead to real jobs being made redundant. The aim of placing 
someone in a measure like this is to make them experience work or to 
                                                
76 See art. 3 of the Policy guidelines. There are three possibilities, a guarantee of 
declaration of intention from a prospective employer, the job being defined as 
“kansberoep” by the UWV or a substantiated argumentation that the training helps 
finding a job or self-employment after completion. 
77 Art. 6 and 6a of the Decree on exemptions from duties in social security legislation 
(Regeling vrijstelling verplichtingen socialezekerheidswetten). 
31 
 
develop certain skills and / or competences.  
Although it is not part of the re-integration chapter in the Act, in my 
view, the rules on ‘inkomensverrekening’ explained above within the context 
of the amount of benefits can be classified as an enabling activation 
measure. By assuring that the individual who accepts a job below his 
former pay rate or even below benefit level will always be better off 
working than not working, this measure is a strong incentive to accept 
work more quickly than might be the case otherwise. Only when the 
wages earned amount to more than 87,5% of the former wages will the 
benefit be lost as this loss is no longer deemed relevant.78 
 
Social assistance 
 
The Participation Act (Participatiewet, Pw 79 ) certainly contains most 
activation measures of all social security and social assistance legislation. 
It distinguishes between assistance (ondersteuning) on the one hand, which 
means assistance in finding employment that can be exercised 
independently and measures (voorzieningen) which are meant for those 
who are not yet able to independently find a job. Concerning assistance, 
the most important right is the right to assistance in finding a job 
discussed above, which can be found in article 10 Pw. Also most of the 
measures discussed above, like participation placements (art. 10a Pw), 
are available under the Participation Act. Again, this means that an 
individual who is not fit to find a job on his / her own may be obliged to 
perform unpaid work in order to get closer to the employment market. 
However, within the framework of the Participation Act, some extra 
rules apply. For example, after working on a participation place for half a 
year the individual who does not have a degree in secondary education 
will be offered a place at school or training, except if this is not feasible 
due to the individual’s (intellectual) capacities.80 Secondly, an incentive 
can be added to this placement, the so-called stimulation bonus. It is a 
bonus the individual receives if he has sufficiently participated in 
                                                
78  Art. 20 (1) (c) WW. 
79 Wet van 9 oktober 2003, Stb. 2003 nr 375. 
80  Art. 10a (5)  Pw. 
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enhancing his chances for a real job and amounts to almost 2.500 Euro 
per year which may be kept in addition to the social assistance 
benefit.81If there is no chance whatsoever of finding any job, placement 
in sheltered jobs is possible as a means of last resort.82 
 
3.2. Enabling measures: Incentives for employers  
 
Some enabling measures do not target the unemployed or social 
assistance benefit recipient, but rather their prospective employers. One 
of these incentives for employers is the no-risk social security coverage 
available for (partially) incapacitated and elderly unemployed 
employees.83 The employer will then be exempted from the duty to pay 
wages while the employee is sick if the sickness manifests itself within 
five years of starting the job. This may help inciting employers to offer a 
job to someone with health problems, who, usually, due to the 104 
weeks of wages in case of sickness, will be a liability and therefore more 
or less without a chance on the employment market. A comparable 
instrument is the reduction of social security contributions in case elderly 
or partially incapacitated unemployed are taken on.84 
For persons trying to re-enter the employment market from a social 
assistance benefit situation and who are at that point unable to earn at 
least the statutory minimum wage, there is a possibility to ask for a wage 
cost subsidy. The employer pays the employee the statutory minimum 
wage and is compensated for up to 70% of that amount, depending on 
how valuable the work is.85 The employer thus only pays the “real value” 
of the work, while the person in question can start on a real job with 
“real” minimum wages.  
 
                                                
81  Art. 10a (6) Pw. 
82 Art. 10b Pw. 
83 Art. 29b, 29d Ziektewet (Zw). 
84 Art. 47 and 48 Wet financiering sociale verzekeringen (Wfsv). 
85 Art. 10d Pw. The Besluit loonkostensubsidie Participatiewet (Decree on wage cost subsidy 
in the Act on Participation) and a Regeling loonkostensubsidie Participatiewet (Regulation 
on wage cost subsidy in the Act on Participation) contain the specific rules for the 
determination of the value of the work done. 
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3.3. Coercive measures  
 
In full agreement with EU activation policies, the enabling measures 
discussed above are complemented by measures of a rather coercive 
nature, intended to incite the individual to leave the benefit situation as 
quickly as possible. Irrespective of the benefit / assistance that is sought, 
the first duty of the benefit recipient is a duty to inform the relevant 
instances on all facts that can be relevant for the benefit, particularly, but 
by no means exclusively, income from other jobs, finding / accepting a 
job offer or job applications, 86  changes in the household or family 
situation87 and the like.  
 
Unemployment legislation 
 
A much more interesting obligation is not to become or remain 
unemployed. The unemployed is furthermore obliged to accept suitable 
job offers and must refrain from putting the social security agencies at a 
disadvantage.88 These obligations have been set out in the law in great 
detail and will be discussed below. 
However, before the duties to accept, keep and get a suitable job can be 
explained properly, the notion of ‘suitable employment’ must be 
explained as only this allows for a proper assessment of the strictness of 
these duties. The definition of suitable work in the Decree on suitable 
work is of crucial importance here.89 During the first six months of 
unemployment, suitable work is work that resembles the kind of work 
that was done before the unemployment. This means that the job must 
fit the education and training, offer a salary that amounts to at least 70% 
of the salary earned in the old job and does not demand more than two 
hours of commuting per day. However, suitable work can also be work 
on a lower level which offers perspectives to get back on the old level 
                                                
86 Art. 25 WW. 
87 Art. 17 Pw. 
88 Art. 24 WW. 
89 Besluit passende arbeid WW en ZW (Decree on suitable work in unemployment and 
sickness legislation), Stb 2014, 525. 
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within six months. Intermittent work of a lesser nature, with lower 
qualification requirements and lower wages before a new job that has 
been secured is started also is suitable.90 The person in question is 
therefore allowed to restrict the search for jobs to a level and to 
functions comparable to the one he or she just lost, but must be 
prepared to start on a lower level or to accept intermittent work in order 
not to remain unemployed longer than necessary. After six months, 
every kind of job, taking into account the individual’s capabilities is 
deemed suitable, except if acceptation cannot be demanded due to 
physical, mental or social reasons connected to the individual. This may 
mean that the individual in question will be required to commute to even 
faraway places or to move houses. It may also mean employment far 
below the level of skills and responsibility (and therefore wages) the 
individual was used to.   
 
a) Reprehensibly becoming unemployed (verwijtbaar werkloos worden)  
 
The Unemployment Act defines two situations in which the individual is 
held to be reprehensibly unemployed. The first situation is where the 
individual through his behaviour or deeds gives a reason for summary 
dismissal.91 The second ground is that the employee takes the initiative 
concerning the termination of the contract, even though it could 
reasonably have been continued.92 However, it is not necessary to defend 
oneself in court against an employer’s action to terminate the contract, as 
in this case the initiative for termination is clearly with the employer.93 It 
is also possible to agree to a termination proposal made by the employer 
without risking one’s unemployment benefits. Still, sometimes 
acquiescence or approval of a termination can amount to disfavouring 
the social security agency, for example in case the employee is sick for 
less than 104 weeks and cannot be dismissed. As in that case the 
employee voluntarily and unnecessarily surrenders his legal protection, 
                                                
90 Art. 4 Besluit passende arbeid WW en ZW. 
91 Art. 24 (2) (a) WW. 
92 Art. 24 (2) (b) WW. 
93 Art. 24(6) WW. 
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this will be deemed a ‘disfavouring of the social services’ 
(benadelingshandeling) and will be sanctioned.94 
 
b) Reprehensibly remaining unemployed (verwijtbaar werkloos blijven) 
 
A second main obligation is not to remain unemployed for a longer 
period than necessary. It is within this framework that the concept of 
suitable work discussed above is of crucial importance. A first aspect of 
this duty is the duty to apply for suitable jobs. It is important to 
document the activities so the social security agency can verify the 
efforts. If these are deemed insufficient, the benefits will be cut 
according to art. 27(3) WW.95 
A second aspect of the duty of not remaining unemployed is that the 
employee must not neglect to accept suitable work (art. 24 (1) sub b 2 
WW). In short, this means that the employee must not reject a concrete 
job offer that is deemed suitable. This obligation starts even before 
unemployment has arisen, namely the moment when unemployment 
becomes a realistic prospect.96 
This duty must be distinguished clearly from the duty to keep suitable 
work (art. 24 (1) sub b 3 WW). This falls within the ambit of 
reprehensibly becoming unemployed, therefore, as long as the employee 
cannot be blamed for not keeping suitable work, the benefit will be safe. 
There is one exception to this, being that the employee does not accept 
an offer to continue a fixed-term contract while there are no relevant 
changes in the employment and working conditions. This shows that as 
long as the employment conditions do not change substantially, the 
criterion will be whether the individual kept his job (passende arbeid 
behouden). On the other hand, if there are significant changes in the job, 
                                                
94 Art. 24(5) jo (6) WW. 
95 The general rule is a reduction of 25% for four weeks, but sanctions can be harsher 
or less harsh according to the concrete circumstances of the case. See the paragraph 
on sanctions below. 
96 S. Klosse, G.J. Vonk, (2015), Hoofdzaken Socialezekerheidsrecht, Boom juridische 
uitgevers, Den Haag, p. 150. 
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the criterion will be whether the employee should have accepted the job 
(passende arbeid aanvaarden).97 
 
3.4. Sanctions 
 
The Unemployment Act also contains sanctions. They can be found in 
art. 27-29 WW. The most important article to discuss here is article 27 
WW as this contains the different sanctions to the duties explained in 
more detail above.  
Non-compliance with the duty to keep suitable work (passende arbeid 
behouden ex art. 24 (1) sub b 3 WW) triggers the sanction of article 27 (1) 
WW. This category applies to situations in which there is no substantial 
change in employment conditions, for example if the employee is 
offered a continuation of a fixed-term contract under essentially the 
same conditions as the contract that just expired. The sanction article 
27(1) WW prescribes is a permanent reduction of the benefit, but there 
is an escape: if the reason why the work was not kept is not 
reprehensible, the sanction can be limited to a temporary reduction of 
benefits.98 On the other hand, if there are significant changes in the job, 
the duty that has been neglected is that the employee should have 
accepted the job (passende arbeid aanvaarden). According to article 27 (2) 
WW, the sanction in this case is the permanent reduction of benefits. 
There is no possibility to moderate the sanction. It is interesting to 
notice that the thin line between significant and insignificant changes in 
employment conditions, which is often less clear in concreto than in 
abstracto, can make a huge difference in sanctions. It is even more 
astonishing that the harsher sanction applies in cases that entail bigger 
changes, as one might expect the sanctions to be stricter in case the 
differences between the old job and a prospective new one are relatively 
irrelevant.  
To make things more complicated, in addition to the sanctions 
contained in the WW itself, there also is the Decree on sanctions in 
                                                
97 CRvB 14 november 2012, ECLI:NL:2012:BY3495. 
98 Article 24(2) WW jo Art. 27 (1) WW. 
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social security legislation99 and policy guidelines on sanctions in social 
security law.100 Therefore, if a sanction cannot be found in the WW itself 
(e.g. non-compliance with art. 24 (1) b 1 or 4 (not b2 and b3 as they are 
regulated in art. 27 WW), the decree defines the sanction.  The Decree 
describes the different categories of sanctions in social security law (art. 
2) and defines the cases in which any of those five categories of 
sanctions is applied. The normal sanction consists of a reduction or even 
complete withdrawal of the benefit and range from a 5% reduction of 
benefits during at least one month for the first category up to a complete 
and permanent refusal of benefits in the fourth category. Special rules 
apply in case the non-compliance is not reprehensible and in case the 
person in question has been sanctioned before.101 The policy guideline 
on sanctions offers some more guidance for individual cases, where it 
states that, generally speaking, the sanction should be equal to the 
amount of benefits that have been paid. This means that the individual 
will not only have to pay back the benefits to which he / she was not 
entitled, but also that he / she has to pay a fine of the same amount by 
way of sanction. In case the individual has been sanctioned before, the 
fine will be 150% of the amount of benefits received. 102  In every 
individual case, according to art. 4 of the guideline, an assessment has to 
be made whether the fine is in line with the seriousness of the 
individual’s neglect of duties. The fine must be in balance with the 
seriousness of the facts and must reflect the circumstances of the 
concrete case.103 
Sanctions can also be found in the Participatiewet. Municipalities are 
responsible for the implementation of the Participatiewet, including the 
sanctioning part and therefore have their own decrees which concretise 
the rights, duties and sanctions.104 With regard to certain duties, specified 
                                                
99 Maatregelenbesluit socialezekerheidswetten, Stb. 2007/304. 
100 Beleidsregel boete werknemer 2013. 
101 Art. 8 Maatregelenbesluit Socialezekerheidswetten. 
102 Art. 3 Beleidsregel boete werknemer 2013. 
103 CRvB 27 mei 2010, ECLI:CRVB:2010:BM5914. 
104 See e.g. art. 18 (5) Pw from which it becomes clear that the municipal authorities 
must have a regulation on sanctions concerning non-compliance with the duties in 
the Participatiewet. 
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in art. 18 (4) Pw, the municipality must react with a reduction of the 
social assistance, but may still be free in determining the period of time 
during which this sanctions apply. Just to give an idea on how strict the 
sanctions can be, art. 18 (6) and (7) Pw allow for a 100% reduction of 
social assistance allowances for a period of time to be specified in the 
municipal regulation. This essentially means that a household can be left 
without any means of subsistence due to non-compliance with duties 
specified in art. 18 Pw.  
 
4.Assessment 
 
Considering all the aspects of Dutch legislation concerning the 
protection of unemployed persons, where do the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Dutch system lie?  
Although the Act on Employment and Security has barely been in force 
for a year, it has already become clear that not all the intended aims have 
been reached. Recent figures show that instead of limiting dismissal 
protection, the introduction of limited grounds for dismissal actually 
made dismissal harder.105 This leads to employers becoming even more 
risk-averse and opting for even more flexible contracts which eventually 
leads to no dismissal protection at all. On the activation side, the 
transitory compensation does not seem to have much effect yet, which 
may be due to the fact that there is no obligation to spend the money on 
education and re-training. As before 2015, any compensation awarded 
because of the dismissal could be used freely, the envisaged mindset may 
just need some time to develop.  
With regard to income protection of unemployed persons, the Dutch 
Unemployment Benefit Act offers relatively generous benefits of 75% 
and 70% respectively of the maximised daily wages. If the person in 
question receives a benefit below subsistence level, recourse to the 
Toeslagenwet may alleviate the financial hardship, while eligibility for the 
                                                
105 Under the old system about 10% of all requests for dismissal were turned down, 
that figure now seems to stand at somewhere between 30 and 40%.  For more 
details, see VAAN-VvA Evaluatieonderzoek WWZ 2016, A.R. Houweling, 
M.J.M.T. Keulaerds, P. Kruit, (2016), Boom juridische uitgevers, Den Haag . 
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IOW or the IOAW prevents the application of the harsh income and 
asset tests of social assistance legislation. A social assistance benefit is 
only available if the individual in question does not have income or 
assets. In that case, a minimum subsistence level is provided by the state 
in order to prevent the (long-term) unemployed from having to rely on 
charity.  
Concerning activation measures, a first thing that has to be noted is the 
importance attached to all forms of training, particularly at a young age. 
The Dutch authorities try to prevent as much as possible that young 
persons leave school without any kind of basic qualification. Once in 
employment, employees have a right to training and education that is 
needed to stay fit in their job or another job in the enterprise if the 
current job is likely to disappear. For the unemployed, training 
opportunities, due to lack of funds of the administrative authority, are 
few. Generally speaking, an individual may enrol in training, but only if 
this is deemed necessary by the authority will this lead to an exemption 
from the duty to accept suitable work. Anyone fit to accept suitable work 
without training may enrol, but will always be supposed to leave 
educational measures in favour of taking up suitable employment. For 
those in real need of training, the rules suffice, but for those who want 
to improve their prospects on the labour market, the current rules 
actually are a disincentive to engage in training.  
Possibly the most important and – potentially most effective – enabling 
activation measure is assistance in re-integration through guidance and 
counselling in finding a new suitable job. Therefore it is astonishing that, 
although all social security and social assistance legislation contain this 
right, little seems to be achieved in practice. This may be due to the fact 
that many of the activation policy measures that were meant to help 
people back into employment quickly have become starved of funds and 
staff. As described above, the UWV does not offer any personal 
counselling during the first three months of unemployment, all 
communication is held via the UWV website, which, incidentally, often 
has technical problems. It seems therefore, that although the law offers a 
lot of instruments to help people back into work, in practice, very little 
happens, and particularly those who do not possess great computer, 
40 
 
reading or cognitive skills are placed at a disadvantage right from the 
beginning. After all, it is this group that has the greatest difficulties with 
the digital approach and the concept of self-help. Incidentally, this may 
also be the group that is in greatest danger of becoming long-term 
unemployed. Once it has become clear that the individual will not be 
able to get out of unemployment by himself, other measures become 
available. These include training, trial periods and even unpaid work if 
that helps the individual in getting back into or closer to the employment 
market. However, the easiest moment of getting someone back on track 
has passed by then. A second potentially valuable activation measure – 
although not being labelled as such - is the ‘inkomensverrekening’, the 
concept explained above according to which an individual on benefits 
will always be better off accepting (low paid) work than just living off a 
benefit. It offers a financial incentive to the individual to accept paid 
work. Therefore I am not sure whether it can be classified as truly 
enabling, as it does not depend on funding or active participation on the 
authorities’ side. Maybe one could state that the inkomensverrekening is the 
more enabling or incentive aspect of duty to accept suitable work.   
The second track of the activation measures consists of duties and the 
corresponding sanctions. Benefit recipients, regardless of the legal basis 
of the specific benefit sought, are confronted with many duties ranging 
from information duties to the duty to provide unpaid work. Sanctions 
are harsh. As described above, failure to accept a suitable job can result 
in a complete withdrawal of benefits. This sanction is even harsher when 
one takes into account the new definition of ‘suitable employment’. 
Unemployed persons eventually are nudged into jobs, even if they are 
below their qualifications, skills and competences and offer lower wages. 
If applied too harshly, this measure threatens to undermine the 
employment market in several ways. In the first place, the question needs 
to be asked whether employers really are queuing for overqualified job 
applicants. In other words, why would an employer choose an 
overqualified engineer above someone who is sufficiently qualified for 
the job on offer? In the second place, one has to take into account how 
rejection for a job below the level of qualification affects the individual 
in question. What are the consequences for that person’s self-esteem and 
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what does that mean for long-term possibilities of getting back into 
employment? Finally, if a job below the former level of capacities, skills 
and competences is accepted, this leads to a loss of human capital and 
loss of investment by society (e.g. expensive subsidised university 
degrees don’t pay off) even though from a purely financial point of view, 
acceptation of a lower paid job is appealing for the individual and the 
social security authorities. The duties contained in the different legislative 
acts are meant to assure that the individual does everything reasonably 
within his power to stay out of the social security system and once in the 
system, does his best to get out again. Non-compliance will be 
sanctioned and these sanctions can be harsh, up to a complete, 
permanent withdrawal of a right to benefits. If benefits have been paid 
without proper cause, the individual will not only have to pay back the 
full amount of benefits, but on top of that is liable to be fined the same 
amount, except if there is no or little fault on his side. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Overall, one can say that in Dutch law a reasonable protection is ensured 
in the first place by relatively harsh rules on dismissal and generous 
benefits. Once a person is unemployed, activation aspects complete this 
picture: benefits for more than three months have to be earned. Once 
unemployment occurs, strict duties apply. If these are neglected, harsh 
sanctions will follow. When assessing the protection system as a whole, it 
is interesting to note that some of the most effective measures like 
individual guidance and counselling are not generally available until after 
three months of unemployment, which makes persons with a small 
network and low digital skills vulnerable. It seems that within the 
framework of activation, the Dutch legislator and also the executive 
authorities believe in coercion and sanctions rather than in enabling 
measures. This may be due to the fact that enabling measures tend to 
cost money before any benefits in the form of shorter unemployment 
duration, better matches leading to higher wages and higher 
contributions can be reaped. Right now, this money is not readily (made) 
available due to budgetary restraints. Instead, coercive measures are 
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chosen, which also are costly, if one thinks about enforcement. Maybe 
the rewards are more visible if the individual has to pay back benefits 
and a fine on top of that while the costs are hidden? However, this 
emphasis on repression and duties rather than on prevention and 
enabling measures means that the whole system seems out of balance. 
Activation towards participation is definitely the main focus in all social 
security, but this is achieved via duties, responsibilisation of the 
individual and sanctions rather than by enabling measures. 
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Abstract 
 
Unemployment became a new social problem in Poland after the collapse of the 
socialist regime and the transition to the free market economy. The experiences gained 
by other free-market countries have proved that the effective fight against 
unemployment requires appropriate public policy in this regard. Since 1989 Polish 
labour law has undergone a number of significant changes. Most of them were 
introduced after Poland’s accession to the EU and were aimed at the better integration 
of unemployed people with the labour market. Although Poland was not severely hit 
by the results of the global economic crisis of 2008, it is emphasized that the economic 
recession was one of the main driving forces of the last legislative changes, especially 
those adopted in 2014. Despite significant improvements in this regard, changes 
aimed at making the labour market work better are still necessary. After the 
introduction and brief description of the existing protection against unfair dismissal, 
this study focuses on the mechanisms with regard to protection in case of unemployment 
– both insurance and activation. Taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of 
the system of protection against unemployment, the study is going to identify challenges 
that Poland still faces in this area.  
 
 
Summary: Introductory remarks. 1. Protection against unemployment: dismissal law. 2. 
Income protection for unemployed people. 2.1 Unemployment benefit. The right to 
benefit. Duration of benefit. Amount of benefit. Conditionality and activation duties. 
2.2 Social assistance benefits. 2.3 Additional benefits. 3. Activation measures. 3.1 
Professionally active people. 3.2 People at risk of unemployment. 3.3 Unemployed 
people. Individualized approach. Institutional dimension: public-private model of 
cooperation. 3.4 Active inclusion tools. Support by social assistance services. Support 
from public employment services. Institutional dimension: cooperation between 
agencies. 4. Conclusions.  
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Introductory remarks 
 
The process of political and economic transition which began in 1989 
played a decisive role for unemployment issues in Poland and in other 
so-called Eastern block countries. The pre-1989 socialist political system, 
based on the idea of full employment, did not at all allow for the 
existence of the phenomenon of unemployment, which was attributed 
only to the capitalist economy. As a result, at this time neither public 
employment services nor social assistance services existed in their 
current form.106 The already existing legislation against unfair dismissal 
remained with no practical significance. The application of the full 
employment policy resulted in considerable employment overgrowth, 
which over the time has led to the emergence of hidden unemployment 
phenomena. In these circumstances the transition to the free market 
economy was reflected in massive unemployment, which at the end of 
1990 covered the stunning level of more than one million people. 
Protection against unemployment has become, since that time, a highly 
debated issue, especially with regard to the existing differences in 
protection between different forms of employment that coexist in the 
labour market.  
The socioeconomic effects of unemployment forced the Polish 
government to address this problem, which was new for Polish reality. 
In these circumstances “the social policy system had to be created 
immediately and from scratch”.107 The experience gained by countries 
that already had a free market economy proved that the fight against 
unemployment requires appropriate public policy in this regard.108 As 
business practice shows, the free market mechanism could not itself 
effectively address the issue of unemployment, which, besides the grave 
                                                
106  D. Zalewski, (2005), Opieka i pomocspołeczna – dynamikainstytucji, [Socialassistance – 
Dynamics oftheinstitution], Warszawa, p. 108-109. 
107  S. Mandes, (2016), Activation policy in a fragmented welfare system: the case of Poland, in: 
Integrating Social and Employment Policies in Europe: Active Inclusion and 
Challenges for Local Welfare Governance, ed. Marin Heidenreich, D. Rice, UK, 
USA, p. 72. 
108  E. Staszewska, (2012), Środki prawne przeciwdzia ania bezrobociu, [Legal measures to 
tackle unemloyment], Wolters Kluwer. 
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economic effects, also causes far-reaching social consequences. The 
model of the social market economy as an economy that takes into 
account its social aspects, and that was accepted in the newly adopted 
Constitution from 1997 as the basis for an economic system in Poland 
(Article 20 of the Polish Constitution 109 ), constituted an additional 
justification for state intervention in this regard. In this model the 
economic system is based, not only on free market forces, freedom to 
conduct business activity and private ownership, but also and foremost 
on solidarity, dialogue and cooperation between the social partners, 
which all are pillars of the economy defined as “social”.110  
Shortly after the transition to the free market economy the key priority 
of the institutional reforms was to improve the functioning of the Polish 
labour market. At this time the role of the activation policy within 
employment and social policy was, however, secondary compared to the 
primary role that was then played by the social policy aimed at alleviation 
of the negative social effects of the transition, which was based on well 
developed and generous social security benefits.  The ability of 
individuals to adjust to the changing market needs was then naively 
believed in. 111  However, hard reality quickly changed this wrong 
approach when the level of unemployment gradually grew to its peak of 
above 16% in 1993 and 20% in the early 2000s. The negative effects of 
unemployment hit first and foremost fixed-term employees, who 
remained without protection compared to indefinite-term employees. 
Polish legislation has not addressed this problem, just as the emergence 
of the phenomena of the massive use of self-employment and civil law 
contracts as working arrangements has occurred.  
The accession to the European Union (EU) caused a decrease in the 
unemployment rate, which was not the result of the improvement of the 
situation in the labour market, but the strong mass emigration that 
Poland experienced at this time, due to the opening of the labour market 
                                                
109  Constitution of the Republic of Poland dated 2 April 1997, (Journal of Laws from 
1997, No 78, item 483). 
110  T. Liszcz, Pracaikapitał w KonstytucjiRzeczypospolitejPolskiej, [Labour and capital 
under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland], (2014) No 22, Studia Iiuridica 
Lublinensia, p. 259-260. 
111  S. Mandes, (2016), Acivation policy… p. 74. 
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of the “old EU Member states” for Polish citizens. At this time, Poland 
was faced with implementing objectives provided for in programming 
documents on employment issues, in particular in the Lisbon strategy.112 
On the basis of the flexicurity strategy, which provides for the adequate 
combination of effective active labour market policy and a modern social 
security system, the newly adopted Act on employment promotion and 
labour market institutions 113  completely restructured the system of 
support for individuals who fail to meet the challenges of the labour 
market. In comparison to the previous relevant legislation in this area, it 
is the current legal act that has been based on different, as previously, 
assumptions that may be seen from its title that puts emphasis on an 
active approach to labour market policy, and not only on the alleviation 
of the negative consequences of unemployment phenomena.114 As such, 
the Act on employment promotion fits in with the implementation of 
effective active labour market policy (ALMP) that helps people cope 
with rapid changes and reduces periods of unemployment and eases the 
transition to new jobs. Since this time, in Poland the activation policy 
was also implemented by the social assistance institutions, within the 
social assistance system, whose key principle is not only to provide 
support to those in a difficult situation in life, who are threatened with 
social exclusion in the form of redistributive measures (which, however, 
remains the primary objective of social assistance services under the Act 
on social assistance115), but also “to offer them help in social re-inclusion 
and in becoming socially independent, also in view of their professional 
integration and return to the labour market” in the form of activation 
                                                
112  See Lisbon strategy,  
 http://www.wrpo.wielkopolskie.pl/files/117372424745f59c57e9cb1/att1155.pdf 
(accessed on 13 April 2016) - here in after referred to as the Lisbon strategy. 
113  Act of 20 April 2004, (Journal of Laws from 2013, item 674 –hereinafter reffered to 
as the Act on employment promotion or the Act from 2004.  
114  Z. Góral, (2011), in: Ustawa o promocji zatrudnienia i instytucjach rynkupracy. 
Praktycznykomentarz,  
[Act on employment promotion and labour market institutions. Practical 
commentary], Z. Góral (ed.), Wolters Kluwer, Lex/el. 
115  Act on 12 March 2004 on social assistance, (Journal of Laws from 2004, No 64, 
item 593) – hereinafter referred to as the Act on social assistance. 
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policies.116 The legal basis for active forms of social assistance aimed at 
the activation of individuals of marginalized groups at the risk of social 
exclusion is provided for in the Act of 13 June 2003 on social 
employment.117 In this respect, the Act of 27 April 2006 on social co-
operatives118 is also of particular importance.  
Following a period of positive developments, which could be observed 
up to the end of 2008, Poland, like the rest of the Europe, had faced the 
challenge of the financial crisis. Although the effects of the crisis were 
relatively mild for Poland, the weakening economy led to  
a clear increase in the unemployment rate, which reaches a high of 
28.4%, including, especially, young people. Finally, in April 2013 
unemployment amounted to the level of 14%. Almost 35% of the 
unemployed remained out of work longer than 12 months, and most of 
them entered the so called “shadow economy”. The high unemployment 
rate was supported by such phenomena attributed to the Polish labour 
market as: low labour market participation of the young (under 30 years 
old) and older population (over 50 years old), especially women, low 
flow from economic inactivity to economic activity, high risk of women 
who decide to have a family leaving the labour market for a longer 
period of time, long-term unemployment, low labour and spatial 
mobility, deficits in terms of professional qualifications, increasing pace 
of ageing of the population, and low efficiency of the activity of public 
employment services. In the last one, and so far, the largest amendment 
of the Act on employment promotion from 2014,119 the legislator made 
                                                
116 Ż. Mecych,  E. Chylek, (2009), The Polish experience of active inclusion tools targeted to the 
most vulnerable groups – comments on Norwegian good practice of the National Qualification 
Programme, 
https://www.google.pl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja
&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwi04pfT9tHMAhXDiywKHf6jBi8QFggcMAA&url=http
%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fsocial%2FBlobServlet%3FdocId%3D8346%26lang
Id%3Den&usg=AFQjCNGMJ28MtzHyyw_yhX9lpQnLBksGYQ (accessed on 10 
May 2016), p. 5. 
117  Journal of Laws from 2003, No 122, item 1143 – hereinafter referred to as the Act 
on social employment. 
118  Journal of Laws from 2006, No 94, item 651 – hereinafter referred to as the Act on 
social co-operatives. 
119  The Act on Amending the Act on employment protection and labour market 
institutions– hereinafter referred to as the Act from 2014 r.  
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an attempt to address all those challenges. By maintaining the already 
existing shape of the regulations, based on the primacy of the active 
labour market programmes, a strong emphasis was then put on 
increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation of the public 
employment services, as well as on greater, as before, individualization of 
support for the most disadvantaged groups in the labour market.  
Despite significant improvements on the labour market that have been 
reported compared to 2014, changes are still necessary aimed at making 
the labour market work better.120 The challenges that face Poland in the 
field of employment and social policy that had been previously reported 
have not been properly addressed. These are, firstly, the low level of 
employment and relatively high level of unemployment, especially 
among younger and older workers, particularly women. The employment 
rate, at 68.4%, is one the lowest among OECD countries and below the 
EU average, despite an increase compared to 2014. The same is the case 
with the unemployment rate, at 7.1% in 2015, which indeed was back to 
the pre-crisis level, although it is still relatively high. The high 
unemployment among younger people is caused by the significant 
difficulties that they experience in entering into the labour market. A 
similar situation exists for older people, and is related to the mismatches 
between the professional qualifications of employees and the changing 
labour market needs, and leads to a situation where these people exit the 
labour market early by benefiting from early retirement. The lower 
participation level among women is mainly caused by difficulties in 
combining professional and family life, because of the weakly developed 
system of institutional care on the one hand, and also the insufficient 
number of measures that allow for better organization of working time 
that put more emphasis on the individual allocation of working time 
than only on its reduction. Secondly, low internal labour market mobility 
persists in regional differences in employment outcomes, which is 
impeded by the differences in employment prospects and cost of living 
among regions. Thirdly, labour market segmentation, due to the 
differences in the employment and income protection between particular 
                                                
120 OECD (2016), OECD Economic Surveys: Poland 2016, OECD Publishing. 
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categories of employed. Fourthly, the rapidly ageing population that 
Poland is experiencing at a greater and greater pace, compared to other 
European countries. 121  Fifth, imperfect functioning of the public 
employment services, due to the lack of human resources both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, serious coordination problems, and poor 
access to information at local level, and insufficient effectiveness of 
active labour market policies. 
 
1. Protection against unemployment: dismissal law 
 
The implementation of dismissal law, under existing regulations of the 
Polish Labour Code,122 leads to a strong labour market segmentation 
between employee who have a permanent, full time employment 
contract and the rest engaged on different working arrangements, 
especially fixed-term employees, the self-employed, and those on civil-
law contracts. The first and foremost problematic aspect of the dismissal 
law in Poland is the fact that it applies only to the employment regulated 
by the labour law provisions – an employment contract. It does not 
cover employment arrangements on the basis on self-employment and 
civil law contracts, which both are widespread in the Polish labour 
market. Moreover, although employment protection in the employment 
contract is not stringent, there is a significant differentiation with respect 
to ordinary termination by an employer of an indefinite-term and fixed-
term employment contract, and that is the second aspect of the Polish 
dismissal law that deserves our attention. As was mentioned before, the 
transition to a free market economy was not accompanied by changes in 
the regulation on protection against dismissal, which became even more 
flexible with regard to fixed-term employment contract compared to the 
rules that apply to indefinite-term employment contracts. Under existing 
regulations, which do not properly reflect the nature of temporary 
                                                
121 C. Żołędowski, Starzeniesięludności – Polska na tle Unii Europejskiej, [The ageing 
society – Poland and the European Union], (2012) Vol. 17, Problemy polity 
kispołecznej. Studiai Dyskusje, p. 38-39. 
122 Act of 26 June 1974 The Labour Code, (Journal of Laws from 1998, No. 21, item 93 
with subsequent amendments). 
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employment, a fixed-term employment contract may be terminated by 
an employer at any time, with no reason, under no control of trade 
unions, with only limited judicial control, and the right to relatively small 
compensation in cases of unlawful dismissal. Moreover, until 2015, the 
notice period for the termination of a fixed-term employment contract 
was fixed at 2 weeks, regardless of the length of the service of the 
dismissed employee. For these reasons, at the time moving towards 
greater flexibility in the labour market both temporary work 
arrangements, especially on the civil-law basis and self-employment (that 
is often bogus), are considered by employers as “attractive” alternatives 
to regular permanent and full-time employment contracts. As a result, 
besides self-employment and the civil law contract, fixed-term 
employment contract appears excessive in Poland. Currently, Poland has 
the highest share of fixed-term employment in the EU, and one of the 
highest among OECD countries. In 2015 fixed-term employment 
covered more than a quarter of all the employed (28,4%), which is 
characterized by a disproportionately higher proportion of young people 
(15-29) compared to other EU countries, especially labour market 
entrants and the low skilled, for whom fixed-term employment is not  
a voluntary choice.123 Temporary contracts are thus rarely a step towards 
permanent employment. The Polish government has not yet addressed 
this problem. The last legislative amendment from 2015124 only aligned 
the notice period for fixed-term and indefinite-term employment 
contracts, which currently in both cases depend on the length of the 
service of the employee, but has again not put any limitations on the 
ordinary termination of fixed-term employment contracts, leaving fixed-
term employees without any, even minimal, stabilization of their 
employment relationship, and so adding to the risk of the unjustified use 
of temporary employment. 
 
 
 
                                                
123 Eurostat (2014), Labour Force Survey, Luxembourg, European Communities. 
124  Act of dnia 31 August 2015 amending the Labour Law Act and amending certain 
acts (Journal of Laws from 2015, item. 1220). 
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2. Income protection for unemployed people 
 
Under the flexicurity strategy, the social security system, together with 
effective active labour market policies should provide for adequate 
income support, encourage employment and facilitate labour mobility. In 
this very sense the social security system in the case of unemployment 
should alleviate the adverse effects of unemployment, providing 
unemployed people with adequate income support, while not imposing 
negatively on the employment activity of individuals due to certain 
activation requirements of the unemployed. In Poland the right to social 
security, as a constitutional right, is guaranteed under Article 67(2) of the 
Polish Constitution. Unemployment is one of the risks that provides the 
right to certain social benefits in the form of compulsory insurance, 
social assistance and certain additional benefits.  
 
2.1 Unemployment benefit 
 
Unemployment benefit is the basic social security benefit under the Act 
on employment promotion. It has been designed as a universal benefit, 
financed from the Labour Fund, which is a State purpose fund at the 
disposal of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. The main sources 
of revenue of the Labour Fund are contributions paid by employers, 
which are deducted from employees’ remuneration, and additional 
financing is provided by EU-funded projects and budgetary donations.  
 
The right to benefit 
 
The right to unemployment benefit may be exercised by a person who is 
unemployed not of their own will in the absence of any other means of 
subsistence and registered in the labour office on further conditions 
specified by the law. The person who is unemployed of their own will, 
which means the termination of the employment relationship on their 
own initiative or by mutual agreement, or termination without notice 
within 6 months before registration in the labour office, would be 
temporarily deprived of the right to unemployment benefit. Due to the 
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priority of active forms of support over the passive measures, the person 
who is registered in the labour office receives unemployment benefit 
only when they have no job offer or other forms of support for their 
professional activation suited to them in the form of an internship, 
professional preparation of adults, training, intervention works or public 
works. Theoretically, no category of employed person is excluded from 
the unemployment benefit scheme. However, due to further strict 
eligibility rules on access to the unemployment benefit scheme certain 
categories of employed persons are in a less favourable position in this 
regard. This refers foremost to the second statutory condition that a 
person who applies for unemployment benefit must be employed 
directly before registration within at least 18 months for a total period of 
365 days for remuneration equivalent to at least the amount of the 
minimum wage. This significantly restricts the right to unemployment 
benefit for part-time workers, who usually receive pay that is lower than 
the minimum amount, and those employed under civil-law contracts, e.g. 
contracts of service that are not covered by the provisions on the 
minimum wage. Therefore, in practice these categories of employed may 
be excluded from the unemployment benefit scheme. Given the above, 
it is not surprising that in 2015 only 13.4 % of registered unemployed 
were entitled to unemployment benefit, much less than in other OECD 
countries. The differentiation as regards employment and income 
security which affect part-time workers and those employed on the basis 
on civil-law contracts significantly contributes to the segmentation of the 
Polish labour market, which appears to be one of the most problematic 
aspects of the use of those working arrangements. The existing legal 
regulations only partially address this problem with regard to 
unemployed persons who have already received unemployment benefit. 
According to the relevant regulations, if such  
a person takes up employment or any other kind of gainful activity, 
business activity or obtains income exceeding half of the minimum wage 
per month and/or for a period shorter than 365 days, they will not lose 
the right to unemployment benefit in the case of re-registration within 14 
days from the date of the termination of the abovementioned 
circumstances. In this case the legislator has rightly assumed that at the 
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time of re-registration it may not always be possible to demonstrate that 
all the conditions for the acquisition of the unemployment benefit 
referred to in law have been fulfilled, e.g. when the unemployed person 
worked in part-time work receiving a salary less than the minimum wage, 
which might significantly weaken the motivation for professional activity 
of unemployed persons even on a small scale. It has to be mentioned 
that with the aim to reducing labour market segmentation, in January 
2016 a draft was presented to introduce an hourly minimum wage of 12 
PLN (apox. 3 EURO) applying to the employed on civil law contracts 
that may facilitate access to unemployment benefit for this category of 
workers.  
 
Duration of benefit 
 
Due to the amendment from 2014 the right to unemployment benefit 
may be exercised from the first day of registration in the labour office, 
not as previously after the period of 7 days. The period of receiving 
unemployment benefit basically depends on the level of unemployment 
in the area of the poviat (county). It amounts to 180 days or 365 days for 
unemployed persons who are residing, respectively, in the area of the 
poviat where the rate of unemployment does not exceed 150% of the 
average national employment rate, or where the rate of unemployment 
exceeds 150% of the average national employment rate. The 
unemployed person is entitled to longer unemployment benefit even in 
the case of a change in their place of residence. This encourages low 
internal labour mobility, while the unemployment benefit system is more 
generous in high-unemployment regions. This is additionally supported 
by the level of the minimum wage, which is not differentiated across 
regions according to differences in the costs of living. However, the right 
to unemployment benefit for 365 days is granted in any event to: 
unemployed persons over 50 years old, with at least a 20-year period for 
entitlement to unemployment benefit; unemployed persons who support 
a child under 15, whose spouse is also unemployed and has lost the right 
to unemployment benefit; unemployed person who maintain single-
handedly at least one child under 15 years old. For this category of the 
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unemployed a longer period of eligibility may discourage their faster re-
employment, and that especially concern persons over 50 years old, who, 
as mentioned before, may be entitled to unemployment benefit in  
a higher amount.   
 
Amount of benefit 
 
The amount of unemployment benefit is not related to the minimum 
wage or the past remuneration of individuals. Unemployment benefit at 
the level of the so-called basic amount depends on the length of time for 
which the right to unemployment benefit may be exercised. Within the 
first 90 days a beneficiary is entitled to unemployment benefit in the 
amount of 823.60 PLN per month [around 196 Euro], while in the later 
days the unemployment benefit is in the amount of 646.70 PLN per 
month [around 153 Euro]. The amount of unemployment benefit, 
depending on the joint period of employment or other paid activity, is 
calculated at the level of: 80% of basic unemployment benefit in the case 
of persons with a total period of employment not exceeding 5 years; 
100% of basic unemployment benefit in the case of persons with a total 
period of employment between 5 and 20 years, and 120% of basic 
unemployment benefit in the case of persons with a total period of 
employment of at least 20 years. On the one hand, the lower level of 
unemployment benefit may encourage faster re-employment, but at the 
same time it involves greater risk of poverty during inactivity, especially 
within the category of the less educated young. On the other hand, the 
higher amount of benefit in combination with the longer duration of 
such support may result in the long-term unemployment of those who 
due to their age are already in a disadvantageous position in the labour 
market. In this regard Polish legal arrangements do not meet the 
standards set out in ILO Social Security Convention No 102125 and in the 
European Social Security Code of the Council of Europe from 1964,126 
under which unemployment benefit should compensate suspension of 
                                                
125  Adopted at the 35th ILC session on 28 June 1952. Entered into force on 27 April 
1955, www.ilo.org (accessed on 2 August 2016). 
126  Adopted in Strasbourg on 16 April 1964, www.coe.int (accessed on 2 August 2016). 
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earnings due to the inability to obtain suitable employment, and 
determined at the level of 45% of the beneficiary’s previous 
remuneration of a “typical” beneficiary – a man with a wife and two 
children. In the Protocol to the Code from 1964 this amount was 
determined at the level of 50%. According to ILO Convention No 168 
on Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment127 
the level of unemployment benefit, which is not based on the 
beneficiary’s previous remuneration, should amount to at least 50% of 
the minimum wage, or at the level that is necessary for the beneficiary’s 
basic expenses, depending on which one is higher. For a transitional 
period unemployment benefit may, however, be established at lower 
levels, but no more than 45% of the beneficiary’s previous remuneration 
or 45% of the minimum wage or the wage of a “typical” employee, but 
no less than at the level that is necessary for his/her basic expenses. In 
2016 in Poland the minimum wage is 1850 PLN gross, and thus the 
threshold mentioned has been not met. Since that time Poland has not 
ratified either the European Social Security Code or ILO Convention No 
168. ILO Convention No 102 has been partial ratified, but without the 
above-mentioned provisions concerning unemployment benefit.  
 
Conditionality and activation duties 
 
Both the unemployment status and unemployment benefit payments are 
conditional on some job-seeking behaviour of unemployed person, 
which are “passive” rather than “active”. It does not go beyond the duty 
of the unemployed person to be ready to accept certain activation 
measures taken by the labour office, nor the real self-active job search of 
the unemployed person under effective monitoring of the public 
employment service. 128  Among the duties a primary one is  
a duty to accept a suitable job offer from a labour office. The law 
                                                
127 Adopted on 75th ILC session on 21 June 1988. Entered into force on 17 October 
1991, www.ilo.org (accessed on 2 August 2016). 
128  D. Venn, (2012), Eligibility Criteria for Unemployment Benefits: Quantitative Indicators for 
OECD and EU countries, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working 
Papers, No 131, OECD Publishing. 
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provides for a relatively broad definition of ‘suitable job’ that is 
determined by four conditions: qualification, health, geography and 
income. Under these conditions a suitable job is defined as employment 
or other gainful work, subject to social insurance, and for the 
performance of which the unemployed person has sufficient 
qualifications or occupational experience, or which the unemployed 
person can perform after prior training or apprenticeship for adults; the 
health condition of the unemployed allows him/her to perform it, and 
the total time of commuting to the place of work and back by public 
transport does not exceed 3 hours, and for the performance of which the 
unemployed person collects monthly gross remuneration in the amount 
of at least the minimum remuneration for work calculated as the full-
time equivalent. The broad definition of a suitable job facilitates the 
rejection by the unemployed person of a job offer from a labour office. 
This especially concerns the geographical condition that still exists even 
though the law already provides for certain forms of mobility allowances 
for an unemployed person who decides to take a job outside the place of 
his/her permanent residence. Moreover, the qualification condition is 
not sufficiently enforced in practice as the labour office usually does not 
refer an unemployed person to jobs for which they are overqualified. 
The refusal without a justified reason of a job offer or proposal of any 
kind of support from a labour office is subject to a relatively mild 
sanction, which is only temporary suspension of the unemployed status 
and/or a reduction of unemployment benefit. This significantly 
contributes to the perception of unemployment benefit as a substitute 
for remuneration, especially by low-earners. The law provides for certain 
instruments as income compensation for unemployment benefit which 
are designed to encourage unemployed people to engage in professional 
activity. These are activation allowance, in the amount of 50% of basic 
unemployment benefit, if they undertake part-time employment with a 
wage lower than the minimum wage, as a result of a referral by the local 
labour office or in the case of re-employment on their own initiative, and 
other cash benefits that an unemployed person receives in return for 
undertaking particular forms of activation provided for by the labour 
office, which are internships, professional preparation of adults, or on-
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the-job training, in the amount of 120% of basic unemployment benefit, 
as well as in the case of continuation of education in secondary school or 
in a high school in the amount of 100% of basic unemployment benefit, 
including post-graduate studies in the amount of 20% of basic 
unemployment benefit. However, as existing studies show that in the 
cases where the amount of the cash benefit is lower than unemployment 
benefit, the unemployed postpone the decision to actively search for a 
job to the end of their benefit entitlement period. 
 
2.2 Social assistance  
 
Unemployment is one of the reasons for social assistance benefits due to 
the provisions of the Act on social assistance. As was mentioned before, 
the key principle of the social assistance system in Poland is to provide 
support to those in a difficult situation in life, and to offer them help in 
social re-inclusion and in becoming socially independent, also in view of 
their professional integration and return to the labour market”. 129 
Therefore, the social assistance benefits are not of a universal character 
and are limited to persons and families without sufficient income, i.e. 
lower than the legal income criterion. A person who is unemployed is 
eligible to cash benefits in the form of temporary benefit for a period 
that in any single case is determined by the social assistance centre. The 
amount of a temporary benefit is stated as up to the difference between 
the income criterion and the personal income. However, according to 
the provisions of the Act on social assistance, the level of the single 
benefit cannot be lower than 50% of the difference between the income 
criterion and the person’s income. The amount of the temporary benefit 
cannot be lower than 20 PLN [5 Euro] by month. With regard to an 
unemployed person who is running a household alone, their personal 
income may not exceed 461 PLN [round 109 Euro] per month. That in 
practice excludes persons who at the same time receive unemployment 
benefit, who as a result may be more interested in re-employment. For a 
person in a family the income per person may not exceed 316 PLN 
                                                
129Ż. Mecych,  E. Chylek (2009), Polish experience…, p. 5. 
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[around 75 Euro] per month, which automatically does not exclude a 
person who also receives unemployment benefit, for whom, by contrast, 
temporary benefit together with unemployment benefit may encourage 
inactivity and result in long-term unemployment. The risk of long-term 
unemployment among social benefit recipients increases the lack of any 
active job-search requirements. This is due to the fact that social 
assistance services are not primarily oriented towards an active inclusion 
approach, but instead on securing the biological needs of recipients. 
Therefore, unemployed persons who apply for social assistance services 
have no job-search duties. 
 
2.3 Additional benefits 
 
Within additional benefits, unemployed persons and the members of 
their family have a right to sickness insurance. 130  Moreover, an 
unemployed person during the period of unemployment benefit is 
covered by pension and disability pension insurance.131 The coverage by 
sickness insurance, but not real willingness for professional activation, 
many times remains a major reason for registration in the poviat labour 
office. That situation significantly weakens the effectiveness of public 
employment services, while the support provided is not always addressed 
to people who are really interested in employment. Due to the fact that 
this type of service entails a lot of extra work for the poviat labour office 
staff, separation between the unemployed status and the right to sickness 
insurance has long been called for, through the transfer of power to 
decide on the coverage of unemployed person by sickness insurance 
from labour offices to social security institutions.  
 
 
 
                                                
130  Article 66(24) publicznych of the Act of 27 August 2004 on health services financed 
through public funds, (Journal of Laws from 2004, No 210, item 2135 as 
amendment). 
131  Article 6(1) point 9 of the Act of 13 October 1998 on social security system 
(Journal of Laws from 1998, No 137, item 887 as amendment).  
59 
 
3. Activation measures 
 
Active labour market policies reflect two dimensions of the 
constitutional right to work which are: a full and productive employment 
policy and support for unemployed persons (Article 65 of the Polish 
Constitution). The first scope of this right covers the labour market 
policy aimed at planning tasks, while its second aspect applies to the 
provisions on active measures to combat unemployment that are aimed 
at inhibiting the rise in unemployment and increasing employment. In 
this very sense active labour market policies are based on different forms 
of support that are aimed at enhancing the spatial and occupational 
mobility of the unemployed, encouraging employers to hire them, as well 
as to support the creation of new jobs and the maintenance of already 
existing ones.132  
 
3.1 Professionally active people 
 
Active labour market policies are dedicated not only to unemployed 
people, but also - to some extent - to professionally active people, 
including those who are at risk of unemployment. In this regard special 
attention has to be paid to the preventive function of job matching and 
occupational guidance, where the first one involves informing employers 
about expected changes in the labour market, while the second one is 
aimed at the professional development of employers and their 
employees. The application of these labour market services may allow 
employers and employees to take appropriate actions in order to be 
better prepared for changes in the situation in the labour market. In this 
regard, the training of employees is of particular significance as it 
enhances their employability, and strengthens the company’s potential 
                                                
132  J. Wratny, [in:] M. Kabaj, G. Uścińska, J. Wratny, (2007), Metody i mechanism 
yograniczania bezrobocia oraz realizacja zadań władz publicznych w zakresie prawa do pracy i 
zabezpieczenias połecznego bezrobotnych, [The methods and unemployment limiting 
mechanisms and the implementation of tasks of public authorities related to labour 
law and social security of unemployed], Eksperyzadla Rzecznika Praw 
Obywatelskich, Warszawa, p. 23. 
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and job protection. 133  For this purpose the law provides for the 
possibility of co-financing, in the amount of 80% of the total costs, of 
training of employees from a special public fund – the National  Public 
Training Fund (KFS), which was created by the Amendment from 2014. 
The previously existing financing mechanism based on  
a company training fund which could have been established by 
employers proved to be ineffective in this respect.  
 
3.2 People at risk of unemployment 
 
For employees at risk, unemployment training, aimed at adjusting the 
qualifications already acquired or gaining new ones, may also be 
implemented in order to facilitate their transition to new employment. 
Apart from that, this category could also be assisted with other labour 
market services and instruments tailored to them, aimed at their swift 
professional activation. These could be implemented through the 
mechanism of monitoring dismissals. This institution, inspired by the 
outplacement known in some European countries, is defined by the law 
as the termination of the employment relationship for reasons related to 
the employer, in connection with which labour market services are 
provided for employees during the notice period, or at the risk of 
termination of the employment relationship. It is therefore an institution 
of a preventive character, whose fundamental objective is to cover 
employees who are dismissed or who are at a risk of dismissal, with 
assistance in labour market participation to facilitate their re-
employment. In this respect the institution of monitoring dismissals to 
some extent fills a gap which occurs in the act on collective dismissals,134 
which in that case does not provide for cooperation between employers 
and public employment services in activities enabling the quick re-
                                                
133  E. Bielak-Jomaa, (2011), Ustawa o promocji zatrudnienia i instytucjach rynkupracy. 
Praktyczny komentarz, [Act on employment protection and labour market institutions. 
Practical commentary], Z. Góral (ed.), Lex, commentary to Article 67, thesis 2. 
134 The Act of 13 March 2003 on specific rules regarding the termination of 
employment relationships for reasons beyond the employees’ control, (Journal of 
Laws from 2015, item 192). 
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employment of dismissed employees.135 The monitoring of dismissals 
occurs when an employer intends to dismiss at least 50 employees within 
the period of 3 months. In this case an employer has a duty to agree with 
the poviat labour office on the type of support for dismissing disabled 
employees, which may involve training. Previously, the Act provided for 
a higher level of the number of employees for which the institution of 
monitoring dismissals was applicable, which amounted to 100 dismissed 
employees. A reduction in the number of employees dismissed was made 
by the amendment of 2007,136 which was argued by the necessity to 
adjust that institution to the situation in the labour market and its 
dissemination. This change was welcomed by the social partners. With 
regard to employees to be made redundant, at the time of termination or 
within a period of 6 months after the termination of their employment 
relationship an employer has a duty to provide access to the labour 
market services that are implemented in the form of a programme, in 
particular with regard to job matching, vocational guidance and training. 
An employer, in consultation with the poviat labour office, can also offer 
to those employees other labour market services that are adjusted to the 
local labour market. Depending on the offered labour market services, 
the programme may be implemented by the poviat labour office, an 
employment agency or a training agency. Basically, the programme is 
financed by an employer. However, subject to the type of programme, 
the law provides that it can also be financed by an employer and the 
relevant public administration units, as well as "on the basis of an 
agreement of organization and legal entities with an employer”. If the 
programme provides for the participation of an employee in training, the 
employer, at the employee’s request, may provide him/her with a 
training benefit, which he/she shall then be entitled to after the 
termination of the employment relationship for a duration of  
the training, but for no more than a period of 6 months in the amount 
equivalent to the remuneration of an employee, but no more than 200% 
                                                
135  E. Bielak-Jomaa (2011), Ustawa o promocji…, Z. Góral (ed.).  
136 The Act of 25 September 2007 amending the act on employment promotion and 
labour market institutions and certain other acts, (Journal of Laws from 2007, No 
176, item 1243). 
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of the minimum wage. During the period of training benefit the 
dismissed employee is also entitled to support with regard to vocational 
guidance provided by the poviat labour office. An employee may also be 
delegated to one-time training that is organized and financed by the 
poviat labour office, in accordance with principles specified by law. If the 
right to training benefit is granted to an employee by an employer, the 
labour office refunds the employer’s social security contributions. 
 
3.3 Unemployed people 
 
With regard to unemployed persons, job matching is a basic form of 
support. Occupational guidance, training and other instruments of the 
labour market are only applied where it is not possible to ensure them a 
suitable job. In this regard instruments that enhance the occupational 
mobility of unemployed people and facilitate their quick re-employment 
have special importance. These are training, intervention works, 
internships, socially useful work and public work. Among them training 
aimed at enhancing new qualifications or the development of existing 
ones that may protect unemployed persons against long-term 
unemployment have special importance. From this point of view 
internship also seems to be significant, which allows gaining new 
experience and allows the unemployed, especially the young, to enter the 
labour market, even if after the period of support the employer does not 
decide to continue the employment. The training may be effectively 
connected with intervention works, socially useful work and public work 
as it enhances the opportunities of the unemployed to find a permanent 
job. The effectiveness of training increases when it responds to the 
needs of the local labour market and when it is adjusted to the needs of a 
relevant beneficiary. From this perspective special attention should be 
paid to the practical aspect of the training and the possibilities which 
entails the involvement of potential employers in such training which 
identifies their needs with regard to professional qualifications and 
undertakes to employ an unemployed person after the end of the 
training. Such option introduced through the Amendment from 2014 
may significantly contribute to the effectiveness of training. The law also 
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provides for a loan on preferential terms for financing the cost of 
training, which may be applied individually by an unemployed person, 
and a new instrument in the form of a training voucher that may be 
given to an unemployed person under 30 years old as a guarantee of 
referring them to particular training and financing its costs. Apart from 
occupational mobility several instruments that may enhance the spatial 
mobility of an unemployed person in the case of the necessary to take a 
job outside the place of his/her permanent residence are available, which 
include: financing the costs of travelling to an employer or the place 
where the internship, professional training or occupational guidance are 
performed; financing the costs of accommodation in the work place of a 
person who has been employed or who started an internship or 
professional training, and an accommodation voucher for unemployed 
people under 30 years old. The introduction of all these instruments 
become a step towards addressing the obstacle of the relocation of 
unemployed persons that impeded internal labour mobility, as was 
mentioned before, but were not, however, supported by the change in 
the definition of “suitable job”. The law provides for a number of 
instruments that are aimed at encouraging employers to hire unemployed 
persons and the creation of new jobs. These are various forms of 
subsidized employment. The Amendment from 2014 also introduced a 
new one, which is a loan to an employer for financing a new job 
position, and a few additional instruments addressed at increasing the 
employment of young persons under 30 years old, people who have 
difficulties with re-entering the labour market, long-term unemployed 
persons who benefit from social assistance services, and people over 50 
years old. The controversy over these instruments, which entail concrete 
financial support for the employer, relates to the question of their real 
long-term effectiveness. It is emphasized that subsidies increases the risk 
of treatment by employers of such workers as a cheap labour force, and 
lack of willingness to continue employment after the end of public 
support. Therefore, these instruments should be applied carefully to an 
appropriate person.  
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Individualized approach 
 
With the aim of more effective active measures to combat 
unemployment, the amendment from 2014 introduced new rules on the 
application of labour market instruments towards its greater than 
previously flexibility and individualization according to the needs of  
a particular unemployed person. First and foremost, this has resulted in 
the elimination of the previously existing category of additional labour 
market instruments that were addressed exclusively to the group of 
unemployed who need additional support because of their weaker 
starting position in the labour market influenced by such factors as age, 
sex, qualifications, educational level or family situations. The favourable 
treatment of this category of unemployed under previous legislation lead 
to the situation where this category covered almost 90% of registered 
unemployed people, while the low effectiveness of support for people 
not fitting into any of these groups has been recognized.137 By holding 
the view that some persons, due to their disadvantageous position, 
should be given priority, the legislator, based on available statistics, 
redefined a category of people whose situation in the labour market is 
special”, and that now includes unemployed persons: under 30 years old; 
above 50 years old; who benefit from social assistance; who maintain 
single-handedly at least one child under 6 years older at least one 
disabled child under 18 years old, and addressed them only with a 
preference in access to special programmes that are aimed at the 
maintenance of a job or the swift re-employment of a person who is at 
risk of unemployment or is already unemployed. Special programmes 
include a specially designed set of actions that involve services and 
instruments of the labour market aimed at adjusting the qualifications 
already acquired or gaining new qualifications and professional skills, and 
                                                
137  E. Flaszyńska (ed.), L. Antkowiak, (2015), Dialog na regionalnym rynku pracy. Przegld i 
analiza moliwych rozwiza w kontekcie znowelizowanej ustawy o promocji zatrudnienia i 
instytucjach rynku pracy [Dialogue on regional labour market. Review and analysis of 
possible solutions in the view of amended Act on employment promotion and 
labour market institutions],   
 http://www.dolnoslascypracodawcy.pl/upload/upload/Ekspertyza_dialog_na_regi
onalnym_rynku_pracy.pdf (accessed on 9 April 2016), p. 49. 
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supporting jobs threatened with liquidation, or existing and newly 
created jobs. The possibility to implement a special programme in 
cooperation with the employer may significantly improve its 
effectiveness.  
The “universalisation" in the application of the labour market 
instruments was accompanied by the institution of the profiling of 
assistance for unemployed persons. The profiling of assistance is 
implemented immediately after the registration of unemployed person in 
the labour office with the aim of determining and adopting the relevant 
forms of support for the individual needs of that person, and which may 
be applied within particular profiles. Consent for the profiling of 
assistance has been recognized as one of the “activation” duties of an 
unemployed person, sanctioned by the temporary revocation of the 
status of unemployed and related forms of public support. The law 
provides for three profiles of assistance that are based on the degree of 
alienation of the unemployed person from the labour market and his/her 
readiness to enter or reintegrate into the labour market. Profile I 
addresses active persons that need only job matching, and only 
exceptionally may require other certain forms of support, in particular 
vocational guidance or training. Profile II is directed toward persons that 
are not managing well with individual job searching, and who need 
support in this regard. For these categories of the unemployed most of 
the forms of support may be implemented, except actions within the 
Activation and Integration Programme. Profile III, which is dedicated to 
unemployed persons who are furthest from the labour market and 
therefore at risk of social exclusion, those who remain inactive towards 
the transition to employment, and those who compose the “grey area” 
of  the labour market. This profile covers unemployed people who are at 
the same time recipients of social assistance for whom the Activation 
and Integration Programme may be implemented, aimed at their 
professional activation and social inclusion. The process of profiling is 
based on a hard profiling method through a standardized questionnaire 
consisting of 24 closed questions processed by a specially designed 
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system.138 Doubts arise over the accuracy of such a profiling technique 
that to a great extent is based on the generalization and categorization of 
unemployed persons, and does not take into account the specific life 
circumstances of a person concerned. The risk of simplifications and 
inappropriate forms of support that it entails is not balanced by the 
possibility of the labour office employee changing the profile generated 
by the system through the mechanism of soft profiling adopted 
simultaneously. As practice shows, labour office employees relatively 
rarely decide to determine a different profile, which as a consequence 
significantly alleviates the individualization of assistance. These concerns 
particularly relate to young persons under 30 years old, people who have 
difficulties with re-entering the labour market, long-term unemployed 
persons who benefit from social assistance services, and people over 50 
years old who address the number of additional labour market 
instruments for their professional activation. Belonging to one of these 
groups does not automatically create a condition for obtaining 
instruments addressed to them, which is definitely dependent upon its 
qualification to the relevant profile.139 Moreover, in the case of a change 
in the circumstances relevant for profiling there is no legal obligation for 
the labour office to provide an unemployed person with a new profile of 
assistance, which then reduces the effectiveness of support, and that 
does not address the real needs of the person concerned. Profiling of 
assistance is followed by the preparation for the unemployed person of 
their individual action plan, which is an individual programme of job-
search assistance, tailored to the assistance profile and established with 
the involvement of the unemployed person. Within an individual action 
plan, there would be determined a set of measures that are possible to 
implement by the labour office, and those for their own implementation 
by the unemployed person, including deadlines set for the completion of 
                                                
138  The questionnaire is provided for in the Regulation of the Minister of Labour and 
Social Policy of 14 May 2014 on assistance profiling for the unemployed, (Journal 
of  Laws from 2014 r., item 631). 
139  See also A. Drabek, Ł. Ciołkiewicz, (2015), Bezrobotni do 30 roku życia jako nowa grupa 
szczególnego ryzyka na rynkupracy, [Unemployed persons under 30 years old as a new 
special risk group in the labour market], Zeszyty Naukowe Politechniki Łódzkiej Nr 
1196. Organizacja i Zarządzania, p. 21. 
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a particular task. The final effect of such support should be finding 
appropriate employment within the period of time indicated in law. This 
might be impeded by the lack of legal obligation for the flexible 
modification of the scope of support due to the changing situation of the 
unemployed person and the weak mechanism of control over the 
effective implementation of actions to be implemented within the plan. 
A sanction, in the form of a temporary depriving of the unemployed 
status, is applied only in the event of the interruption of the 
implementation of an individual action plan. The greater 
individualization of support addressing the unemployed person, and 
improvement of the effectiveness and professionalization of the activity 
of the poviat labour offices were also the objectives of the new institution 
of ‘customer advisor’. The customer advisor is an employee of the poviat 
labour office, who would be in charge of the unemployed person during 
the whole time of their job search process, from profiling, the 
preparation of an individual action plan, and the control over its 
implementation, as well as providing the unemployed person with all the 
other forms of support available. Similar to that model, the activity of 
public employment services in relation to institutional customers was 
organized. For this purpose, every employer who benefits from the 
services and instruments of the labour market will continually cooperate 
with the institutional customer advisor, who in particular will be 
responsible for determining the demand for a new employee and 
acquisition of employment offers, as well as facilitating access to the 
other forms of support determined by law. 
 
Institutional dimension: public-private model of cooperation 
 
Due to the process of Europeanization, employment services were based 
on the public-private model of cooperation of different labour market 
actors who fulfil tasks which so far were under the monopoly of the 
State. 140  In this model the implementation of activities within 
employment services may also be entrusted to private institutions of 
                                                
140  M. Szylko-Skoczny, (2006), Zwrot w polityce…, p. 1. 
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varying character and responsibilities, in particular non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), as well as employment agencies or training 
institutions, as separate labour market institutions. The model of 
cooperation adopted by the Polish legislator responds to the challenges 
of the modern labour market, and are related to its greater flexibility and 
the need to take integrated, multidimensional actions in this field, with 
the involvement of institutions operating at different levels. The 
experiences of other European countries show that the privatization of 
public tasks is a good and effective means of fostering not always 
sufficient public services.141 Training remained activities that are the most 
likely to be the subject of contractualization (almost 80% of all 
partnerships), especially for NGOs within the framework of ESF-funded 
programmes. As a key area of concern within a partnership with training 
institutions, the public money that it entails is considered a waste. Many 
times, the organizers, catering companies, etc. and not the unemployed, 
are the de facto beneficiaries of financial support. The Amendment from 
2014 opened up a new option for strengthening cooperation between 
public and non-public labour market institutions. It introduced the 
possibility of outsourcing activation services by public employment 
services to employment agencies, addressed to the long-term 
unemployed, including those covered by assistance profiles II or III. The 
remuneration of the employment agency shall be dependent on the 
effectiveness of activation, which is aimed at bringing an unemployed 
person to employment and maintaining them in employment for an 
indicated period of time. Apart from the benefits resulting from the 
outsourcing activities, it at the same time also entails the risk of fraud 
concerning public money. Moreover, a question arises over the real 
willingness of public employment services to cooperate with 
employment agencies, whose activity (if successful) could be perceived as 
a threat to their position with regard to job placement.  
 
 
 
                                                
141  Z. Góral (2011), Ustawa o promocji… 
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3.4 Active inclusion tools 
 
Active inclusion tools consist of measures aimed at the activation of the 
most vulnerable groups who are the furthest from the labour market and 
therefore at a risk of social exclusion. These people, due to their 
disadvantageous starting position in the labour market, need  
special treatment in order to fulfil their professional and social re-
integration aimed at reviving their capacity to fully participate in society 
and to take up employment. It is emphasized that initiatives for 
professional activation of social assistance clients represent an essential 
step towards the development of social assistance institutions in 
Poland.142 The concept of active social policy comprises eliminating 
social assistance based on mechanical social transfers, in favour of 
assistance which is focused on the professional activity of inactive 
beneficiaries who are at risk of social exclusion.143  
 
Support by social assistance services 
 
Active inclusion tools implemented by social assistance services are 
addressed to unemployed people who are at greater risk of social 
exclusion than persons in a special situation in the labour market under 
the Act on employment promotion. 144  This category includes, in 
particular: long-term unemployed persons, persons with disabilities, 
homeless persons, those addicted to alcohol or drugs, the mentally ill, 
persons released from prison, those facing particular difficulties with 
social integration, and refugees. The activities especially include the 
institution of social employment under the Act on social employment,145 
                                                
142  J. Krzyszkowski, M. Skrzyński, Ł. Kutyło, (2007), Twojaszansa. Analziaefektywności 
form wsparciadlaosóbzagrożonychwykluczeniemspołecznym, [Yourchance. The analysis of the 
efficiencies of the forms of support for people at risk of social exclusion], Łodź, p. 
32. 
143  Ibidem, p. 33-34. 
144  R. Szarfenberg, (2006), Aktywnapolitykaspołeczna,  
 [Active social policy], http://rszarf.ips.uw.edu.pl/pdf/APS.pdf 
 (accessed on 10 May 2016), p. 12. 
145 Ż. Mecych,  E. Chylek (2009), Polish experience…, p. 6. 
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which consists in ensuring the possibility to participate in activities 
conducted by specially developed institutions - Social Integration 
Centres (CIS) and Social Integration Clubs (KIS), or within supported 
employment. The CIS and KIS provide for its participants complex 
support, and are aimed at professional and social integration for the 
purpose of “recovery and maintenance” - in the first case -  of their 
ability to participate in the local community and fulfil their social roles in 
the place of employment or residence” – and in the second case - of 
their capacity to work independently”. The implementation of the 
actions within CIS is made on the basis of the individual programme of 
social employment that is signed by a participant. The objectives within 
CIS are pursued by means of the following labour market services: a) 
providing practical skills in order to fulfil social roles and to achieve 
social status; b) the acquisition of new professional skills, and 
apprenticeships, requalification or improvement of professional 
qualifications; c) learning how to plan one’s life and to meet one’s needs, 
in particular through the opportunity to achieve one’s own income by 
employment or business activity; d) education on the ability to manage 
financial resources, while within the activity of KIS the following forms 
are carried out through: a) actions taken to find a job or preparation for 
starting employment or undertaking activity in the form of a social 
cooperative; b) useful social work; c) public works; d) legal advice; e) 
self-help activities in finding employment, housing and social services; f) 
internships subject to the regulations on the Act on employment 
promotion. The audit carried out by the Polish Supreme Chamber of 
Control (NIK) that covered the years of 2011-2013 revealed the rather 
low effectiveness of activities within CIS and KIS with regard to the 
number of participants that become professionally and socially 
independent after this form of support. This is mostly attributed to the 
lack of adjustment of social employment to the participants, training in 
occupations already sufficiently covered by the local labour market, and 
lack of developed follow-up actions.146 The activities covered by the 
                                                
146 NIK (2013), Zatrudnienie socjaln jako instrument działań na rzecz rozwiązywania trudnej 
sytuacj iżyciowej oraz wzmocnienia aktywności osób zagrożonych wykluczeniem społecznym, 
[Social employment as an instrument of support for solving difficult life situations 
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scope of the supported employment may be described as social 
employment sensustricte. 147  The supported employment may be 
implemented through: a) social useful work; b) work for an employer or 
in the Social Integration Centre on the basis of delegation from the poviat 
labour Office; c) vocational, psychological or social guidance for those 
who take up employment, useful social work, business activity, or 
establish or join a social cooperative. The supported employment is 
implemented on the basis on an individual social employment 
programme or social contract. The latter is a kind of agreement with the 
social assistance seeker, specifying the rights and duties of the parties – 
the beneficiary and the Social Assistance Centre, within joint actions 
aimed at counteracting the difficult life position of that person and/or 
his/her family. The aim of the social contract is to mobilize the social 
assistance beneficiary to undertake economic activity. The use of the 
individual social employment programme or social contract ensure an 
individual approach to the social assistance services adjusted to the 
specific needs of every single beneficiary. However, unlike the Individual 
Action Plan, signing the social contract is mandatory. The controversy 
over supported employment refers to its effectiveness, which is the 
regaining by recipients of the capacity to be fully integrated into the 
labour market. It is emphasized that social employment preserves the 
stereotypes among employers, who consider social assistance 
beneficiaries as a “second category” of workers and are not interested in 
their employment after the end of the public support.148 The report of 
the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) indicated the following shortcomings 
with regard to the social contract: wrong choice of aims set out in the 
contract, as well as the ways to achieve them; organization of training in 
professions that are not in demand in the local labour market; 
                                                                                                              
and improving the activity of people at risk of social exclusion], www.nik.gov.pl, 
(accessed on 10 August 2016). 
147  Ibidem, p. 12. 
148 M. Rymsza, (2008), Aktywna polityka społeczna w Polsce. Szanse i ograniczenia 
upowszechniania koncepcji, [Active social policy in Poland. The opportunities and 
limitations for dissemination of concept], in: Polityka aktywizacji w Polsce. Nowy 
paradygmat zmiany społecznej, [Polish activation policy. New paradigm of social 
change], H. Kaszyński, A. Karwacki (ed.), Toruń, p. 54. 
72 
 
insufficient support in the area of activation measures and bias towards 
the passive tools, such as the payment of cash benefits, while active 
measures such as internships, socially useful work and public work 
covered only 12% of the resources utilised in the contract, and 
supporting activities (psychological counselling, support groups etc.) 
covered 7% of resources; insufficient legal provisions for the 
enforcement of the contract.  Given the individual situation of the 
clients, in particular their family status, benefits are frequently delivered 
even if the conditions of the contract are not fulfilled.149  
 
Support from public employment services 
 
Unemployed people benefiting from social assistance services has been, 
at the same time, recognized under the Act on employment promotion 
as a risk factor that justifies the treatment of such a category of the 
unemployed as those “whose situation in the labour market is special”. 
For this category of unemployed persons, being qualified by the labour 
office or III profile of assistance, actions may be implemented related to 
their professional activation and social inclusion within the Activation 
and Integration Programme (AIP), which was introduced by the 
Amendment from 2014. This programme, which involves a mix of 
instruments, is aimed at keeping an unemployed person who benefits 
from social assistance in contact with the labour market in order to 
minimize the practice of long-lasting social assistance financial support 
without any professional activation, and to improve their transition from 
inactivity to professional activity. The law opens an option to implement 
this programme in cooperation with social assistance services. After the 
end of the programme an unemployed person may be delegated to 
supported employment or to employment in social co-operatives, or be 
provided with appropriate forms of support from public employment 
services.  
 
 
                                                
149 European Commission (2015), ESPN Thematic Report on integrated support for the long-
term unemployed. Poland, p. 13-14.  
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Institutional dimension: cooperation between agencies 
 
It appears from the above that, in many areas, the activities of 
employment and social assistance institutions focus on support for the 
same individuals, who as unemployed are at the same time the recipients 
of social assistance.150 The effectiveness of actions within active inclusion 
tools, which involve both vocational and social activation, therefore 
needs the close cooperation of public employment services and social 
assistance services. According to the OECD, it requires the creation of a 
one-stop shop approach to the activation of the unemployed, which 
under the existing regulatory structure is rather difficult, if not 
impossible. The tasks within active inclusion tools are implemented at 
various levels: the municipal level within the Gmina (Municipal) Social 
Assistance Centres (Gminne Ośrodki Pomocy Społecznej) and district within 
the poviat labour office (Powiatowe Urzędypracy). Both systems of support – 
employment and social security – at national level are supervised by the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, but at local level they are 
independent of each other, and in practice do not cooperate closely.151 
Among the obstacles towards coordination between employment and 
social assistance services there are indicated no general rules for the 
exchange of data on their clients and no non-legislative mechanism 
supporting the development of such coordination, for example in the 
form of the promotion of best practices. The insufficient cooperation 
between public employment services and social assistance services 
reduces the effectiveness of the vocational aspects of social employment 
as it leads to the shortcomings that have been indicated by the Polish 
Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
150 B. Piotrowski, K. Sztandar-Sztanderska, M. Zielińska, (2008), Powiatowyurząd…,p. 18. 
151 Ibidem, p. 76, 78. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
When we look at the system of the protection in the case of 
unemployment in Poland as a whole, one may agree that there are a 
several pending issues that are still “waiting for” resolution in this regard.  
At the first line the changes should start with the segmented labour 
market in which certain categories of workers (self-employed, civil-law 
contract workers, fixed-term workers) are pushed out of the protection 
of employment. In the ongoing race to achieve better economic results, 
workers who have a permanent employment contract and are the most 
protected in case of dismissals, usually win over the rest on different 
working arrangements, who lack such protection, and are the first ones 
who suffer the consequences of economic fluctuations. This requires an 
effective fight with the abuses in the use of self-employment and civil-
law contracts, and changes in dismissal law that should not be 
discriminatory for fixed-term employees.  
The already existing preventive role of job placement and vocational 
guidance should be strengthened. Comprehensive information about 
expected changes in the local labour market and - related to this - 
professional development opportunities may help avoid dismissals and 
facilitate employees in the transition to a new job within the same 
employer or another employer. In this regard, what seems to be 
important is to enhance the position of company- based vocational 
training of employees.  
The construction of the system of social insurance, addressed to the 
unemployed, should be changed. The eligibility rules with regard to 
access to unemployment benefit should be less rigid in order to make 
this benefit more open and equal for all categories of workers. Health-
insurance has to be disconnected from registration as “unemployed”. 
With the aim of improving the spatial mobility of the unemployed and 
stimulating the initiative for their re-employment, unemployment benefit 
should be related to past remuneration or the national minimum wage 
(not related to the level of unemployment in the region, age, or personal 
or family situation of the beneficiary), while its duration should be lower. 
The existing mechanism that provides for higher unemployment benefit 
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to certain categories of the unemployed and for a longer period of time 
produces strong disincentives to take a job, which is even higher when 
unemployment benefit is supported by social assistance benefits that are 
still mainly aimed at satisfying the essential biological needs of recipients.  
The social security system should be more “activating” for the 
unemployed. This requires the adoption of more instruments - those 
making work pay - encouraging unemployed people to seek re-
employment. Moreover, more attention should be paid to the 
conditionality of unemployment and social assistance benefits. This 
especially concerns the necessary for the greater engagement of the 
unemployed person in his/her individual job search process, and the 
implementation of his/her Individual Action Plan and/or Social 
Contract, which should be more effectively monitored by the relevant 
public employment/social security office. Finally, it is necessary to 
redefine the concept of “suitable job” so that it would not weaken the 
already available activation measures aimed at enhancing the spatial 
mobility of the unemployed person.  
The activation measures should be better matched to the needs of a 
particular unemployed person. To avoid mismatches in this regard, the 
approach to the activation measures should be more individualized. This 
will require the greater involvement of labour office employees 
(individual customer advisors) in the process of preparing the assistance 
profile for every particular unemployed person, taking into account the 
specific life circumstances of the person concerned, and should be more 
eager to derogate from the profile applied automatically by the system. 
At the same time, a legal obligation for the labour office to provide the 
unemployed person with a new profile of assistance and a new individual 
action plan in the case of a change in the circumstances relevant for its 
activation should be introduced.  
The improvements within income and activation benefits should be 
accompanied by improvements in the functioning of public employment 
and social assistance services. With the aim of strengthening the 
vocational aspect of active inclusion tools a one-stop shop approach of 
public employment services and social assistance services should be 
promoted for the activation of the unemployed who as recipients of 
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social assistance are the furthest from the labour market. This requires 
the coordination of activities between public agencies operating at  
different levels – employment and social assistance services – employers 
and non-public operators, the introduction of rules on the exchange of 
data on clients of both public agencies, as well as strengthening the 
current function of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, including 
the promotion of best practices in this regard. To make the measures 
tailored as closely as possible to the particularities of the local labour 
market, there is a need for better cooperation between employers that 
operate in the local labour market and education institutions. Public 
institutions, both employment and social assistance, should open up to 
non-public actors, especially NGOs. The commercialization of labour 
market services that would be addressed to particular groups of 
unemployed, who need a specific approach, and to the specific needs of 
the local labour market may improve the effectiveness of labour market 
services. At the same time, however, it is necessary to control their 
activities in order to prevent possible fraud in spending public money. 
Finally, the way in which employees of public employment and social 
assistance services are remunerated needs to be changed, by introducing 
an incentive component, connected with achieving the primary objective 
of activation – bringing the unemployed to employment.   
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Abstract  
 
Both active and passive labour market policies are crucial to provide protection to the 
unemployed: unemployment benefits and subsidies (passive LMPs) economically 
support the unemployed while they are searching for a new job or enhancing their 
employability through activation initiatives (active LMPs). 
This article aims at analysing the Italian active and passive LMPs by highlighting the 
latest reforms in the field – in relation to specific and traditional problems of the 
system - and their impact on the protection of the unemployed. 
In the first part, a description of the development of the Italian LM system will be 
provided together with the latest tendencies in the regulation of flexibility at the 
domestic level. As a matter of fact, active and passive LMPs should play a crucial 
role in balancing flexibility in the labour market and guaranteeing adequate 
protection in case of unemployment. 
In the second part, the benefit, which are provided by the Italian system in case of both 
unemployment and temporary lack of work, will be analysed by highlighting their 
characteristics in terms of eligibility requirements, lengths and amounts.  
The third part will focus on activation by considering the initiatives and duties which 
beneficiaries are requested to comply with as a requirement to access or to maintain the 
benefit. Problems, which make it difficult to achieve effective active LMPs, will be 
highlighted. Activation possibilities to promote vocational training at the company 
level and the apprenticeship working contract apprenticeship will be also mentioned 
since they can be considered a way to avoid dismissals and to re-qualify both the work 
force and unemployed people to be hired.  
In the last part, some conclusions will be proposed on the relationship between the 
Italian active and passive LMPs and on the protection in case of unemployment. In 
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highlighting the pending issues in the field, the attempt of this contribution will be to 
provide some proposals to cope with them. 
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Introduction 
 
Article 4 of the Italian Constitution states the right and the duty to work 
and article 38 states the right to be protected in case of unemployment. 
Within this constitutional framework, according to Cinelli, the protection 
in case of unemployment should be intended in two ways: (i) protection 
against unemployment, by providing citizens with public employment 
services and with vocational training to enable them to be active; (ii) 
protection in case of unemployment, by providing citizens with 
unemployment benefits to cope with the temporary lack of work.152 
In the EU perspective, activation and unemployment benefits are two 
crucial elements of the flexicurity strategy, and they should be worth to 
secure transitions in the labour market. 
In both fields the Italian system has to face issues, which make achieving 
satisfactory results difficult. 
                                                
152  M. Cinelli, (1994),  Diritto della previdenza sociale, Giuffrè, Milano, p. 177. 
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Activation profiles were included in Italian legislation from 1924, by 
requesting the beneficiaries of unemployment benefits to register with 
the public employment services and be available to work or to take part 
in vocational initiative.153 But activation has never actually been effective, 
and just recently it was taken into consideration by the legislator. 
In 2001 the White Book154 on the Italian labour market was presented by 
the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy as a project to be carried 
out according to the European indications in the field, asking for both 
flexibility and security for workers.155 This book caused a rather heated 
debate, especially in calling for the need for more flexibility in the labour 
market. 
In 2003 a reform was adopted in order to increase the employment rate 
and promote the quality and stability of work. 156  This regulation 
implemented part of the White Book, without including those aspects 
focused on strengthening the level of security; at the same time, it 
introduced a number of new atypical forms of contract, which also have 
been misused to avoid hiring workers through the traditional unfixed 
form of subordinate working contract. 
During Berlusconi´s second term of Government, which issued the 
above-mentioned 2003 reform, the main idea was gaining flexibility 
through legislation. This is interesting, because until then, flexibility 
issues had been managed by the social partners through collective 
bargaining. The switch to regulation by legislation shows a limitation of 
the contractual autonomy of the social partners.  
In 2007 Prodi´s new left-wing Government signed the tripartite 
“Welfare Agreement” with social partners in order to focus on 
                                                
153  Royal Decree n. 2270/1924: F. Liso, Part time, disoccupazione e ammortizzatori 
sociali, in C. Lagala (a cura di), (2004), Part time e disoccupazione nella riforma degli 
ammortizzatori sociali, Milano, p. 21. 
154 Libro bianco sul mercato del lavoro in Italia, Ministero del lavoro e delle politiche sociali, 
October 2001. 
155  The „security“ was debated at the EU level in connection with the sustainability 
issue at least since the 90ies: E. Ales, Dalla politica sociale europea alla politica 
europea di coesione economica e sociale. Considerazioni critiche sugli sviluppi del 
modello sociale europeo nella stagione del metodo aperto di coordinamento, (2007), 
51, WP C.S.D.L.E. Massimo D'Antona. 
156 Legislative Decree n. 276/2003. 
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strengthening the security net for workers. Despite some improvements 
in the field, this goal wasn´t achieved and in 2008 the right-wing 
Government won the election (Berlusconi´s IV Government).  
In the meanwhile, at the European level, the flexicurity strategy was 
launched as a central idea in the EU’s employment policy through the 
Commission´s Communication on the common principles of 
flexicurity.157 According to this Communication, flexicurity should focus 
on flexible and reliable contractual arrangements; on comprehensive 
lifelong learning strategies to ensure the continual adaptability and 
employability of workers, particularly the most vulnerable; on effective 
active labour market policies (ALMP), and on modern social security 
systems that provide adequate income support, encourage employment, 
and facilitate labour market mobility. 
These concepts were debated at the domestic level, and a number of 
scholars158 expressed the position that the main problem of the Italian 
labour market was the lack of flexibility. Other reasons, such as the lack 
of an adequate macroeconomic policy, or traditional problems, such as 
inefficiency of the public administration, have been downplayed or 
attributed to the lack of flexibility. 
In 2011 “art. 8” (art. 8 Decree Law n. 138/2011, converted into law n. 
148/2011) introduced - by law - the possibility to derogate from 
National Collective Bargaining Agreements through specific collective 
bargaining at the company level, affecting directly and incisively a field, 
which was traditionally let to social partners.159 By doing so, one of the 
possible security mechanisms in labour law, collective representation, has 
been heavily damaged.  
The 2012 Monti-Fornero reform heavily modified the dismissal 
regulation by lowering the protection for workers, and also introduced 
relevant changes in the passive and active labour market fields.  
                                                
157 Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs through 
flexibility and security, COM(2007) 359 final. 
158 Some influential authors, advocating greater flexibility, are: P. Ichino, (1996) Il lavoro 
e il mercato. Per un diritto del lavoro maggiorenne, Milano, Mondadori; T. Boeri, P. 
Garibaldi, (2008), Un nuovo contratto per tutti, Chiarelettere. 
159  V. Leccese, Il diritto sindacale al tempo della crisi. Intervento eteronomo e profili di 
legittimita ̀ costituzionale, (2012), n. 4, Giornale di diritto del lavoro e relazioni industriali. 
81 
 
In 2014 the Renzi´s job Acts project was drawn by Law 183/2014, 
which delegated the implementation of that plan to the Government.160 
The purposes mentioned in the Law are: (i) to guarantee, in case of 
unemployment, homogeneous protection to the unemployed and to 
foster their activation; (ii) to guarantee a minimum standard of activation 
services in the entire country; (iii) to simplify and rationalize the creation 
and the function of working relationships, even within work health and 
safety; (iv) to strengthen the opportunities to re-access the labour market 
for people who are searching for a job; (v) to reorganize the contracts in 
order to make them more coherent with the productive and employment 
context; (vi) to make more efficient the labour inspection activities; (vii) 
to guarantee support for parental care, to support maternity, and to 
guarantee a trade-off between professional life and leisure time. 
The same year, the so-called decreto Poletti161 completely deregulated the 
fixed contract in the sense that any temporary reason is requested in 
order to sign a fixed contract.  
The idea of Renzi´s job Acts is still one of achieving a flexicurity model, 
by downsizing the protection in case of dismissal, and by increasing the 
employer´s powers in the working relationship.162 At the same time, the 
idea is also oriented to strengthening social protection in case of 
unemployment and increasing the effectiveness of activation policies.163 
                                                
160 Problems of constitutionality seems to concern this law: M. V. Ballestrero, La 
riforma del lavoro: questioni di costituzionalitá, Lavoro e Diritto, n. 1, 2015, p. 39 ff. 
 The Legislative Decrees which have been adopted - in the field under analysis - 
according to the Law n. 183/2014 are: Legislative Decree n. 22/2015; Legislative 
Decree n. 150/2015; Legislative Decree n. 148/2015. 
161 Decree Law n. 34/2014, converted into law n. 78/2014. 
162 F. Martelloni, Stagione 183: prevedibilitá del dirito del lavoro e sue perversioni, 
(2015), n. 1, Lavoro e Diritto, p. 53 ff.; in the same review and number: A. Lassandari, 
L´ordinamento perduto, (2015), n. 1, Lavoro e Diritto, p. 63 ff. 
163 Latest references in active LMPs: 
 L. Mariucci, P. Bianchi, M. Barbieri, B. Caruso, L. Valente, Tre domande e quattro 
risposte sul governo del mercato del lavoro, (2016), n. 2, Lavoro e Diritto; A. 
Lassandari, La tutela immaginaria nel mercato del lavoro: i servizi per l´impiego e le 
politiche attive, (2016), n. 2, Lavoro e Diritto; V. Ferrante, Le politiche attive del 
lavoro fra decentramento e accentramento: un dolce girotondo?, (2016), n. 2, Lavoro 
e Diritto; R. Salomone, Le prestazioni di politica attiva del lavoro al tempo del Jobs 
Act, (2016), n. 2, Lavoro e Diritto; A. Donini, Effettivitá dei servizi per l´impiego: 
forme e garanzie nella ricerca di lavoro, (2016), n. 2, Lavoro e Diritto; B. Caruso, M 
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Nevertheless, one can affirm that currently the system has achieved 
more flexibility than security. In this regard, one should highlight the 
introduction of a new form of contract, the “contratto unico a tutele 
crescenti”. This would be a subordinate unfixed working contract, but it 
actually consistently downsizes the protection in case of dismissal.  
At the same time, the EU employment guidelines and the specific 
Council recommendations addressed to Italy over the years have also 
always asked for “security”, i.e. adequate unemployment benefits and 
effective activation policies. Although some improvements have been 
achieved in both these fields, the Italian system still has to cope with 
issues in providing adequate protection in terms of benefits and 
activation services.  
 
1. Flexibility in the Italian system 
 
1.1. Flexibility: the other side of security 
 
Within the EU flexicurity concept, flexibility should be achieved within 
the enterprise (internal flexibility) and in the labour market, from one 
enterprise to another (external flexibility). In line with the 2006 Green 
Paper on the modernisation of labour law to meet the challenges of the 
21st century, a premise on which the regulation should be shaped is the 
idea that a “light” protection in case of unemployment, such as a “light” 
employment protection legislation as a whole, would be useful to 
encourage the hiring of people. This should be combined with adequate 
                                                                                                              
Cuttone, Verso il diritto del lavoro della responsabilità: il contratto di ricollocazione 
tra Europa, Stato e Region, (2015) 283, WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D´Antona”; M. 
Cinelli, C.A. Nicolini, L´attuazione del Job Act: le nuove tutele per i disoccupati, 
(2015), III, Rivista Italiana di diritto del lavoro. Concerning passive LMPs: D. Garofalo, 
Il d.lgs. 4 marzo 2015, n. 55: un primo commento, (2015), n. 2, Rivista del Diritto della 
Sicurezza Sociale; P. Bozzao, I nuovi trattamenti di disoccupazione: a piccoli passi 
verso l´Europa, in L. Fiorillo, A. Perulli, (a cura di), (2015), Contratto a tutele crescenti e 
Naspi, Torino, Giappichelli; S. Renga, Post fata resurgo.  La rivincita del principio 
assicurativo nella tutela della disoccupazione, (2015), n. 1, Lavoro e Diritto; M. Cinelli, 
C. A. Nicolini, L´attuazione del Jobs Act nei decreti di settembre. Il nuovo assetto 
delle discipline degli ammortizzatori sociali in costanza di rapporto, S. Renga, Post 
fata resurgo.  La rivincita del principio assicurativo nella tutela della disoccupazione, 
(2015), n. 4, Lavoro e Diritto Rivista Italiana di diritto del lavoro. 
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active labour market policies, and “substantial investment in training as 
well as high unemployment benefits with strong conditionality”.164 
In this regard, the Italian system shows itself to have adopted regulation 
in recent years, and is oriented towards flexible and atypical working 
contracts and towards a deregulation of the working relationship. Below 
we will discuss the most important changes in this field. 
 
1.2. Protection in case of dismissal 
 
Regulation in protection in case of dismissal is very articulated in Italy. 
First of all, there is a difference in protection for workers who are 
employed in a medium/big or in a small company. In the former case, 
workers are more protected. 
In Italy it is possible to dismiss workers for specific reasons, which can 
be summarised in: 1) right causes (e.g. the worker is found to have been 
stealing); 2) for justified reasons, which can be 2.a) subjective (e.g. the 
employee always comes to work late) and 2.b) objective (e.g. the 
company closes its activity). 
If the worker decides to contest the dismissal and the judge verifies that 
there were no good reasons to dismiss, or specific formal 
elements/procedures were not followed, the judge orders 
reimbursement and/or reinstatement. 
In recent years, from the 2012 Monti-Fornero reform, the amount of 
reimbursements and the possibilities for reinstatement have been 
downsized. Moreover, the deadline for suing was reduced.  
 
1.3. Flexibility in working contracts: fixed term contract  
 
At the beginning of the labour law development, the fixed-term contract 
was perceived as necessary in order to avoid slavery in the case of 
unfixed contracts. Then things changed and the need for a stable job 
became crucial. 
                                                
164 COM (2006) 708 final, p. 10. 
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The regulation of the Sixties required compulsory and specified reasons 
to sign a fixed contract. In the Eighties the excessive rigidity of the 
system was attenuated by the possibility to admit further reasons – in 
order to sign a fixed term contract - as a result of agreements between 
social partners. 
In 2001 the European Directive on fixed-term work165 was implemented 
in Italy166 and substituted the specified reasons – a catalogue to which the 
social partners could add reasons -  with a generic formula, i.e. technical, 
substitutive, organizational and productive reasons. 
In 2012 the Monti-Fornero reform (L. 92/2012) considerably changed 
the protection in case of dismissal, downsizing the rights in favour of the 
workers and, at the same time, introduced wide possibilities to sign fixed 
contracts without specifying the temporal reasons within a certain 
period. Until that moment, this contract could be signed just in cases of 
the above-mentioned technical, substitutive, organizational and 
productive reasons. 
In 2014, the so-called decreto Poletti167 abolished the formula of technical, 
substitutive, organizational and productive reasons in favour of mere 
time and percentage limits to cope with. 
 
1.4. Flexibility in working contracts: atypical working contracts 
 
Since 2003, new types of working contracts have been introduced in the 
Italian system: the job on call, job sharing, a new regulation of temporary 
work, a completely different regulation in apprenticeships, work paid 
through vouchers, and employer-coordinated freelance work.168  
A new regulation of part time introduced clauses, which allow increasing 
working hours and/or differently distributing working hours. 
                                                
165  Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework 
agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP. 
166  Legislative Decree n. 368/2001. 
167 Decree Law n. 34/2014, converted into law n. 78/2014; see A. Perulli, Il contratto a 
tempo determinato é la forma comune di rapporti di lavoro, in L. Fiorillo, A. 
Perulli, (a cura di), (2016), Tipologie contrattuali e disciplina delle mansioni: Decreto legislativo 
15 giugno 2015, n. 81, Giappichelli Ed. 
168  Legislative Decree n. 276/2003. 
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1.5. Internal flexibility 
 
National collective agreements provide the wide possibility to shape the 
company´s organisation for its particular needs, following specific 
procedures or through company collective agreements. 
Working time and shifts can be adjusted to different necessities during 
different periods of time. Vocational training is encouraged by collective 
agreement to enrich skills and strengthen the workforce, even if it is not 
actually widespread.  
In spite of these potentialities, collective bargaining has been 
progressively weakened. At the same time, it concerns usually big 
companies. 
 
2. Security: benefits in case of unemployment and in case of temporary 
lack of work 
 
2.1. Unemployment benefit: Naspi 
 
The 2015 Renzi reform introduced the “new social insurance for 
employment” (Nuova Assicurazione Sociale per l´Impiego), named Naspi, 
which is the most common unemployment benefit. 
This benefit replaced two previous benefits, which were introduced in 
2012 by the Monti-Fornero reform, i.e. Aspi and MiniAspi. These 
benefits replaced two other previous benefits, i.e. the indennitá di 
disoccupazione and the indennitá di disoccupazione a requisiti ridotti. Thus, many 
changes occurred towards an attempt to simplify the system.169   
With this regard, the Monti-Fornero reform introduced the Aspi by 
stating the progressive homogenization of another benefit – the indennitá 
di mobilitá – to the Aspi. This was indented to systematise the benefits 
legal framework. At the same time, this also brought negative outcomes, 
as we will explain in the paragraph 2.2. 
                                                
169 Special unemployment benefits are still used in particular sectors, i.e. in agriculture, 
in the construction sector and for journalists. 
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The Renzi reform transformed Aspi and MiniAspi into one benefit, 
contributing always in the direction of a more systematised picture. This 
also brought better conditions for people who were used to accessing 
MiniAspi. 
 
Eligibility requirements 
 
In Italy a person who applies for unemployment benefits has to be 
dismissed in order to prove that the unemployment is involuntary. The 
only exceptions are: (i) in the case of resignation for good reasons, such 
as, for example, when the worker is not paid by the employer for his 
work for a certain number of months; (ii) in the case of mutual 
agreement between the employer and employees, in the presence of a 
specific condition: the agreement has to follow a particular procedure 
according to the law 92/2012. 
To access Naspi170 one should: (i) have 13 weeks of contributions within 
the previous 4 years; (ii) have worked at least 30 days within the 12 
months before the beginning of the unemployment; (iii) acquire the 
status of unemployment according to a specific regulation.171 This latter 
status is achieved by submitting – through online access in the national 
active policies portal – a declaration in which the person affirms to be 
unemployed and immediately available for work and to participate in the 
activation initiatives agreed with the public employment services. The 
declaration links the benefit to activation duties, which we will discuss in 
more detail when speaking about activation. 
 
 
                                                
170 The regulation of this new unemployment benefit refers to the Legislative Decree n. 
22/2015 and the eligible requirements are in particular included in art. 2. 
171 The regulation to achieve the unemployment status has for years been included in 
the Legislative Decree n. 181/2000 and following modifications. Now the 
Legislative Decree n. 150/2015 has abrogated it, with the exception of art. 1 bis and 
art 4 bis. Currently, the regulation of the unemployment status is included in the 
Legislative Decree n. 150/2015, art. 19, which states that art. 1, c .2 lett. C) of the 
Legislative Decree n. 181/2000 should refer to the definition provided by art. 19, c. 
1, Legislative Decree n. 150/2015. 
87 
 
Duration of benefits 
 
The length of Naspi corresponds to half of the weeks of paid 
contributions in the last 4 years, so a maximum of 2 years. Before the 
introduction of Napsi, the duration depended on the unemployed 
person´s age. Naspi doesn´t contemplate any differences linked to the 
unemployed person´s age, with the exception of collective dismissal, as 
we will see. 
 
Amounts of benefits 
 
Naspi amounts to 75% of the reference wage, up to € 1.195; for 
amounts higher than € 1.195 the recognised percentage is 25%.  
The maximum amount is in any case € 1.300. The benefit decreases 
every month by 3%. It is interesting to highlight that in Italy legislation 
doesn´t state a minimum benefit amount. This aspect could be 
considered problematic with article 38 of the Italian Constitution, stating 
both the right to be provided with and assured adequate means for their 
needs and necessities in cases of unemployment.172 
 
2.2. Indennitá di mobilitá 
 
This benefit was introduced at the beginning of the Nineties (Law n. 
223/1991) and addressed to the unemployed in cases of collective 
dismissal. Collective dismissal is the dismissal of at least 5 workers within 
a period of 120 days for reasons that are related to the company´s 
organisation and restructuring. The particular regulation of collective 
dismissal is applied in a company with at least 15 employees in the 
industrial sector, and, since 2013, at least 50 employees in the 
commercial sector and 200 in the touristic sector. 
                                                
172  For deepened remarks on art. 38 Cost., please see:  Edoardo Ales, Diritti sociali e 
discrezionalitá del legislatore nell’ordinamento multilivello: una prospettazione 
giuslavoristica, (2015) n. 147, 3, Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali, p. 
455 ff. 
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This benefit has been traditionally more protective – in terms of 
amounts, lengths and activation opportunities - than other 
unemployment benefits. This particular protection was meant to cope 
with dismissals with a relevant social impact, i.e. collective dismissals. 
But the Monti-Fornero reform started a progressive transformation of 
this benefit in the common one, i.e. currently Naspi. 
 
Eligibility requirements 
 
To access the benefit the person should: (i) have been dismissed within 
collective dismissal in a company of a certain dimension (at least 15, or 
50, or 200 employees); (ii) have worked for the company for at least 6 
months in the last 12 months before the dismissal; (iii) have registered 
on a specific list with the public employment services. 
 
Duration of benefits 
 
The regulation, until the 2012 Monti-Fornero reform, stated a length 
depending on the beneficiary´s age: (i) 1 year up to 40 years old; (ii) 2 
years up to 50 years old; (iii) 3 years for over 50s. 
But the new regulation introduced a different system, which will 
gradually bring the indennitá di mobilitá at the same amounts and lengths 
as Naspi, with exception of the over 50s, who will receive the benefit for 
18 months instead of 12. 
 
Amounts of benefits 
 
Until the Monti-Fornero reform this benefit amounted to 80% of the 
previous wage for the first 12 months: this percentage was recognised 
within maximum amounts, which are stated every year. The amount is 
reduced by 5.84%. 
For the further months, the amount is 80% of the previous benefit-
amount, without the 5.84% reduction. 
As for the lengths, the amount will gradually become equivalent to those 
of Naspi. 
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2.3. Assegno di disoccupazione and Dis-Col 
 
An unemployment allowance was introduced by the Renzi reform in 
2015, the assegno di disoccupazione. This allowance is not an assistance 
allowance, even though it is financed by general taxation. As a matter of 
fact, it is addressed just to those beneficiaries who have already enjoyed 
Naspi.  
The assegno di disoccupazione is means-tested.173 It is not a subjective right 
but subject to availability of means. Priority to enjoy it is given to 
beneficiaries with dependants. Thus, we can say that the reform made a 
mix between some assistance allowance characteristics (means-tested) 
and insurance benefits (needs of contributions).  
The unemployment allowance amount is 75% of the last Naspi, and its 
length is 6 months. 
Another change that was brought by the Monti-Fornero reform is the 
introduction of a particular benefit to protect contract workers, who are 
not dependent workers but could be in a situation of economic 
dependency. This benefit, known as Dis-coll, has already been 
introduced before, but the difference is that the Monti-Fornero reform 
shows the will to verify if it is possible to stabilise this measure, without 
doing it. The benefit is linked to a maximum amount of resources, which 
means that the right is recognised within the available resources. Other 
self-employed workers have no protection in case of unemployment.  
 
2.4. Short-time arrangement 
 
The Italian system also provides protection in case of temporary lack of 
work through what is named tutele in costanza di rapporto di lavoro, i.e. 
protection measures during the working relationship.  
                                                
173 S. Renga, Post fata resurgo: la rivincita del principio assicurativo nella tutela della 
disoccupazione, (2015) n. 1, Lavoro e Diritto, p. 77 ff. 
 G.G. Balandi, L´eterna ghirlanda opaca: evoluzione e contraddizione del sistema 
italiano di sicurezza sociale, (2015) n. 2, Lavoro e Diritto, p. 313 ff. 
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These measures can be summarized in indennitá di Cassa integrazione 
guadagni ordinaria (Cigo), 174  indennitá di Cassa integrazione guadagni 
straordinaria (Cigs), Ammortizzatori in Deroga and Contratti di solitarietá. 
Cigs and Cigo are permanent parts of the protection system, and 
Ammortizzatori in Deroga, for which resources are defined year by year, are 
extraordinary measures. For handicraft companies other options are 
possible through the intervention of special entities, i.e. bilateral entities, 
which are made by companies and workers´ delegates and funded by 
both companies´ and workers´ contributions. 
Cigo should intervene in case of ordinary lack of work, such as lack of 
orders or temporary market reasons, and Cigs should intervene in case 
of restructuring, reorganization, corporate restructuring, corporate crisis 
and bankruptcy proceedings. The maximum length of Cigo is 1 year in a 
period of 2 years; the length of Cigs can reach 2 years: in any case, the 
maximum length for both measures is 24 months in a period of 5 years. 
This is as a result of the last reforms, but some years ago the maximum 
length could reach 4 years. 
Ammortizzatori in Deroga have been introduced for specific reasons over 
the years and recently because of the crisis. A particular kind of 
Ammortizzatore in Deroga is the Cassa in deroga,175 addressed to companies 
and workers who cannot access Cigo and Cig. The maximum length is 
now 3 months for 2016, i.e. 2 months less than for 2015.  
With regard to the amounts, Cigo, Cigs and Cassa in Deroga recognised 
80% of the previous wage. 
Even in the case of all these measures, beneficiaries have to comply with 
specific activation duties, i.e. orientation interviews, vocational training, 
etc. At the same time, since the measures are addressed to workers who 
still belong to a specific company, beneficiaries don´t have to accept 
eventual suitable job offers from public employment offices. 
                                                
174 Special “indennitá di Cassa integrazione guadagni” are still used in particular sectors, i.e. 
in agriculture, in the construction sector and for journalists. 
175 Inter-ministerial Decree (Decreto Interministeriale) n. 83473 1/8/2014 and Agreement 
(protocollo d’intesa) between the Province of Trento and social partners (Provincia 
Autonoma di Trento – Parti Sociali) signed the 30th December 2015. 
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The Contratto di solidarietá is a particular agreement between the company 
and the trade unions in order to avoid dismissals or to hire new 
employees. By signing this agreement the employees of a company will 
work fewer hours for a certain period of time, i.e. maximum 24 months 
(and 36 for Southern regions). The non-worked hours will be covered by 
the State, which will recognise the same amount for Cigs. 
The Monti-Fornero reform introduced a new measure addressed to 
those companies, which cannot access Cigo and Cigs. In this way, 
companies can provide a specific benefit to workers in case of temporary 
lack of work. 
This new system focused on special funds, i.e. the bilateral solidarity 
funds (fondi di solidarietà bilaterali) and has to be compulsory implemented 
in companies with at least 15 dependent workers.176 These funds are not 
bilateral entities, but legislations allow bilateral entities to coordinate 
themselves with the new systems. As aforementioned, the bilateral 
entities are made by companies and workers´ delegates and funded by 
both companies´ and workers´ contributions. They can manage both 
passive and active policies and are particularly effective in the handicraft 
sector.  
 
2.5. Pending issues  
 
Excessive regulation and lack of national assistance in case of unemployment 
 
The Italian unemployment benefits system, including the benefits in case 
of temporary lack of work, is characterized by an excessive production 
of laws and different measures in order to support unemployed people 
with specific supports. 
This stratification caused confusion and difficulties in managing the 
available measures. 
One of the reasons for this excessive regulation is the need to provide 
economic support for those unemployed persons who cannot access 
traditional unemployment insurance benefits. Another reason focuses on 
                                                
176 M. Cinelli, Gli ammortizzatori sociali nel disegno di riforma del mercato del lavoro, 
(2012) 2, Rivista del Diritto della Sicurezza Sociale, p. 228 ff. 
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the hypothesis that after the duration of the benefit, the unemployed 
might still need economic support because he/she is unable to find a 
job. This is a likely situation in times of crisis, such as the current one. 
The problems just mentioned are basically linked to a lack of assistance,  
at national level, in case of unemployment. Assistance benefits can be 
provided at a local level, and they vary between one territory and another 
and depend on regional or municipal resources. But a unique national 
assistance subsidy addressed to people who are not employed doesn´t 
exist yet. 
By failing to provide an assistance level of protection at the national 
level, Italy doesn´t comply with art. 38 of the Constitution: (i) every 
citizen who is not able to work and who does not have sufficient 
resources to live, has the right to social assistance; (ii) workers have the 
right to be provided by the State with means which enable them to cope 
with living needs in case of accident, sickness, disability and old age, and 
involuntary unemployment. 
 
Types of beneficiaries, benefits amounts 
 
Another traditional problem in the Italian system, which has been 
mitigated by the recent regulation in the field, consists in linking a higher 
level of protection – in terms of benefits – to particular “types” of 
beneficiaries, depending to the type of company sector where they are 
employed. Thus, traditionally the industrial sector has enjoyed the best 
conditions in terms of social security protection through access to both 
cigo/cigs and indennitá di mobilitá. 
As above mentioned, in order to fill the protection gap, new tools and 
extraordinary measures have been adopted: (i) new tools, i.e. the creation 
of bilateral entities, in order to provide protection in case of temporary 
lack of work in sectors which couldn´t access Cigo/Cigs; (ii) 
extraordinary measures, i.e. the Ammortizzatori in Deroga. These means 
have been widely put under discussion, and have been considered to be 
both negative and positive instruments: negative because they were not 
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stable;177 because the procedure to determine the order of acceptance 
was not clear;178 because their recognition depended on the financial 
resources available. They have also been considered useful because they 
could achieve a stronger protection for unemployed people – even for 
those traditionally excluded from protection - and brought, at least at the 
beginning,179 the compulsory involvement of trade unions. 
Furthermore, often the amount of benefits cannot be considered 
sufficient to guarantee effective protection in the transition from 
unemployment to other work. This is best illustrated at the nutshell of an 
example with numbers and in comparison with a strong welfare system 
such as the Danish one. Danish insurance unemployment incomes 
amount to 90% of the last 3 months or 12 weeks´ earned wage180 and the 
ceiling is around DKK 801 (€101) per day for full-time workers, i.e. it 
would mean € 2.020 per month.181 This ceiling is around double of that 
in Italy: as aforementioned, the Naspi ceiling is 1.300 €.  
Thus, a Danish worker, whose wage is € 2.000 per month, receives in 
Denmark, as unemployment insurance benefit, € 1.800, whereas in Italy 
she/he receives (75% of 1.195) 896.25 + (25% of 805=) 201,25, i.e. in 
total 1.097,5.182  
                                                
177 F. Liso, Gli ammortizzatori sociali. Percorsi evolutivi e incerte prospettive di 
riforma, in P. Curzio (a cura di), (2009), Ammortizzatori sociali. Regole, deroghe, 
prospettive, Cacucci, p. 33 ff. 
178 M. Miscione, La riforma degliammortizzatori sociali iniziata e delegata, in F. Carinci, 
M. Miscione, (a cura di), (2008) Il Collegato lavoro 2008, Milano, Ipsoa. 
179 M. Barbieri, Ammortizzatori in deroga e modelli di welfare negli accordi Stato-
Regioni e Regioni-Parti Sociali, (2011) Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro, p. 379 ss. 
180 The 1972 Unemployment Insurance Act (Arbejdsløshedsforsikringsloven) raised 
the percentage from 80 to 90 of the previous pay: J. Kristiansen, (2015), The growing 
conflict between European uniformity and national flexibility, Denmark, Djørf Publishing, p. 
63. 
181 J. Hendeliowitz, (2008) Danish Employment Policy, National Target Setting, 
Regional Performance Management and Local Delivery, ArbejdsMarkedstyrelsen, 
Employment Region Copenhagen & Zealand, The Danish National Labour Market 
Authority, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/53/40575308.pdf, (accessed 1 January 
2016), p. 9; European Commission - Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion, Your 
social security rights in Denmark, European Union, 2013, p. 27, 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/empl_portal/SSRinEU/Your%20social%
20security%20rights%20in%20Denmark_en.pdf , (accessed 1 April 2015). 
182  To simplify we refer to the monthly wage, but the calculation of the reference wage 
would be more complicated. 
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In the case the worker´s wage is € 3.000 per month, he/she would 
receive in Denmark, as unemployment insurance benefit, € 2.020 per 
month – because of the ceiling (instead of 2.400) -, whereas in Italy 
she/he would receive (75% of 1.195) 896.25 + (25% of 1.805=) 451,25, 
i.e. in total 1.300 (instead of 1.345,5 without ceiling). 
In the case the worker´s wage is € 4.000 per month, he/she would 
receive in Denmark, as unemployment insurance benefit, € 2.020 per 
month – because of the ceiling (instead of 3.200) -, whereas in Italy 
she/he would receive (75% of 1.195) 896.25 + (25% of 1.805=) 701,25, 
i.e. in total 1.300 (instead of 1.597,5 without ceiling). 
And a worker, whose wage is € 1.500 per month, probably more 
common in Italy, would receive in Denmark, as unemployment 
insurance benefit, € 1.200 per month, whereas in Italy she/he would 
receive (75% of 1.195) 896.25 + (25% of 5=) 1,25, i.e. in total 897,50. 
This difference should also be linked to living costs and to the services 
provided by the entire welfare states to be properly understood, since 
even the entire Italian welfare system seems to be definitely too weak to 
support unemployed people. Moreover, an insufficient amount of 
benefits could potentially foster undeclared work, which is widespread in 
Italy. As a matter of fact, if the amount is insufficient to cope with the 
personal and/or familiar needs, the person could be look for undeclared 
work in the case the labour market would be weak and would not offer 
adequate wage. Thus, undeclared work would be easier to find and 
would avoid to loose the benefits while working. 
 
3. Activation 
 
The active labour market policy includes a wide range of different 
measures in order to promote employment. These measures can 
intervene on the job offer side, by providing specific services, such as 
orientation and vocational training, in order to favour the job matching 
and adapt the workforce to the labour market needs. These measures are 
addressed to the unemployed, but also to inactive people or to employed 
people who are running the risk of losing their job. The vocational 
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training, which is carried out in companies that are not firing, can be 
considered activation, too. 
Specific initiatives can be devoted to disadvantaged categories of persons 
to favour their placement in the labour market. 
At the same time, activation measures can also consist of incentives – 
such as payment reduction for social contributions within a certain 
period - for employers to hire new employees. Thus, these measures 
intervene on the job request side in the labour market. 
 
3.1. Harsher activation duties and the National Agency for Activation 
policies 
 
With regard to unemployment benefits, specific activation duties are 
linked to the right to access and maintain the benefit. Alongside the legal 
development of this conditionality – between unemployment benefits 
and activation – activation duties and the definition of suitable work 
have been changed gradually. As we will mention, over the last years 
these activation duties have been made harsher and the definition of 
suitable work has been narrowed. 
The Renzi reform, though the Legislative Decree n. 150/2015, 
introduced relevant changes in the field of active labour market policies, 
such as the creation of a new Agency for managing these policies: the 
National Agency for Activation policies (Agenzia Nazionale per le Politiche 
Attive del Lavoro, ANPAL). This Agency, which set up is currently 
underway, should coordinate the active labour market policies in the 
country and, specifically, a services network for employment policies. 
This network should be made by several private entities created by the 
social partners and public actors, such as in primis the ANPAL, but then 
also by the Regional structures, by the National Institute for Social 
Security (INPS), by the National Institute of work insurance (INAIL), 
the public employment services, the inter-professional vocational 
training funds, 183  bilateral entities, Italia Lavoro, 184  the system of 
                                                
183 These funds are made by employers´ associations and trade unions, and are funded 
by a public quote that the employer can choose to pay to INPS or to pay to one of 
these funds. These funds provide funds to implement activation initiatives.  
96 
 
chambers of commerce, industry, handicraft and agriculture, the 
universities, and the intermediate schools.  
Thus, such as in the case of the Monti-Fornero reform, the Renzi reform 
pays some attention to the need to connect different actors in the labour 
market in order to make active policies more effective.  
 
3.2. Active labour market services 
 
The Monti-Fornero reform already stated the so-called “essential level of 
public services”: these are the public employment services, which should 
be provided in all the territory of the state to ensure a minimum standard 
of services. This minimum standard should be common in every Region, 
even if it could be improved by each of them. 
The Renzi reform re-writes these services by stating that the 
unemployed, the employees benefiting through benefits in case of 
temporary lack of work and risking transit in unemployment should 
should have access to: (i) a. basic orientation; b. competencies analysis, 
according to the local market situation; c. user profiling; (ii) support in 
job searching, even through group meetings, within three months from 
registration;  (iii) specialised and individualised orientation, through 
competencies analysis and analysis of eventual training needs, work 
experience or other activation measures, by evaluating the coherence 
between personal skills and the territorial, domestic and European 
labour market; (iv) individual orientation towards self-employment and 
tutoring during the further phases after the beginning of the business; (v) 
training towards qualification and re-qualification, towards self-
employment and towards immediate job placement; (vi) support towards 
job placement, including through the individual allowance, assegno di 
ricollocazione; (vii) promotion of new work experience in order to acquire 
more skills, including through intership; (viii) managing of incentives 
                                                                                                              
184 Italia Lavoro is a subsidiary company, entirely held by the Italian Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. Italia Lavoro works for the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy and promotes initiatives in the field of employment policies and social 
inclusion. Italia Lavoro became ANPAL Servizi S.p.A. from December 2016 (Law 11 
December 2016, n. 232). 
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towards self-employment; (ix) managing of incentives towards territorial 
mobility; (x) managing of measures/tools towards a trade-off between 
professional life and leisure time according to caring activities in favour 
of minors and non-self sufficient persons; (xi) promotion of community 
services. 
The above-mentioned services can be provided by Regions and 
municipalities, through public employment services, and by private 
actors with specific accreditation. We should wait some years to 
understand if this regulation will really work. In the Italian system, some 
public employment services can be provided by private actors since at 
least 2003. Temp agencies are entitled to play a role in the job matching 
and to provide temporary work since 1997 already. 
 
Conditionality of benefits 
 
The Renzi reform also re-defined the sanctions addressed to 
beneficiaries in case of non-complying with activation duties.  
The Renzi reform states for the first time a gradation of sanctions. In 
particular, a person loses ¼ of the benefit if she/he doesn´t comply with 
the first request, by the public employment service, to go to the public 
employment offices, which will check her/his availability to work and 
propose eventual activation initiatives; he/she loses half of the benefit if 
he/she doesn´t comply with the second request to go to the public 
employment offices; loses the unemployment status if she/he doesn´t 
reply to the third one. This is also valid as regards the orientation 
initiatives. 185  Other sanctions apply in case of non-attendance at 
activation initiatives.  
The beneficiary has to comply with the above-mentioned obligations in 
the case of Naspi, Dis-coll and indennitá di mobilitá. Similar duties are 
requested in the case of Cigo, Cigs and Ammortizzatori in Deroga. 
In any case, the beneficiary can be considered exempted of complying 
with these duties in case of justified reasons. 
                                                
185 Legislative Decree n. 150/2015, art 20, c. 3, lett a. 
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It is possible to appeal to ANPAL. Against the loss or curtailment 
measure of the public employment benefit within a specific procedure, 
which entails the presence of social partners. 
Beneficiaries lose benefits which are recognised in case of 
unemployment, if they don´t accept a suitable job offer or if they don´t 
comply with the specific obligations which are stated in the patto di 
servizio. This patto is an agreement signed between the unemployed 
person and the public employment office within 30 days from the online 
registration; before the Renzi reform, this agreement could be adopted at 
the Regional level.186 This agreement seems to be linked to the idea of 
New Public Management, which started to be introduced in the Italian 
system since the end of the 90ies. 
 
Definition of suitable job 
 
The definition of a suitable job offer was considerably changed by the 
Monti-Fornero reform, and further modifications have been introduced 
by the Renzi reform. Specific limitations concerning the length and the 
distance to reach the place are still kept. 
According to the Monti-Fornero reform, a suitable job corresponds to a 
wage, which cannot be lower than 20% of the benefit amount. Since the 
Naspi amount progressively decreases, it can be that a job offer that 
cannot be refused, would reach around 400 €. 
In this regard, the Renzi reform keeps this criterion, but adds the need to 
consider the “acquired experiences and acquired skills” (esperienze e 
competenze maturate). This disposition could help to revive another 
regulation, which was abrogated by the Monti-Fornero reform. This 
previous regulation187 stated that the suitable job offer should refer to the 
professional profile of the person. Thus, the higher the professional 
profile was, the higher the professional profile requested by the job offer 
                                                
186  Legislative Decree n. 150/2015, art. 20. 
187 According to the Decree Law 247/2004, implemented with changes by the law 
291/2004. This regulation linked the suitable job offer to the professional profile of 
the person. This aspect was better specified by a 2006 Ministerial circular, which 
clarified that the suitable job offer should be linked to the skills and job position of 
the worker. 
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had to be. This meant also higher wages because, according to article 36 
of the Constitution, the wage should reflect the quantity and “quality” of 
the work. Thus, if we consider that the new regulation of the Renzi 
reform would make live again the old regulation – because of its 
reference to the “acquired experiences and acquired skills”, we could say 
that it wouldn´t be possible to oblige a person with a certain professional 
profile to accept “any” job, and thus also any wage, even if respectful of 
the limit of 20% less of the benefit amount.  
A person who doesn´t accept a job offer which is considered suitable by 
law loses her/his benefit. 
 
Compatibility between benefits and working 
 
For many years the Italian system allowed the interruption - in some 
cases and under certain conditions – of the benefit duration in order to 
let the unemployed person work for a period and then eventually to 
come back into the benefit regime. 
It is possible - under certain conditions - to maintain a part of the benefit 
while working below a certain income, too.  
Under specific conditions it is also possible to ask for the entire benefit 
amount to be outright paid in order to be used in starting a new self-
employment activity. This opportunity was introduced in 1992 in the 
case of indennitá di mobilitá. 
The Renzi reform introduces a new regulation on the compatibility 
between part time work and unemployment benefit, which had been 
denied for a long time. 
 
3.3. Fondi paritetici interprofessionali per la formazione continua (FPFCs) 
 
FPFCs are national funds, which are created by agreements between 
trade unions and employers´ associations.  Currently there are active 19 
funds, while three funds have been put under guardianship due to 
transparency issues concerning the funds. 
The FPFCs finance training projects – collective or individual - at 
company, sector and territorial level.  
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These funds can be particularly interesting both for the lifelong training 
and for those training projects, which are requested to provide the skills 
requested by companies´ industrial transformation and to avoid 
dismissals. Additionally, it is also possible to finance training projects for 
unemployed people the company intends to hire. 
 
3.4. Apprenticeship 
 
Apprenticeships were introduced in the Italian system in 1955. Since 
then regulation has changed considerably.188  
The main idea is to provide a contract whose scope is not just about 
working, but also provides the possibility to learn how to work.  
Recently, especially from 2003 until today, this form of work has been 
re-launched in order to provide a valuable tool for the job placement of 
young people.  
Currently, there are three forms of apprenticeship, by which it is possible 
to reach a job qualification, a school certificate or the completion of a 
doctoral project. 
The first form of apprenticeship – towards a job qualification – remains 
the most common.  
Nevertheless, despite the increased attention devoted by the legislation 
to this contract, it still does not play a crucial role in supporting youth 
employment. Moreover, its utilization in implementing the EU project 
for a “Youth Guarantee”189 has been really modest.190 We will say more 
about this guarantee in paragraph 3.6. 
The Legislative Decree n. 81/2015 – part of the Jobs Act project – 
introduced the possibility to sign an apprenticeship contract between 
                                                
188  M. D´Onghia, Il contratto di apprendistato, in P. Chieco (a cura di), (2013), 
Flessibilitá e tutele nel lavoro. Commentario della legge 28 giugno 2012, n. 92, Cacucci, Bari, 
pp. 145-170. 
189 Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 (2013/C 120/01). 
190  A. Balsamo, XV Rapporto Isfol sull’apprendistato: d’ora in Avanti più attenzione a 
quello scolastico”?, (2015) Bollettivo Adapt: http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/xv-
rapporto-isfol-sullapprendistato-dora-in-avanti-piu-attenzione-a-quello-scolastico/ 
 This article contains remarks on the Report of the National Research Institute 
ISFOL. 
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companies and people over 29 years. In particular, the apprenticeship 
contract can be signed in the case the person is unemployed, is 
benefiting an unemployment benefit and has signed the individual patto 
di servizio. 
This contract provides companies with tax cuts and the possibilities to 
recognise lower wages than those fixed by the collective agreements. At 
the same time, the contract is meant to provide unemployed persons 
with the opportunity for retraining. 
 
3.5. Further changes in the last regulation 
 
A new activation tool which was introduced by the Renzi reform is the 
assegno di ricollocazione. This is a new allowance for which the unemployed 
can apply after 4 months of registration in cases when public 
employment offices are not able to provide them with activation 
initiatives of suitable job offers in this period of time. In particular, this 
allowance allows beneficiaries to access employment services and 
initiatives, according to their specific employability profile. But one 
should highlight that it is still unclear how the public employment offices 
will implement this disposition, and which would be the criteria to link 
the services with the employability profile. Operative indications and 
possible amounts should be determined by the ANPAL. At the same 
time, the recognition of the assegno di ricollocazione depends on the 
availability of resources.191 
 
3.6. Pending issues  
 
Even with regards to activation policies, traditional issues have 
characterised the system over the years. In particular, the non-
homogeneous public employment services within the national territory, 
with considerable regional and municipal differences are worth 
                                                
191 G. Canavesi, La ricollocazione secondo il Jobs act: dall´attivitá al contratto?, (2015) 
n. 3, Rivista del Diritto della Sicurezza Sociale. 
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stressing.192 One should also highlight the wide inefficiency of these 
services, with the exception of virtuous cases. But even the virtuous 
cases are not able to provide appropriate answers to cope with the need 
for social protection because of the lack of resources.  
One historical reason for the public employment offices´ inefficiency has 
been the transition – in the employment offices development - from a 
bureaucratic approach to an employment services approach, more 
dynamic and active. In the Nineties, two European decisions accelerated 
the liberalisation process of the European national employment systems. 
Indeed, job placement is regulated according to the European Union's 
rules on competition, in the same way as economic activities.193 In 1991 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared the illegitimacy of the 
state´s monopoly of job placement because it was not able to cope with 
labour offers.194 In 1997 the ECJ pushed the state's monopoly of job 
placement in Italy to change.195 This process deeply transformed the 
public employment offices, which had to face the transition from a 
                                                
192 F. Liso, Brevi appunti sugli ammortizzatori e sui servizi all’impiego nel Protocollo 
del 23 luglio 2007, in A. Perulli (a cura di), (2007), Le riforme del lavoro. Dalla legge 
finanziaria 2007 al protocollo sul Welfare, Halley Editrice; A. Alaimo, (2009), Il diritto 
sociale al lavoro nei mercati integrati. I servizi per l’impiego tra regolazione comunitaria e 
nazionale, Giappichelli; F. Liso, Servizi all’Impiego, in (2007) Eniclopedia Giuridica 
Treccani, pp. 1-10; F. Liso, Appunti sulla trasformazione del collocamento da 
funzione pubblica a servizio, in De Luca Tamajo, Rusciano, L. Zoppoli (a cura di), 
(2004), Mercato del lavoro: riforma e vincoli di sistema, Editoriale scientifica; F. Liso, I 
servizi all’impiego, in D. Garofalo, M. Ricci, (2006), Percorsi di diritto del lavoro, 
Cacucci; F. Liso, Collocamento. I) Diritto del lavoro (voce; aggiornamento), in 
(1988) Enciclopedia Giuridica Treccani, pp. 1-24. 
 In particular, on the non-homogeneity of the employment services: Indagine sui 
servizi per l’impiego. Rapporto di monitoraggio, 2013. A cura del Ministero del 
Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali – DG Politiche dei Servizi per il Lavoro e Italia 
Lavoro – Staff di Statistica, Studi e Ricerche sul Mercato del Lavoro, in 
Lavoro/Documents/Rapportomonitoraggio SPI 2013.pdf, (accessed 1st October 2016). 
193 C. Barnard, (2012), EU Employment Law, Oxford University Press; S. Sciarra, Job 
centre: an illustrative example of strategic litigation, in S. Sciarra (ed.), (2001), Labour 
Law in the Courts, Oxford, p. 241. 
194  Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 23 April 1991. Klaus Höfner and Fritz 
Elser v Macrotron GmbH. Case C- 41/90. 
195 Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 11 December 1997. Job Centre coop. 
arl. Case C-55/96. Please see (1998), II, Rivista critica del diritto del lavoro, p. 93 ss., E. 
Ales. 
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bureaucratic to a services approach. But the bureaucratic mentality of 
that period has still not yet entirely vanished.  
The legislative choice to recognise the role to private actors has not 
brought significant improvement in the functioning of the labour 
market.196 At the same time, due to public expenditure limits, local 
administrations intervene more and more rarely to protect unemployed 
people who have to cope with particular difficulties. Indeed, at the 
territorial level public administration – i.e. Regions and Municipalities - 
could promote some initiatives and provide specific assistance support 
for people in particular circumstances. 
Furthermore, the traditional lack of national oversight197 could have 
contributed to exacerbating the scarce results of employment services.  
The activation field has also been characterised by endless competence 
disputes between the State and the Regions 198  and a Constitutional 
reform proposal was put to a popular referendum in 2016, supporting a 
competence division in favour of a more central management199 but 
without being approved.  
The public employment offices´ inefficiency is also detrimental in terms 
of the lack of valid opportunities for young people. This is particularly 
relevant if we think that the Italian youth unemployment rate is one of 
the highest in the EU, i.e. 40.3% in comparison with 20.1% in the EU 
on average (25 countries) and in comparison with 7.2% in Germany, 
                                                
196 P. A. Varesi, Il workfare territoriale, in D. Gottardi, T. Bazzani (a cura di), (2014), Il 
workfare territoriale, Editoriale scientifica; Bergamante, Marocco, (2014), Lo stato dei 
Servizi pubblici per l’impiego in Europa[Risorsaelettronica]: tendenze, conferme e sorprese, 
ISFOL, Roma, in http://sbnlo2.cilea.it/bw5ne2/opac.aspx?WEB=- ISFL&IDS=19755, 
(accessed 1st October 2016).  
197 Mariucci, A very bad text? Note critiche sulla riforma, (2012), Lavoro e Diritto, p. 415 
ss.  
198 M. Napoli, Disegno di legge delega e modifiche al Titolo V della Costituzione, 
(2002), 3, Diritto delle Relazioni Industriali, p. 361 ff.; P. Varesi (a cura di), (2000), I 
servizi per l’impiego. Un nuovo ruolo delle strutture pubbliche nel mercato del lavoro, Milano; F. 
Carinci, I due volti della riforma: regionalizzazione e privatizzazione, in I servizi per 
l’impiego tra pubblico e privato, (1999) 22, Quaderni di diritto del lavoro e delle relazioni 
industriali, p. 3 ff.; V. Filì, (2002) L’avviamento al lavoro tra liberalizzazione e decentramento, 
Ipsoa Milano. 
199  This would have been more coherent with the introduction of a National Agency. 
At the same time, the Referendum concerned several other different, complicated 
and substantial issues. 
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where this rate is the lowest in the EU.200 With regards to the crisis 
impact on youth employment, the Council Recommendation of 22 April 
2013 (2013/C 120/01) outlined the strategic aim to invest in the human 
capital of young Europeans in order to achieve “long-term benefits and 
contribute to sustainable and inclusive economic growth”. The Council 
asked Member States to introduce in their legal system a Youth 
Guarantee to “ensure that all young people under the age of 25 years 
receive a good-quality offer of employment, continued education, or an 
apprenticeship or a traineeship within a period of four months of 
becoming unemployed or leaving formal education”. The 
implementation of the Youth Guarantee in Italy has been carried out 
with different outcomes from one Region to another, considering 
unsolved problems regarding public employment services’ and 
apprenticeships’ inefficiency.  
With regards to efficiency in employment policies, particular attention 
should be dedicated to the conditionality of unemployment benefits in 
Italy. 
First of all, from a theoretical perspective, one should highlight the 
eventual relationship between the delineation of unemployment benefits 
conditionality and the Constitution. This would allow a better 
understanding of how this concept – of conditionality – is introduced in 
the Italian framework.  
In this regard, in Italy unemployment protection is not expressly linked 
to any constitutional duties. At the same time, art. 38 of the Italian 
Constitution – stating protection in case of involuntary unemployment - 
can be linked to the right and duty to work, included in art. 4. 
The relationship between art. 38 and art. 4 of the Italian Constitution has 
been interpreted differently by Italians scholars.  
On the one hand, in Cinelli´s opinion these articles provide different 
protection: art. 38 would provide merely economic support and art. 4 
would guarantee placement in a new job. Thus, he thinks the ordinary 
                                                
200 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do 
 This unemployment rate refers to people under 25 years of age. 
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legislation should link the two aspects.201 At the same time, this would be 
possible only if such a process were supported by a macroeconomic 
policy aiming at creating employment.202 
On the other hand, Renga looks at art. 38 and art. 4 as two 
complementary dimension. 203  Actually, since the Royal Decree n. 
2270/1924 unemployment benefits are linked to activation duties, 
implying the acceptance of a suitable job offer or a vocational training 
offer. 204  Furthermore, the social security system can contribute to 
improving job offers by being connected with active labour market 
policies, which have to look at the market.205 Thus, it is of the utmost 
importance to understand how to direct these policies and make them 
effective in order to favour high quality growth.206 This is still an open 
problem in Italy because even though the latest reforms pointed out the 
importance to network different actors, a clear way to connect 
vocational training needs and a territorial economic development plan is 
still lacking. The ordinary legislation has tried and is still trying to realise 
the connection between art. 38 and art. 4 of the Italian Constitution. A 
recent attempt has endeavoured to transform activation policies in 
legitimate conditions to access the unemployment benefits,207 but this 
probably wouldn´t be coherent with the constitutional dispositions 
because, as aforementioned, the Constitution doesn´t expressly make the 
unemployment protection dependent on active behaviour.   
                                                
201 M. Cinelli, Diritto, cit., p. 177 ff.; M. Cinelli, (1982), La tutela del lavoratore contro la 
disoccupazione, Franco Angeli, Milano, p. 31. 
202 M. Cinelli, La tutela, cit. In 1982 Cinelli mentioned the project of creating a national 
agency. See also F. Carinci, Il quadro istituzionale dell'intervento pubblico sul 
mercato del lavoro, (1979) 75, Politica del Diritto. 
203 S. Renga, (1996), Mercato del lavoro e diritto, Franco Angeli, Milano. 
204  F. Liso, Part time, disoccupazione e ammortizzatori sociali, in C. Lagala (a cura di), 
(2004), Part time e disoccupazione nella riforma degli ammortizzatori sociali, Milano, p. 21. 
205 S. Renga, Mercato, cit., p. 265.  
206 M. Ricci, Mercato del lavoro e licenziamenti collettivi, (2007) 116, Giornale di diritto 
del lavoro e delle relazioni industriali, pp. 749-798; M. D´Onghia, Un itinerario sulla 
qualità del lavoro, (2009) 2, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, p. 261. 
207 C. Lagala, F. Liso, La riforma degli ammortizzatori sociali nel disegno di legge del 
Governo (A.S. n. 848-bis), (2003) Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, 
p. 675 ff. 
 M. Tiraboschi, S. Spattini, J. Tschöll, (2009), Guida pratica ai nuovi ammortizzatori 
sociali, I Libri di Guida al Lavoro, Il Sole 24 Ore, Milano, p. 141 ff. 
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At the same time, passive and active policies should be linked – through 
ordinary legislation - by reciprocal duties and rights addressed to 
unemployed people and employment services. This perspective opens a 
relevant pragmatic issue in the Italian system, i.e. the inefficiency of the 
conditionality of unemployment benefits, which is due both to the 
inefficiency of public employment offices to provide valuable activation 
or job offers, and to a lack of punitive measures implementation. 
Basically, the lack of efficiency means firstly an inability to provide 
adequate services to be useful for both companies and workers. This 
makes it impossible for unemployed people to comply with their 
activation duties. Moreover, the duty/right to work is also affected by 
the lack of macroeconomic policies oriented at job-creation. 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
As mentioned in the first part of this contribution, in Italy the last 
reforms increased flexible contract typologies and downsized protection 
in case of dismissal. This increase in flexibility has not been balanced by 
a similar increase in security. 
As a matter of fact, notwithstanding some relevant improvements in the 
field coming from the current reforms, open issues are still pending and 
negatively effect protection in case of unemployment. 
These specific pending issues still have to find a solution. In this part it is 
meant to highlight these open matters and suggest some remarks. In 
particular: 
1) Assistance in case of unemployment is lacking at the national level. In 
order to comply with the State obligation ex art. 38 Italian 
Constitution, Italy could introduce this protection through means-
tested benefits based on general taxation.  
2) Precarious workers/self-employed. The Renzi reform enlarged the 
eligibility requirements and made Naspi more accessible. This 
tendency towards ironing out the protection between workers with 
significant social contributions in recent years and workers without 
such contributions can be dangerous for the sustainability of the 
insurance system, which needs enough social contributions from 
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employers and employees to function and be sustainable. Thus, 
people who couldn´t be included in this type of protection should 
access an assistance level of protection, based on general taxation. At 
the same time, one should also raise the issue of the increasingly 
precariousness of current employment – which is often fixed term 
and with low contributions – might be a crucial problem to cope with 
in order to guarantee the future sustainability of the insurance 
unemployment benefits. 
The new unemployment allowance creates some confusion within 
this approach. This is a tool paid through general taxation and 
addressed just to people who have been able to access the insurance 
protection: this is a mixture of different kinds of protection systems. 
3) In order to support the possibility for transitions in and out the 
labour market, it would be advisable to strengthen the compatibility 
between the right to keep the benefits while working under a certain 
limited amount. Some relevant attempts have been done for self-
employed work and for part-time work. But the regulation could be 
further improved. 
4) In order to implement effective activation policies which could be 
useful to enable the unemployed to find a job, an investment of 
resources in improving public employment offices’ efficiency would 
be advisable, e.g. by hiring more staff and providing them with 
adequate vocational training to deal with the activation needs of both 
workers/unemployed people and companies.  
5) In order to clearly understand which are the vocational training needs 
requested by local companies, it would be worth to strengthen the 
public employment offices networking with crucial actors of the 
labour market. At the same time, it would be desired that public and 
private entities, which provide vocational training services, would 
have a clear picture of the companies´ and the territorial development 
needs.  
6) The responsibility of public employment offices in providing 
adequate services is an open issue in Italy. A responsibility has been 
introduced for workers of the public employment offices to inform 
public authorities about non-fulfilment of the activation duties. But 
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this responsibility doesn´t aim at affecting the public employment 
office’s inefficiency. 
7) By analysing the Italian system, one could highlight that legislative 
changes are not enough to cope with the pending issues in LMPs. 
Changes in the system, as a whole, would be needed. In particular: 
a. A macroeconomic policy towards the creation of new jobs would 
be crucial in order to comply with art. 4, c.1 Italian Constitution 
(right to work); 
b. Despite the attempt of the Monti-Fornero and the Renzi reforms, 
a lack of an efficient network, which is able to manage activation 
policies, is still a crucial problem. Tackling this problem would 
entail the political will to make the networks function. The 
capacity to plan territorial development would also be a 
prerequisite for an efficient system.  
Databases are relevant tools to plan and evaluate the system, but 
for different causes their development is still not completed. 
c. Reasons, which are not legislative, influence the efficiency of 
public employment offices and should be taken into consideration. 
These reasons are of different natures, such as economic, i.e. the 
lack of resources to invest in offices workers, or cultural, i.e. the 
bureaucratic mentality, etc. 
d. The cultural factor of the system as a whole has to be taken into 
consideration, too. Corruption, unclear public procurement 
procedures and undeclared jobs are problems, which are also 
highlighted by the County-specific recommendations addressed to 
Italy. 208  These aspects undoubtedly affect social security or 
activation, such as the efficiency of initiatives aimed at facing 
unemployment.  
e. With regards to the traditional lack of national oversight,209 the 
introduction of an ad hoc National Agency would seem to be worth 
                                                
208  E.g. since the Council Recommendation on the National Reform Program 2014 of 
Italy and delivering a Council opinion on the updated Convergence Programme of 
Italy, 2014 (2014/C 247/11). 
209 Mariucci, A very bad text? Note critiche sulla riforma, (2012), 3-4, Lavoro e Diritto, p. 
415 ss.  
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implementing to face the problem. Some months are needed to 
better understand its outcomes.  
Thus, improvements have been introduced in the recent regulation in 
both active and passive LMPs, but these advancements need to be 
further developed, according to both social and economic sustainability.  
The personal energies of the people should be channelled in a way, 
which can guarantee them to be fairly recognised, even in terms of 
adequate protection against unemployment and efficiency of public 
employment services and activation measures as a whole. The need for a 
change is evident and should first of all entail a cultural and institutional 
level. 
With regard to the relationship between activation duties and 
unemployment benefits, their link should be strengthen by enabling 
people to be effectively more active. This would be possible first of all 
by providing qualitative good employment services for the unemployed, 
services connected with a LM characterized by a strong demand, thus 
driven by a strong macroeconomic policy. 
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Labour market policies “in crisis”: the case of Greece 
 
Effrosyni Bakirtzi210 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Given the ongoing effects of the current economic crisis and the widespread demographic 
problems, the Greek working population has decreased resulting in high 
unemployment rates and an increase in the number of people who are receiving social 
security benefits. These two last factors have further worsened the active/passive ratio 
in the labour market, posing the latter under severe pressure. In the face of these 
developments, it is worthwhile to investigate the ways in which the Greek government 
has responded to these problems. On the one hand, flexible forms of work have been 
introduced to the Greek labour market. On the other hand, certain activation 
employment policies dealing with high unemployment rates have been launched. For 
example, public welfare programmes targeting temporary employment of the 
unemployed and other programmes, aiming at mitigating youth unemployment, long-
term unemployment and promoting self-employment. Nevertheless, studies regarding 
short- and long-term developments in the field of employment policies in Greece expect 
that unemployment rates will reach the levels before crisis only after 2036. This paper 
examines passive as well as active labour market policies in Greece in view of the 
difficult economic situation in which the country is currently immersed and highlights 
some of the pending issues regarding employment protection that need to be addressed.    
 
 
Summary: 1. Introduction. 2. Flexibility of the labour market in times of crisis. 3. The 
(un)employment protection system. 3.1 Entitlement to unemployment benefits. 3.2 
Qualifying criteria for unemployment compensation. 3.3 Required level of 
contributions. 3.4 Regular unemployment benefit. 3.5 Unemployment assistance 
benefits. 3.6 Youth unemployment. 3.7 Long-term unemployment. 3.8 Labour supply 
                                                
210 I am grateful to Costas Papadimitriou, Hande Birkalan-Gedik, Nicola Gundt and 
Tania Bazzani for comments on previous versions as well as Sofia Vezyroglou for 
her research assistance. The usual disclaimers apply. 
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reduction policies as passive labour market policies. 4. Active labour market policies. 5. 
Some thoughts on the existing employment policies.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Employment policies in Greece have been developed in a wider 
historical context which is quite different from the respective contexts of 
other European countries. The period following the civil war in Greece, 
and more specifically after 1952, has left the country in great economic 
distress. At that time, unemployment has been “targeted” by way of two 
policy-substitutes: immigration policy and the policy of employment at 
the public sector. The proper employment policies were marginal and 
only limited to paying benefits to the unemployed. Furthermore, 
employment policies pursued in the 1980s aimed at broadening the 
scope of social protection (e.g. increase in the amount and the duration 
of unemployment benefits, extension of the unemployment protection 
to further categories of employees and “loosening” the requirements for 
retirement for many groups of employees) accompanied by promoting 
employment at the public sector as a means of maintaining low rates of 
unemployment. In fact, active labour market policies made their 
appearance in 1982 as an initiative originated with the European Union. 
At the same time, the social protection policies were no longer 
broadened and the income support in the form of unemployment 
benefit was further reduced.  
Notably, unemployment increased significantly during the 1990s with a 
considerable growth in long-term, female and youth unemployment as 
well as wide differences between regions.211  The primary protection 
against the risk of unemployment is based on the so called system of 
unemployment compensation which has been and is still receiving the 
main part of public expenditure on labour market policies. This system 
provides social insurance coverage due to unemployment to persons 
                                                
211  See T. Papadopoulos, (2000), Integrated approaches to active welfare and employment policies: 
Greece, Eurofound report, p.1 (available at: http://people.bath.ac.uk/hsstp/TP-
Publications/TP_Employment_Policy_Greece_2002.pdf) (accessed 1st October 
2016). 
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affiliated with the Institute for Social Insurance (Ίδρυµα Κοινωνικών 
Ασφαλίσεων – hereafter I.K.A.) who must establish a long contribution 
record in order to be entitled to unemployment benefits. For long-term 
unemployed persons no longer qualifying for unemployment benefits, 
there are limited social assistance arrangements and, consequently, this 
vulnerable group is almost excluded from any kind of welfare support. 
Indeed working on the issue of high unemployment rates in Greece has 
been a matter of great importance for the Greek policy makers during 
the past years. Especially, since the outbreak of the economic and 
financial crisis, the unemployment rates have remarkably increased. In 
terms of numbers, looking at the statistics of the Greek Labour Force 
Employment Organisation (Οργανισµός Απασχόλησης Εργατικού 
Δυναµικού - hereafter O.A.E.D.) shows us that in December 2010 the 
persons registered as unemployed amounted to 804.597, of which 
277.904 persons received unemployment benefits, while in December 
2015 the number of unemployed persons reached 1.047.661, of which 
only 186.737 received unemployment benefits. In order to paint a clearer 
picture of the size of unemployment in Greece, one should bear in mind 
that the total population is around 10.770.000 people with a labour 
workforce consisting of 4.791.000 persons.212 Notably, unemployment 
affects all age groups of the labour force. However, newcomers to the 
labour market are those who are facing the greatest difficulties in finding 
a job: the unemployment rate in the age group 15-24 (youth 
unemployment) is 52,4%. 213  This should be taken seriously into 
consideration because of the long-term direct and indirect impact 
unemployment has to young people and their families.   
Therefore, combating those high unemployment rates and promoting 
economic growth is the prime priority for the Greek policy makers who 
                                                
212  Statistics provided by OAED (published on its website: 
http://www.oaed.gr/synkentrotika-stoicheia).  
213  See statistics from the World Fact Book: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html 
(accessed 1st October 2016). For more information on policies against youth 
unemployment, see A. Apostolidou, Active labour market policies against youth 
unemployment in times of austerity, the case of Greece, (2015) Vol. I, Issue 3,  
International E-Journal of Advances in Social Sciences, pp. 430-435. 
114 
 
have been establishing both passive and active labour market policies 
and recognizing their social and economic role. Broadly understood 
labour market policies - beyond passive and active labour market policies 
– include flexibility policies which aim at increasing the labour demand 
by restricting labour costs.  
This paper which examines labour market policies in Greece, comprises 
four sections. In the first section, reform policy aspects regarding labour 
market flexibility will be analyzed. The second section describes the 
system of unemployment protection in Greece while the third section 
touches upon the active labour market policy initiatives which have been 
taken lately, especially after the beginning of the economic crisis which 
has resulted in a massive loss of jobs and limited government 
expenditure. The final section summarizes the problems identified in the 
implementation of the aforementioned policies and investigates the way 
in which these issues can be dealt with in the future.     
 
2. Flexibility of the labour market in times of crisis 
 
With the onset of the debt crisis, Greek authorities had to undertake 
strict austerity measures and perform reforms in order to receive 
financial assistance funded by the European Union and the International 
Monetary Fund with the aim of reducing government budget deficits and 
avoiding default. These measures as set of policies attached to this 
assistance began with reducing salaries in the public sector, but soon a 
spill over effect to the private sector was perceived and further measures 
targeting at a more flexible labour market followed. The ulterior purpose 
of these measures was, on the one hand, the reduction of labour costs 
combined with an increase in flexible working arrangements so that the 
Greek economy would be competitive in the global market and, on the 
other hand, the reduction in unemployment rates and the creation of 
new jobs.  
Apart from the transformation of the Greek labour market due to the 
crisis, the reforms are connected with the European legislation which 
promotes the employee protection as well as flexibility of the labour 
market. Furthermore, the obligation of the Greek labour legislative 
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reforms did not only arise from the difficult economic situation and the 
rapid changes in the labour market. This obligation has been also 
included in the action plans agreed between the Greek governments and 
its creditors which have been implemented in the Greek legal order 
without the prior negotiation with social partners. 
We could categorize the measures targeting at flexibility in three groups. 
The first includes measures promoting temporary employment, covering 
the extensive use of fixed-term employment contracts and temporary 
agency work. For instance, new legislation has loosened the strict 
requirements for the establishment of a temporary work agency. 214 
Temporary employment exists in Greece since the 1990s215 and it has 
been used to provide businesses promptly with the necessary workforce 
for their smooth operation, especially in times of crisis. Nevertheless, in 
many cases temporary work can be abused and, consequently, 
inequalities between employees can be developed. At the beginning of 
the crisis, the Greek legislator amended the legal framework on 
temporary employment216 in a positive way providing greater protection 
to employees in such employment relationships as it has restricted the 
use of temporary employees to specific cases within the functional 
activity of the enterprise for reasons justified by exceptional, temporary 
or seasonal needs. Furthermore, the principle of equal treatment of 
employees in the event of temporary employment has been extended. 
Equality is no longer limited to the application of the wage clauses of 
collective agreements, but it is now extended to any form of 
                                                
214  Article 123 of the Law Number 4021/2012 (this law has implemented the second 
Memorandum of Understanding - MoU). The MoUs contain detailed 
macroeconomic adjustment programs which have been negotiated between the 
Greek authorities and officials from the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund as conditions of financial 
support.  
215  It has been recognized and regulated by Law Number 2956/2001. 
216  With the Law Number 3846/2010 implementing Directive 2008/104/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary 
agency work. This legislative initiative has been inspired by the Ministry of Labour 
Commission on the conjunction of flexibility and security. 
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compensation and includes all forms of benefits. 217  However, a 
subsequent Law218 has amended the rules regarding the duration of the 
temporary work assignment and has set the maximum duration to 36 
months (as opposed to 18 months allowed before) making the use of 
temporary work even more flexible. Similarly, three more recent Laws219 
changed the existing legal framework governing the terms of operation 
of temporary work agencies by loosening the strict requirements for 
their operation. Moreover, the legal terminology used in these later Laws 
is very different. Notably, the law does not mention any longer 
temporary work “companies”, but rather temporary work “businesses” 
(as temporary employment can be used by most types of companies and 
individuals), and the term used therein is “placement” of temporary 
employees rather than “assignment”.220  
The second category of measures aiming at increasing flexibility in the 
labour market is those promoting part-time employment. In times of 
financial difficulties, the employer-company has the possibility to employ 
employees for a number of days less than those stipulated in the 
employment contracts while the employees receive only part of their 
contractual salary, without receiving any benefits making good the loss. 
This so-called “partial unemployment” could be imposed unilaterally by 
the employer for a maximum period of six months should the economic 
activity of the undertaking be reduced.221  Since 2010 the maximum 
duration of this “partial unemployment” has been increased to nine 
months per calendar year.222 This measure has been in force so that 
                                                
217  C. Papadimitriou, The Greek labour law face to the crisis: A dangerous passage 
towards a new juridical nature, (2013) Issue 3, ELLN Working Paper Series, p. 6.    
218 The Law Number 3899/2010 on the implementation of the necessary measures 
required for supporting the Greek economy.  
219 The Laws Number 4052/2012, 4093/2013 and 4254/2014. 
220 C. Papadimitriou, Οι νέες νοµοθετικές ρυθµίσεις για την προσωρινή απασχόληση 
[The new legislative regulations on temporary employment], (2016) Vol. 72, Issue 
1684, Δελτίον Εργατικής Νοµοθεσίας [Bulletin of Employment Legislation], p. 3. 
221 Article 38 of the Law Number 1892/1990. 
222 Article 17 of the Law Number 3899/2010 on the implementation of the necessary 
measures required for supporting the Greek economy. An interesting judgment of 
the Greek Supreme Court (Areios Pagos) 1252/2014 decided on the forms and 
requirements of “partial unemployment”. According to this judgment, it is 
unacceptable to impose partial unemployment selectively to specific employees 
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dismissals may be avoided in times of financial difficulties and 
workplaces may be retained. Nevertheless, the extension of the 
maximum duration to nine months may be regarded disproportional to 
the purpose of the measure.      
The third category of measures considers reforms in the dismissal 
protection law. In the past, the Greek labour law has been accused for 
inflexibility due to the high severance pay in case of dismissal and the 
strict legal regime of collective redundancies. At the demand of the 
employers and on the pretence of the crisis, the dismissal protection 
legal regime has been made more flexible. Firstly, the cost of dismissal 
has been indirectly reduced because the maximum notice period for the 
termination of an employment contract has been reduced to four 
months (compared to 24 months in the previous regime) and if the 
employer complies with this shortened notice period, the amount of 
severance pay is reduced to half.223 Secondly, during a probationary 
period of 12 months employees are not entitled to severance pay, should 
their employment contract be terminated within this period.224 Thirdly, 
the Greek collective dismissals regime in situations of structural changes, 
economic crisis or loss of competitiveness has changed as the threshold 
for collective redundancies has increased to 6 employees (instead of 4 
previously) over a period of 30 days in establishments with 20 to 150 
employees and for establishments with more than 150 employees the 
threshold is set to 5% (instead of 2% previously) of all the staff, but 
maximum 30 employees. 225   In Greece the flexibility supported by 
                                                                                                              
only, while the others continue to work full-time, as well as when specific work is 
covered by one and only person who cannot be replaced by somebody else during 
her obligatory absence. 
223  It should be noted that if the severance pay is not dully paid, then the dismissal is 
null and void under Greek law. In order to better understand the Greek dismissal 
protection regime one should take into consideration that in case of an open ended 
employment contract the lawfulness of the dismissal does not depend on the 
existence of a cause. 
224  Article 74 of the Law Number 3899/2010. Under the previous legislation 
employees having less than a year of service were entitled to severance pay equal to 
one month’s salary. 
225  Article 74 of the Law Number 3899/2010. 
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austerity measures has been directed towards the facilitation of dismissals 
usually at the expense of employment protection.   
Interestingly, flexibility has been implemented by the Greek legislator in 
a way that the austerity measures in the labour market supporting such 
flexibility resulted in the deregulation of work and labour relations. 
Moreover, apart from examining the legal framework and reforms of the 
legal regime, one should investigate what the reality reveals in practice. It 
is often observed that flexibility is being abused at the cost of 
employment protection. We currently see practices of hiring and firing 
persons in one day and employing people only for the probationary 
period of 12 months so that no severance pay would be owed.  
In a similar vein, undeclared and under-declared work is quite common 
in Greece. Undeclared work is the best-known form of social security 
fraud and it has to be clearly distinguished from mere cases of error. 
Fraud concerns the deliberate violation of reporting provisions resulting 
in a loss of funds due to evaded social security contributions. This 
affects, primarily, the revenue of the welfare state. The fraudulent 
behaviour can be found among all kinds of work, from self-employment 
to different types of dependent employment. Under-declared work 
concerns the misrepresentation of the actual employment. Instead of 
completely hiding the employment relationship, the employer misreports 
to the competent authorities as to the nature and the extent of a 
particular employment relationship.226 As a result, an officially declared 
employee is paid by the formal employer two wages (an official-declared 
one and a supplementary-unofficial one: the so-called envelope wage). 
This is also referred to as grey labour market or under-declared waged 
employment, which consists of envelope wages for regular or 
overtime/extra work. Undeclared work has been characterised as a 
phenomenon detrimental to working conditions, social protection, 
health and safety of workers and overall labour standards. One of the 
consequences of the economic crisis could be identified the increase of 
                                                
226  S. Reindl-Krauskopf, M. Meissnitzer, Types of social security fraud - A legal 
analysis, in L' Association luxembourgeoise des organismes de sécurité sociale (ed.), 
Annual conference of the European Institute of Social Security on "Social security 
and fraud". (2013) Vol. 30, Bulletin luxembourgeois des questions socials, p. 11. 
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undeclared and under-declared work. The main attraction of undeclared 
and under-declared work is financial as these types of activities allow 
employers to reduce their costs and employees to increase their take-
home earnings by evading taxation and social security contributions.  
 
3. The (un)employment protection system 
 
In Greece, passive labour market policies primarily refer to income 
support for the unemployed with the objective of limiting the 
consequences of unemployment in the living standards for the 
unemployed. The Greek Labour Force Employment Organisation 
(O.A.E.D.) has assumed the responsibilities of the insurance against the 
risk of unemployment and the payment of the unemployment benefits. 
This organisation implements the governmental policies in the fields of:  
a) employment and combating unemployment,  
b) the reinforcement and facilitation of integration of the labour 
force into the labour market,  
c) the insurance against the risk of unemployment,  
d) the promotion of professional training and its linking with 
employment,  
e) the intellectual and social development of the labour force and 
their families.227 
The main reform of O.A.E.D. took place through the setting up of a 
National Unemployment Protection System (Εθνικό Σύστηµα 
Προστασίας από την Ανεργία – E.S.P.A.) under Law Number 
1545/1985 where for the first time the participation of the State to the 
financing of the insurance protection against unemployment has been 
established.  
 
3.1. Entitlement to unemployment benefits 
 
The persons insured against the risk of unemployment and members of 
the Greek Labour Force Employment Organisation (O.Α.E.D.) are 
                                                
227  Article 25 of the Law Number 4144/2013. 
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those who perform work, as a main profession/activity228 in a dependent 
(either fixed-term or open ended) employment relationship with 
remuneration (wage), if they have been insured for health care in a social 
security institution229 and they are between the ages of 15 and 74.230 The 
requirement of being in a dependent employment relationship is not 
fulfilled by persons on a service contract, managing directors and 
members of the board of directors, 231  trainees and students and, 
therefore, these persons are excluded from the entitlement to 
unemployment benefits. Relatives of first and second degree as well as 
husbands/wives are insured at O.A.E.D.232  
Special provisions apply for civil servants who are excluded from the 
system of unemployment protection of O.A.E.D and they are insured by 
a special social security fund.233 Moreover, special provisions apply for 
homeworkers or those employed with vouchers, persons in 
apprenticeships 234  or vocational training, 235  pensioners, prisoners, etc. 
Self-employed persons can be insured against the risk of unemployment 
within a special fund administered by O.A.E.D.236 This regulation has 
been regarded as a positive legal intervention in the times of the crisis, 237 
                                                
228  Main profession/activity is regarded the one that mainly supports the living of the 
employee, defines her professional and social position and in which she dedicates 
most of her time. Whether an employee performs work as a main profession/ 
activity is an issue which is examined on a case by case basis by the Institute for 
Social Insurance according to the given facts.  
229  Article 11 para. 1 of the Law Decree 2961/1954. 
230  Exceptionally registration at the Labour Force Employment Organisation is 
permitted for persons who are over 74 years old. 
231  If they are shareholders of 3% at least (Article  49 of Law Νumber 4144/2013). 
232  This was regulated by article 1 para. 1 and 2 of the Law Number 4075/2012. In the 
past these persons were not insured at all (relatives of second degree) or they were 
insured under certain conditions.  
233  Article 12 of the Law Number 2961/1954. 
234  Article 3 para. 2 lit. (c) of the Law Number 1545/1985 as amended by Article 30 
para. 4 of the Law Number 4144/2013. 
235  Article 30 para. 2 of Law Number 4144/2013. 
236  Article 50 of the Law Number 4144/2013. 
237  O. Aggelopoulou, Ασφάλιση ανεργίας και αποκατάσταση απώλειας µισθού 
[Unemployment insurance and compensation for loss of wages], (2014) ΕΕργΔ 
[Greek Labour Law Review], p. 99. 
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especially given the high levels of self-employment which is a distinctive 
feature of the Greek structure of employment. 
 
3.2. Qualifying criteria for unemployment compensation 
 
This income support usually takes the form of unemployment benefits 
granted to unemployed persons under certain conditions. These 
conditions are the qualifying criteria for receiving unemployment 
compensation and they will be analyzed in detail below. 
To begin with, the person should be unemployed according to the 
provisions of the Law Number 1545/1985 which is one of the main 
legal instruments for the Greek national unemployment system. This law 
defines as unemployed a person whose employment relationship has 
been legally and validly terminated or has expired,238 who is seeking 
employment, agrees to work in an employment relationship within a 
broader employment sector suggested by the employment services of 
O.A.E.D. or consents to undergo vocational training or retraining.239 
Therefore, the first requirement is the status of being unemployed. 
Furthermore, the person should be capable of working in a sense that 
depending on his/her capacities, capabilities and professional training 
he/she can earn at least 1/3 of what a physically and intellectually 
healthy person with the same professional training usually earns in the 
same region.240 Consequently, a rebuttable presumption exists that a 
person with a disability of 66,6% and higher cannot be capable of work 
and, thus, is not entitled to unemployment benefits.241 In addition, the 
unemployed person has to be available for work which means that 
he/she has to accept any kind of suitable employment offered or 
undergo updating training.242 In case the unemployed person does not 
                                                
238  It is worth mentioning that those who leave their jobs voluntarily are not 
considered unemployed (Article 15 para. 1 of the Law Decree 2961/1954, Articles 3 
and 7 of the Law Number 1545/1985). 
239  Article 3 para. 1 of the Law Number 1545/1985. 
240  Article 15 para. 2 of the Law Decree 2961/1954. 
241  This person can be, however, eligible for disability benefits, if he/she fulfils certain 
requirements. 
242  Article 15 para. 4 of the Law Decree 2961/1954. 
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accept the suitable employment243 offered, he/she will no longer be 
considered unemployed and, hence, will not qualify for receiving 
unemployment benefit. If the unemployed person does not agree to 
undergo the updating training, he/she will be deprived of the 
unemployment benefit for 15 days. 244  The last requirement of 
entitlement to the unemployment benefit is the reference period of 
insurance against the risk of unemployment. As a general rule, the 
unemployed persons must have realized 125 full-time working days 
during the last 14 months prior to the termination of employment not 
taking into account the working days of the past two months.245 Within 
the meaning of working days are included fictitious working days, such 
as days of sickness, vacation, maternity leave, etc. given that they have 
been recognized as such by I.K.A.-E.T.A.M. (Institute for Social 
Insurance Institute – Unified Insurance Fund for Employees – Ίδρυµα 
Κοινωνικών Ασφαλίσεων Ενιαίο Ταµείο Ασφάλισης Μισθωτών).  
A procedural requirement can be considered the registration of the 
unemployed person within the services of O.A.E.D. of his/her residence 
or place of work. After the termination of employment, the unemployed 
also has to submit an application for acquiring the benefit within a 
deadline of 60 days since the termination of his/her employment 
contract. Should this requirement not be fulfilled, the application shall be 
rejected.246  
In case a person receiving unemployment benefit works undeclared for 
an employer, strict sanctions shall be imposed on the employer 
                                                
243  For an analysis of the definition and nature of suitable employment see A. Stergiou, 
(2014), Δίκαιο Κοινωνικής Ασφάλισης [Social Security Law], Sakkoulas publications, 
pp. 687-688.  
244  Article 15 para. 6 of the Law Decree 2961/1954. 
245  Article 4 para. 1 of the Law Number 1545/1985. Should the unemployment benefit 
be requested for the first time, the person applying for it shall have realized 
additionally at least 80 working days during each of the two years prior to the 
unemployment support (Article 5 of the Law Number 1545/1985). Special 
provisions apply for seasonal workers, long-term unemployed and youth aged 20-
29. 
246  Article 2 para. 1 of the Law Decree 2961/1954 as amended by Article 7 para. 4 of 
the Law Number 1545/1985 and Article 4 para. 4 of the Law Number 2434/1996. 
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according to the existing legal framework which provides for such 
sanctions, both administrative and pecuniary.247 
 
3.3. Regular unemployment benefit 
 
The regular unemployment insurance benefit is the basic insurance 
benefit granted by O.A.E.D. This benefit consists of a basic income 
support plus increments due to family responsibilities. Since March 2012 
the amount of the basic insurance benefit is 55% of the current national 
minimum wage of an unskilled worker248 and it is independent from the 
previous wage records of the unemployed person. The basic insurance 
benefit is increased by 10% for each protected family member. The 
benefit can be paid for a period of 5 to 12 months depending on the 
previous employment record of the person and from January 2014 
onwards the benefit cannot exceed 400 days during the past 4 years.249 
The unemployment benefit is payable upon the completion of a waiting 
period which begins with the termination of employment and includes 
the first 6 days of unemployment (excluding the day of dismissal).250   
 
3.4. Unemployment assistance benefits  
 
Apart from the regular unemployment benefit, the Greek system of 
unemployment protection covers several other benefits for particular 
situations. These benefits are granted exclusively to insured persons. The 
first of these is provided to those unemployed whose employer is 
                                                
247  Pecuniary sanctions in cases of detected undeclared work by the Labour Inspectors 
and IKA are provided for in Law Number 4093/2012. Both agencies can conduct 
controls and impose penalties which are calculated in a specific manner and are 
extremely high. Cases, like hiring the concerned persons one day before the 
inspections or firing them one day after the completion of the controls or avoiding 
the unexpected controls through the sea way in tourist areas, have been reported in 
Greece. Moreover, sanctions for the illegal employment of a person receiving 
unemployment benefits are foreseen in Law Number 4144/2013. 
248  Article 5 para. 3 of the Law Number 3552/2007. 
249  Before January 2014 the maximum was 450 days during the past 4 years. 
250  Article 18 of the Law Decree 2961/1954. 
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insolvent or bankrupt.251 In such a case, the employment relationships 
with the employer are terminated and the unemployed persons are 
entitled to a benefit equal to three unpaid monthly wages which refer to 
a period of six months before the employer’s bankruptcy or insolvency. 
In addition, an allowance of work suspension can be paid to employees 
whose work is suspended by the employer. This allowance amounts to 
10% of the average of their regular full-time wage during the last two 
months and it can be paid only for a period of three months on a yearly 
basis.252 This allowance is not paid to persons working part-time or in 
rotational work. A further ad hoc allowance is given to persons due to 
the withholding of labour or business stoppage.253 Moreover, a seasonal 
allowance is provided to persons of certain professions who cannot 
qualify for unemployment benefits because they do not fulfil all the 
necessary legal requirements.254 Last but not least, an allowance for all 
other persons who do not qualify for the regular unemployment benefit 
constitutes a “bridge” from unemployment insurance to social 
assistance. 255  The procedure, its requirements, amount and all other 
details are regulated by the decision of the Minister of Labour.256  
 
3.5. Youth unemployment 
 
Young persons aged 20-29 years who enter the labour market for the 
first time after completing their studies, are entitled to a monthly benefit 
of 73,37€ for 5 months in total.257 This entitlement is repealed if the 
unemployed person does not accept employment offered to him/her by 
the employment services.258 
                                                
251  Article 16 of the Law Number 1836/1989. 
252  Article 27 para. 5 lit. (c) of the Law Decree 2961/1954. 
253  Article 27 para. 5 of the Law Decree 2961/1954 and Article 20 para. 1 of the Law 
Number 1836/1989. 
254  Article 22 para. 1 of the Law Number 1836/1989. 
255  O. Aggelopoulou, Ασφάλιση ανεργίας και αποκατάσταση απώλειας µισθού 
[Unemployment insurance and compensation for loss of wages], (2014) ΕΕργΔ 
[Greek Labour Law Review], p. 99. 
256  Article 22 para. 6 of the Law Number 1836/1989. 
257  Article 2 of the Law Number 1545/1985. 
258  Article 2 para. 4 of the Law Number 1545/1985. 
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3.6. Long-term unemployment 
 
Long-term unemployed are considered insured persons in uninterrupted 
unemployment for a period of more than 12 months. They are entitled 
to long-term unemployment benefit assuming that they have exhausted 
their entitlement to the regular unemployment benefit and their family 
yearly income does not exceed a certain limit.259 
 
3.7. Labour supply reduction policies as passive labour market policies 
 
Among passive labour market policies in Greece one could classify 
labour supply reduction policies, such as early retirement, staff 
suspension, parental and sabbatical leave, job sharing, etc. These policies 
have a passive nature, because they absorb unemployment without 
increasing the volume of employment. 260  For instance, the early 
retirement and pre-retirement reserve of civil servants has been 
implemented by recent legislation.261 Yet, the recent pension reforms in 
Greece, along with reducing the amount of pensions, have put obstacles 
to the early retirement of employees.  
 
4. Active labour market policies 
 
Active labour market policies in Greece were established in the mid 
1980s under the auspices and with the financing of the European Social 
Fund. Such policies were related to programs of vocational training for 
unemployed and employees, subsidies for employers in order to hire 
unemployed persons and subsidies to unemployed in order to create 
their own business. These policies are complementary to social 
protection policies for unemployed (for example, granting 
unemployment benefits) known as passive labour market policies.   
                                                
259  Article 1 para. IA.1 lit. III of Law Number 4093/2012. 
260  A. Apostolidou, Active labour market policies against youth unemployment in times 
of austerity, the case of Greece, (2015) Vol. I, Issue 3, International E-Journal of 
Advances in Social Sciences, pp. 430-435, 433. 
261  Article 33 of the Law Number 4024/2011. 
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The task of implementing activation policies is entrusted to O.A.E.D. 
which is providing technical and professional training either through 
apprenticeships where teaching and practice are combined or through 
shorter professional training regarding specializations which are on 
demand in the labour market on a short-term basis.  
The initiation of a series of activation measures can be found in the Law 
Number 2434/1996 where a system of “employment cards” combined 
with training vouchers, new subsidized training programs, non-wage 
subsidies for firms who employ young people and first-time job seekers 
and financial incentives for unemployed to start their own business as 
self-employed have been introduced. In the course of time, further 
initiatives were taken, such as the program “Young People in Active 
Life” with two subcategories: “New Jobs” (employment subsidization 
program) and “Young Professionals” (promotion of self-employment). 
Moreover, young unemployed could participate in the so-called Stage 
program so that they can gain work experience.  
Lately, employment programs for unemployed run by O.A.E.D. offer 
subsidies for social security contributions.262 Other programs aim at the 
promotion of employment and usually concern the preservation of jobs 
(for instance, in the hotel businesses during the winter period), the 
subsidization of employers for the creation of new jobs, the support of 
young self-employed persons and public welfare programs for the 
temporary employment of unemployed persons for short terms at 
communal and regional administrative bodies (the so-called workfare 
program which regards fixed-term quasi employment in not-for-profit 
agencies and public services).263 
In general, activation measures take the form of either job or social 
security contributions subsidization or they are vocational training 
programs offered in particular to those who have lost their entitlement 
to unemployment benefit.264 In principle, these measures are targeting 
                                                
262  Article 18 of the Law Number  3833/2010. 
263  C. Dimoulas, Exploring the impact of employment policy measures in the context 
of crisis: The case of Greece, (2014) Vol. 67, 2, International Social Security Review. 
264  C. Papadimitriou, Κρατική πολιτική και δηµιουργία νέων θέσεων εργασίας [State 
policy and the creation of new jobs], in P. Agallopoulou, (2001), Η πολιτική 
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young people, long-term unemployed and older unemployed persons 
which are seen as the most vulnerable groups.  
Further aspects of the future reform policy can be identified in the 
National Reform Plan 2016 where it is provided that the life-long 
learning and apprenticeship systems will be upgraded and extended and 
the O.A.E.D. services will be modernized. Programs enhancing 
employability and promoting employment have been redesigned and will 
be further developed in four pillars: i) programs intended for the 
dynamic sectors of the Greek economy, supporting businesses in 
guaranteed employment, ii) programs providing targeted training and 
consulting for the unemployed or the new businessmen, iii) programs 
leading to the certification of knowledge and development of skills, and 
iv) programs specially designed for regions with high unemployment 
rates. During 2015 three workfare programs have been realized for more 
than 50.000 full-time jobs and pursuant to new legislation 265  
improvements in their realization have been introduced. For the year 
2016 the workfare programs shall focus on the unemployed person and 
they should be linked to the development of one´s skills so that one´s 
sustainable integration into the labour market should be assured. 
Furthermore, programs for older and young unemployed persons have 
been designed and will be implemented in the course of time. Regional 
actions for the social integration of vulnerable groups which were 
completed during 2012-2015, will be continued within the Regional 
Business Programs in the future as well.   
 
5. Some thoughts on the existing employment policies 
 
The Greek welfare regime can be described as dual and unequal, 
because, on the one hand, offers protection to the insiders who are 
provided with safe employment and social security coverage, and, on the 
other hand, there is no minimum protection for outsiders who work in 
undeclared and precarious jobs with no social security coverage and 
                                                                                                              
απασχόλησης στο πλαίσιο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης [Employment policies within the 
European Union], Ant. N. Sakkoulas publications, pp.11-22. 
265  Article 1 of the Law Number 4368/2016. 
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access to social assistance benefits.266 As a matter of fact, the existing 
legislative framework of unemployment protection has been adopted 
more than 20 years ago and does not take into consideration the 
developments of all these years, especially the fact that the standard 
employment relationship in the labour market is no longer the rule. As a 
result, the current legislation can be regarded as ineffective because the 
legal rules no longer correspond to the social reality they seek to regulate. 
In addition to the out-dated legislative framework, the interpretation of 
the legal rules by the public administration is often problematic as this 
tends to be done at the expense of the protection of the unemployed 
usually in order to avoid economic and organizational costs.  
Moreover, the pension system used to provide generous pensions to 
those retired from public service employment and certain other 
professions while farmers and labourers received the minimum national 
pension. However, the 2016 reform of the social security system strives 
to eliminate such discrepancies the results of which are to be seen in the 
near future. 
Unemployment benefits in Greece are available mainly to individuals 
with long or uninterrupted contribution records. Consequently, a large 
number of vulnerable employees who do not fulfil the strict 
requirements because they have short or interrupted contributions or no 
records (first-time job seekers), are excluded from unemployment 
protection.267 The personal scope of application of the unemployment 
protection legislation should be changed providing unemployment 
insurance coverage to atypical workers who usually do not fulfil the 
requirement of dependency or insurance periods due to the particularity 
of their employment relationship.  
                                                
266  C. Dimoulas, Exploring the impact of employment policy measures in the context 
of crisis: The case of Greece, (2014) Vol. 67, 2, International Social Security Review, p. 
52. A. Mouriki, (2009) Πόσο ευέλικτη είναι στην πραγµατικότητα η ελληνική 
αγορά εργασίας: τυπικές ακαµψίες και απορρύθµιση στην πράξη [How flexible is 
the Greek labour market in reality: typical rigidity and deregulation in practice], in 
Πολιτικές για την ενίσχυση της απασχόλησης και ασφαλιστική κάλυψη της 
ανεργίας [Policies supporting employment and unemployment insurance coverage], Greek 
Ombudsman, Sakkoulas, p. 65. 
267  T. Papadopoulos, (2000), Integrated approaches to active welfare and employment policies: 
Greece, Eurofound report, p. 9. 
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Furthermore, unemployment benefits are available for a short-term 
period after the expiration of which there used to be no safety net, like 
social assistance arrangements for the long-term unemployed. There has 
been only access to some form of income support through, for instance, 
participation in vocational training programs. However, this participation 
is neither obligatory nor guaranteed for all.268 The absence of social 
assistance for the unemployed leads to an intensification of the level of 
poverty. 
In addition, the monetary value of the unemployment benefits is very 
low. Because of a decrease of 22% the national minimum wage for 
persons over 24 years and nearly 32% for young persons during the past 
years, the amount of the unemployment benefit has been readjusted 
lately and equals 360€ per month, an amount far below the minimum 
standards of social security as set in the 102 ILO “Convention 
concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security” as well as below the 
poverty line according to the European Committee of Social Rights 
Conclusions XIX-2 (2010).269 This readjustment of the unemployment 
benefit amount was necessary due to the major reductions in the public 
expenditure because of the austerity measures taken to amortize the 
public debt directed at social benefits. As employment policy costs need 
to be maintained at low levels, the financing of passive employment 
policies has been rendered insufficient.270  
The termination of the employment relationship required for the 
activation of the unemployment protection and the entitlement to 
unemployment benefits, is a “legal” fact, which sometimes complicates 
the access to the right to unemployment benefits. This happens, because 
employers may sometimes refuse to provide a dismissal notice271 and the 
cases will be pending before the courts. O.A.E.D. will only pay the 
                                                
268  Ibidem, p.9. 
269  O. Aggelopoulou (2014), Ασφάλιση ανεργίας και αποκατάσταση απώλειας 
µισθού [Unemployment insurance and compensation for loss of wages], ΕΕργΔ 
[Greek Labour Law Review], p. 107. 
270  As for the financing of activation policies it should be highlighted that most of the 
actions and programs are (co-)financed by the European Union. 
271 If the employer refuses to provide a dismissal notice, then the termination of 
employment is null and void and overdue wages will be owed. 
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unemployment benefit after the judicial decision has been issued which 
may be very time-consuming. This way, the unemployed person is 
deprived of the right to unemployment benefit, especially in a period 
when she is most vulnerable after having lost her job.  
Alongside the employment protection, another important factor in 
relation to the support towards the unemployed was the family. During 
the past years, families in Greece used to support their members if they 
were in economic need. Over the course of time, this has changed and 
because of the reduction of the purchasing power of most Greeks and 
the loss of their wealth, many households can no longer offer financial 
support to their unemployed family members.272 
As far as active labour market policies are concerned, in the 2000’s 
Greek National Action Plan for Employment the government 
committed to a shift from passive to active labour market policies. 
However, active labour market policies in the context of this National 
Action Plan take the form of job subsidisation or vocational training 
programmes offered to persons who lost their entitlement to 
unemployment benefits. The situation remains unchanged today with a 
number of negative consequences that have been reported so far, such as 
the substitution of unemployment benefits with active labour market 
policy benefits, which have not actually contributed to limiting 
unemployment. Moreover, it has been argued that active labour market 
policies in Greece have supported clientelism.273 This is because they 
have been assisting financially not the most vulnerably and 
disadvantaged unemployed persons, but those with established network 
contacts with politicians. 
There are some other important points to be mentioned in relation to 
the active labour market policies. First, activation policies for technical 
and professional training of the labour force are directed towards 
satisfying the needs of certain businesses rather than addressing the 
actual needs of the unemployed persons and the necessities in the labour 
                                                
272  C. Dimoulas, Exploring the impact of employment policy measures in the context 
of crisis: The case of Greece, (2014), Vol. 67, 2, International Social Security Review, p. 
54. 
273  Ibidem, p. 53. 
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market. Second, the lack of a single institution providing this kind of 
training is seen as problematic.274 Third, the systematic introduction of 
active labour market policies in the Greek labour market has been 
regarded to a certain extend ineffective because of the institutional and 
functional weaknesses of O.A.E.D. in realising such programs. 275 
Although the services of O.A.E.D. have been reformed and 
reorganised,276 there are still many issues that need to be addressed, 
especially with regard to the quality of services provided to unemployed 
persons. Last but not least, it should be noted that the activation policy 
measures adopted lately in the Greek legal system have been introduced 
without taking into serious consideration the proposals of the social 
partners. However, a positive development is that the Greek 
governments tend to utilize the European funds more compared to the 
past, especially when it comes to combating youth unemployment.  
In addition, the legal regime concerning activation measures in Greece is 
considered instable due to the sudden changes of the regulatory 
framework of programs supporting employment. This renders their 
administrative implementation even more difficult and inefficient. It 
should be highlighted that a large number of complaints submitted to 
the Greek Ombudsman concerned activation measures and their 
insufficient implementation by O.A.E.D., in particular with regard to 
providing information and individualized advice to the interested 
persons and the non-timely payment of the subsidies. Consequently, 
such difficulties in administering effectively the complexity and increased 
bureaucracy attached to the realization of active employment policies 
may jeopardize the credibility of the actions of O.A.E.D. 
Several legislative initiatives have been taken in order to fight 
unemployment and support employment during the crisis in Greece. 
Nevertheless, these initiatives proved ineffective and failed to restrain 
the high unemployment rates, especially because flexible forms of work 
                                                
274  V. Papadogambros, (2009), Πολιτικές απασχόλησης. Όροι και προϋποθέσεις 
[Employment policies. Terms and conditions], in Πολιτικές για την ενίσχυση της 
απασχόλησης και ασφαλιστική κάλυψη της ανεργίας [Policies supporting employment 
and unemployment insurance coverage], Greek Ombudsman, Sakkoulas, p. 98. 
275  Ibidem, pp. 99-101. 
276  For example through the Law Number 2956/2001. 
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(such as fixed-term, part-time and rotational work) were incapable of 
counterbalancing the reduction in full-time employment. Taking into 
consideration the impact of the facilitation of dismissals on the labour 
market without promoting the creation of new jobs, one could argue that 
this flexibility cannot offset the weakening of the employment 
protection.   
In turn, flexible forms of employment, such as part-time work, partial 
(un)employment and temporary work, tend to be dominating the Greek 
labour market replacing the standard employment relationship. 
According to data from the information system ERGANI,277 one of the 
two employees hired in September 2016 were employed in a flexible 
employment relationship (i.e. other than full-time open ended 
employment contract). Apart from the statistics on the newly hired 
persons, one should take into consideration the fact that many standard 
employment relationships in Greece are converted into part-time or 
other flexible work arrangements. Of course, it is plausible to have 
pluralism in the Greek labour market promoting flexibility of work 
arrangements, but this flexibility should be accompanied with security 
and employment protection for persons employed under the flexible 
work arrangements. Otherwise, there is a high risk that these employees 
will be deprived of security in terms of employment stability, 
professional development and entitlement to social security benefits as 
well as access to state benefits; a risk that is currently one of the 
problems that the labour force in Greece is facing.   
It is currently discussed whether some elements of the Danish flexicurity 
model, such as a deregulated legal framework of employment protection, 
active labour market policies, lifelong learning and social dialogue, could 
                                                
277  An information system called “ERGANI” has been developed since March 
2013(See Decision of the Minister of Labour, Social Security and Solidarity No. 
5072/6/25.2.2013 as amended and complemented by Decision No. 
28153/126/30.8.2013). This information system monitors the flows of employment 
in the private sector and was created in order to minimize the bureaucratic 
procedures for employers and to combat undeclared work. The employers have to 
register their employees to the information system “ERGANI” upon hiring and 
before the latter start working, by using the forms E3 and E4. 
133 
 
be “imported” in the Greek system.278 The success story of this model is 
based on job mobility coupled with a safety net for unemployed persons 
and the involvement of social partners. The Danish labour law system is 
rooted in a negotiating culture with an emphasis on the willingness of 
management and labour to reach compromise,279 an element which does 
not exist in the Greek labour law system. As a matter of fact, in the past 
years the Greek social partners tend to play a less important role in the 
establishment of terms of employment and working conditions and their 
position has been weakened, especially in comparison to the one of the 
employers. Moreover, an equivalent to the Danish safety net for the 
unemployed does not exist in Greece and it is difficult to be developed 
due to the lack of the needed funds. Such a net would have been 
required for promoting activation policies and supporting job mobility in 
the labour market. 
To conclude, the current legislative framework regarding employment 
protection in Greece needs to be up-dated in order to correspond to the 
social reality it seeks to regulate. It remains to be seen whether future 
initiatives will be effective enough to mitigate the negative impact of the 
rapid changes overrunning the Greek labour market on the employment 
protection of the workforce. Appropriate activation measures should be 
put in place in order to complement efficiently passive labour market 
policies alongside the flexibilization of work. The key question would 
seem to be whether an apparent shift towards active labour market 
policies and flexibility of work can make a difference to supporting the 
(re)integration of unemployed into the labour market.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
278  See 3rd Quarterly Report of the Parliament of Greece, State Budget Office, pp. 44-
46 (October 2016).  
279  J. Kristiansen, (2015), The growing conflict between European uniformity and national 
flexibility. The case of Danish flexicurity and European harmonization of working conditions, 
Djof Publishing, p. 13. 
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Flexicurity in Spain in order to help unemployed people: A barren 
relationship between active and passive measures? 
 
María Salas Porras280 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The analysis of protective measures for the unemployed in the Spanish Labour Law 
includes both active and passive policies by forming a single block since the flexibility 
has been installed in European labour markets. The effects of this so-called flexicurity 
are analysed in the first section of this article which defines the current regulatory 
context ordering labour relations and the impact that deregulation is generating, from 
which we want to provide an unbiased objection to the alleged efficiency of labour 
flexibility. 
Once the old and new problems plaguing the Spanish labour market are detected, we 
first present the mechanisms of economic support for the unemployed, especially 
highlighting the organization of two new protection programs. After this, the actions 
that are studied are those that seek not only the activation of the unemployed but also 
other measures that reflect the necessary co-responsibility of all those involved in this 
area, so there are two sections for activation of public services and of businesses. It will 
become clear that only when activation measures for unemployed, the labour market 
and the employment services are applied in a coordinated manner, high levels of 
employment will be reached. Finally, a reflection is offered on how the interaction 
between active and passive policies is legally provided, to the extent that these relegated 
to complements of those, cease to be a social right to become a complement that the 
citizen loses if he does not behave in a way the authorities deem suitable. 
 
                                                
280 This work was carried out during the development of a quarterly stay at the Library 
of the International Labour Office in Geneva, Switzerland, during the months of 
August, September and October 2016. The completion of the stay has been 
possible thanks to economic and institutional support of the University of Malaga, 
as well as the invaluable assistance of Mrs. Richelle Van Snellenberg, Mrs. Sonia 
Sanchez Cubero and Mrs. Susana Cardoso. 
136 
 
Summary: 1. Flexibility of labour market to avoid unemployment: Does it work? 2. 
Spanish National System of protection for unemployed people. 2.1. Contributory Level 
– Nivel Contributivo. Unemployment Benefit. Unemployment Subsidy. 2.2. Assistance 
Level - Nivel Asistencial. 2.3. Temporary Extraordinary Programs. 3. Spanish Strategy for 
Activating the Employment. 3.1. Strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy: Variations 
according to the evaluation method. 3.2. Materialization of its content. Activation of 
the unemployed people. Activation of the labour market. Activation of the 
Employment Public Services. 4. The necessary activation for having access to 
unemployment social protection. 5. Conclusion. 
 
 
1. Flexibility of the labour market to avoid unemployment: Does it 
work? 
 
Making labour markets more flexible is one of the flagships of the 
European Employment Strategy since 1998 when it was formulated for 
the first time. Flexibility has been brought about by the deregulation of 
labour standards, or, what is the same, the reduction of state intervention 
in the management of labour relations because, according to the 
neoliberal philosophy, labour market rigidity stifles economic grow. On 
the other hand, it leaves ample leeway to private will, which encourages 
competitiveness and production, and therefore the creation of 
employment and wealth. 
Since the economic and financial crisis in 2008, dizzying labour law 
reforms have taken place in our country that have led to very strong 
labour market liberalization with a clear erosion of permanent contracts. 
Currently, Spain has one of the highest levels of temporality within 
Europe,281 to which must be added poor working conditions and low 
wages. 282  Scholars 283  have repeatedly stated that these reforms, and 
                                                
281 Data available on 
 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_eppga&lang=en, 
(accessed on 16 October 2016). 
282 Spanish Interprofessional Miminum Wage for 2017 is 707,70 €/month, as provided 
in the Royal Decree 1171/2015, 29 December, published in BOE n° 312, 30 
December. 
283 M. Serrano Argüeso, Medidas de reparto de empleo en España en un contexto de 
crisis económica ¿Solución contra el desempleo o vía de incremento de la 
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especially the one of 2012, represent a significant shift towards job 
insecurity, to the extent that stable employment has become a burden 
that stifles economic growth and competitiveness. 
With regard to the threat to stable and permanent employment, we will 
now indicate here some of the regulatory provisions affecting the 
stability and quality of employment. First, the figure of the “contract for 
supporting entrepreneurs”,284 which establishes an annual trial period 
that allows dismiss without a cause the workers hired under this formula. 
Second, the increased flexibility of a learning and training contract, 
which extends the age until which young people can benefit from this 
contractual type to 30 years and enables them to be hired by a company 
on both contracts after each other without the contract changing into a 
permanent one.285 As anyone employed on a learning or training contract 
can be dismissed without any cause, it is easy to imagine what 
consequences these new contract types have for young people employed 
on their basis. This significantly increases the precarious and irregular 
employment as contracts are linked to low pay and poor conditions even 
with the level of training acquired by the worker. Thirdly, the 
amendment of the regulation of part-time contract, also means a pay cut. 
Although the regulatory reform has limited overtime, - which cost more 
than ordinary work-hours -, ironically, it has made it possible to increase 
the number of additional hours, 286being their cost the same as of 
ordinary work-hours. Fourthly, the government granted legal protection 
and promotion of contractual arrangements of atypical employment 
located in the so-called “gray areas” of productive relations such as 
economically dependent or “false autonomous”, whose employment, 
depends on both, subordinate and independent work, is formally 
described as autonomous work but, in reality, follows the same 
guidelines of work or subordinate employee with a significant degree of 
dependence on the employer. On the other hand, grants, practical 
                                                                                                              
precariedad laboral?, (2016), Vol. 3, núm. 3, Revista Internacional y Comparada de 
Relaciones Laborales y Derecho del Empleo. 
284 Article 4 of Law 3/2012, 6 July, published in BOE nº 162, 7 July. 
285 Article 2 of the same norm. 
286 Article 5 of the same norm. 
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training or other work situations without employment relationship can 
also be understood as a covert or informal ways of employment, which 
particularly affects young people forced to accept precarious working 
conditions with the expectation to gain professional experience or just to 
enter the labour market in exchange for low or no wages, lack of Social 
Security coverage, little or no training and no labour rights. Fifth and 
finally, it is necessary to underline the modifications regarding flexibility 
in the regime of layoffs. This is doctrinally287 recognized as a problem of 
greater importance than the temporality, to the extent that the 
destruction of employment generated at all is comparable to the 
difficulty that our labour market has to create it. To this, one must add 
that the contracts most affected by the layoffs are mostly temporary, due 
to reasons of security, efficiency and cost savings. In this sense, the “last 
in, first out” option discourages the formation of human capital, 
undermines productivity, directs the production model for temporal 
activities, favors outsourcing, which creates insecurity and hinders social 
integration.288 
This legal and regulatory flexibility, is also recognized internationally, it 
places Spain among European countries with high rates of 
liberalization.289 However, it strongly contrasts with the overwhelming 
levels of unemployment that still exist in our country. On September 
2016, these figures rose to 19.5%, with youngsters bearing the brunt. For 
example, for young people of an age up to 25 years, the unemployment 
                                                
287 These are the terms used by Professor Aurelio Desdentado Bonete in his work of 
2016, ¿Un miércoles de ceniza para la contratación temporal?, Por Almacén de 
derecho, (2016), Derecho Laboral, Sentencias.  
 Available on: http://almacendederecho.org/miercoles-ceniza-la-contratacion-
temporal/ (accessed on 14 October 2016). 
288 Ibidem. 
289 B. Lamotte, C. Massit, (2014), Questioning the “flexicurity” model with regard to the rise of 
job insecurity. Focus on Germany, Spain, Italy and France, HAL, pp. 13, available on 
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01092370, (accessed on 16 October 
2016). 
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rate stands at 46.5%, compared with 18.5% of the population between 
25 and 55 years and 16.5% of those over 55 years.290 
Adding to this, the most recent studies291 conducted in the Euro zone in 
order to deepen the analysis of the efficiency of employment policies 
show that our country has the worst results, reaching only 75.65% of 
efficiency instead of the 98% measured in other territories such as 
Germany or Denmark. Ironically, never before have so many resources 
been allocated to the prevention of unemployment and the results had 
never before been so terrible. Therefore, it is clear that the greater 
flexibility of the labour market, by itself, does not lead to sufficient levels 
of employment, or at least a bearable level of unemployment, but quite 
the opposite. At least in the Spanish case, deregulation or flexibility 
therefore must be accompanied by actions that encourage job creation 
and, of course, measures to ensure the livelihood of unemployed citizens 
while employment opportunities arise. Thus, the following sections are 
dedicated to analyzing one and the other, in order to present the way the 
authorities have planned their interaction. 
 
2. Spanish National System of protection for unemployed people 
 
In Spain, as in many other countries of the European territory, the Social 
Security system is an essential tool of social protection to alleviate the 
contingencies which cause loss of income, such as health – regarding 
disability benefits temporarily or permanently -, death - including cases 
of widowhood and orphanhood-, old age - retirement pension - and, 
finally, job loss-creating two kinds of aid, contributory benefits and 
assistance, depending on whether there had been a previous contribution 
period or not. 
                                                
290 Data published by the Spanish Statistic Institute, available on 
http://www.ine.es/infografias/tasasepa/desktop/tasas.html?t=0&lang=es, 
(accessed on 16 October 2016). 
291 Among other works, we quote here M.d.C. Pérez Gutiérrez, F.J. Maza Ávila, M. 
Blanco Canto, M. Jiménez García, Eficiencia y productividad de las políticas de 
empleo en la Eurozona, (2015), Vol. XXII, nº1, Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 
Universidad del Zulia, p. 19, and the study of B. Lamotte, C.  Massit, (2014), 
“Questioning the “flexicurity…”, op.cit. 
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This positive vision of the solidarity purpose of Social Security, however, 
is being tarnished, especially nowadays, from an unwanted collateral 
individualist effect regarding the fact that this can lead to discouraging 
someone to look for a job, or rejecting job offers to the point that once 
guaranteed a certain level of income, the unemployed citizen may no 
longer be interested in working. 
Indeed, this positive, but particularly the negative vision on social 
security justifies the increasing institutional and political concern about 
harmonizing active and passive employment measures going to the 
extreme of accepting this activation to even have access to what was 
once an unconditional social right. Specifically the combined reading of 
Article 41 of the Employment Act292 (hereinafter RDL 3/2015) and 
Article 263 of the General Social Security Law293 (hereinafter GSSL) 
establish the obligation of recipients of benefits – from the contributory 
or assistance level - to sign the known as “commitment of activity”, meet 
the requirements of that engagement and accept a suitable job offer 
when it arises if they want to have access to such economic aids. 
Consequently, the breach of this commitment –without a justified cause- 
causes temporary suspension or even loss of the right to receive the 
benefit. 
 
2.1. Contributory Level – Nivel Contributivo 
 
The Spanish Social Security System is characterized by being public, 
mandatory, and contributory. This explains that this is where we find 
most of the measures aimed at replacing the income due to losing a job, 
or a reduction of working hours. Here we can distinguish two types of 
aid: Unemployment Benefit and Unemployment Subsidy. 
                                                
292 Royal Legislative Decree 3/2015, 23 October, approving the revised text of the 
Employment Act, published in BOE nº 255, 24 October. This Royal Decree is to 
compile all the changes made on the previous Law 56/2003 of Employment, on 
which it has had the opportunity to rule the Social Economic Council in its 
publication Dictamen 13/2015, available at http://www.ces.es/dictamenes, 
(accessed on 11 October 2016). 
293 Royal Legislative Decree 8/2015, 30 October, approving the revised text of the 
General Social Security Act, published in BOE n° 261, 31 October. 
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Unemployment Benefit 
 
In order to be eligible for unemployment benefits three requirements 
have to be met.294 One, being registered as a jobseeker with the public 
employment service, which involves willingness and availability to work 
by signing the commitment of activity. Two, having contributed for at 
least 360 days within the six years prior to the legal unemployment 
situation. And three, losing a previous job. Within this category, several 
possibilities can be distinguished. First, in case of dismissal, it must not 
be the employee's fault. Secondly, in case of sexual harassment, the 
employee is allowed to quit the job in order to safeguard her physical 
and mental integrity.295 Third, suffering the suspension of the contract 
for technical, organizational, economic or production reasons.296 Fourth, 
the worker had endured a reduction of his/her initial working hours, 
provided that said reduction ranging between 10% and a maximum of 
70%, with similar a salary drop, established by the employer on the 
occasion on technical reasons, organizational, economic and production. 
Once these requirements are fulfilled, the right to receive unemployment 
benefits becomes automatic, being the basis of the benefit the average 
contribution bases for this contingency corresponding within the last 
180 days during the period of occupation. The duration of this benefit 
depends on the days worked in the six years prior to the legal situation of 
unemployment, so the worker can receive the benefit for 4 to 24 
months.297 The amount of the benefit is also subject to maximum and 
                                                
294 Article 266.e) LGSS. 
295 Article 267.b).2 LGSS. 
296 Under the provisions of Article 47 Royal Decree Law 2/2015, 23 October, 
approving the revised text of the Statute of the Workers, published in BOE n° 255, 
24 October. 
297 As far as the duration is concerned, it is dependent upon the time listed occupation 
in the six years prior to legal unemployment, which is scheduled as follows: From 
360 to 539 days of contribution, the benefit is paid for 4 months; from 540 to 719 
days of contribution, the benefit is paid for 6 months; from 720 days to 899, the 
benefit is paid for 8 months; from 900 to 1079 days of contribution, the benefit is 
paid for 10 months; from 1080 to 1259 days the benefit is paid for 12 months; from 
1260 to 1439 days of contribution, the benefit is paid for 14 months; from 1440 to 
1619 days of contribution, the benefit is paid for 16 months; from 1620 to 1799 
days of contribution, the benefit is paid for 18 months; from 1800 to 1979 days of 
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minimum limits, which depend on a series of factors, such as the 
number of dependent children of the beneficiary and, public indicator of 
income monthly multiple effects (IMME, hereinafter) in force at the 
time of entitlement, increased by a sixth of the amount298 Expressed in 
other words, if a citizen without children is entitled to the minimum 
contributory benefit, he/she will obtain 497,01 €/month, but if they 
have one or more children, they will receive monthly 664,75 €. While the 
maximum contributory benefit without children is 1.087,20 €, with a 
child it is 1.242,52 €, and with two or more children, the amount is 
1.397,84 €. 
Bearing in mind that the minimum wage in Spain is around 650 €, it can 
be accepted without much reticence that at unattractive employment 
offers, the citizen may choose the unemployment benefit while a more 
desirable opportunity reaches, whether in economic or professional 
terms. 
 
Unemployment Subsidy 
 
The “assistance level” of the Spanish unemployment protection is quite 
different in comparison to other European systems of protection. 
Because although it is set to complement the so-called “contributory 
level”, however it is compulsory for the beneficiary to have been 
working previously at least three month.299 
                                                                                                              
contribution, the benefit is paid for 20 months; from 1980 to 2159 days of 
contribution, the benefit is paid for 22 months, and, if they have contributed 2,160 
days or more, then the benefit is paid for 24 months. 
298 Under the provisions of Article 270.3 GSSL. On one hand, the amount of the 
IMME remains unchanged since 2010 (8th AD of Law 48/2015): 17.75 euros per 
day; 532.51 euros per month; 6390.13 per year. The annual amount of 7,455.14 
euros be taken into account when the rules refer to IMW calculated annually and 
being excluded the extra payments. Regarding the maximum amount of benefit is 
175% of the IMME if the worker has no dependent child; 200% of the IMME, if 
he/she has a dependent child and 225% of the IMME, if he/she has two or more 
dependent children. On the other hand, the minimum amount will be equal to 
107% of the IMME, if the worker has dependent children, or 80%, if not. 
299  Under the provisions of Article 274.3.a) GSSL, the minimum period is three 
months if the beneficiary has minor in his/her charge. 
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This misnamed “assistance level” (Nivel Asistencial) can provide longer 
unemployment protection to beneficiaries who have already exhausted 
the supply, or can offer some protection to workers who have not 
enjoyed the contributory unemployment benefits for not having met the 
minimum contribution period. This category also includes special 
situations in which are certain groups of workers -returned emigrants, 
released from prison or permanently disabled declared fit for work-. The 
unemployment subsidy also offers some kind of public protection to the 
elderly unemployed, enabling them to link said subsidy with their 
retirement pensions. 
Although in common with those already listed for the contributory level, 
the requirements for accessing to this level of protection are much 
stricter. Such is the case of the condition, according to which, the citizen 
has to lack of income exceeding 75% of the IMW, has to sign the 
commitment of activity, and must appear registered as a jobseeker at the 
Employment Office, during and at least one month before receiving the 
aid, unless he/she has never enjoyed the contributory benefit. 
The amount of unemployment subsidy is equal to 80% of the IMME in 
force at each time,300 which means that the value of the subsidy may be 
increased by the same extent as it does the minimum wage. 301  Its 
duration will depend on different factors as whether the supply is 
exhausted,302 whether the citizen has never been entitled to it,303 the age 
of the applicant304 or the existence of children in their care. 
Therefore, this second level of protection, as one can see, still tied to the 
working life of the citizen and not so much the actual lack of income as 
                                                
300 By 2016, this amount has been set at 426 €/month. 
301 However, in the contributory benefit, its maximum and minimum limits are 
calculated in relation to the IMME in force at the time of creation of the right. 
302 Article 277.1 GSSL, if the applicant has previously exhausted the provision, the 
duration of the unemployment subsidy is six months, renewable for six-month 
periods for up to 30 months. 
303  Unemployed who have not generated right to unemployment contributory benefit 
for not having covered the required contribution period, the duration of the subsidy 
varies depending on the time of contribution accredited and tenure of family 
responsibilities, but will move between a range of 3 to 21 months. 
304 Older unemployed workers over 55 years who enjoy the so-called “pre-retirement 
benefit” to meet the requirements of art. 274.4 GSSL may continue perceiving this 
until at least the age that allows them to access the contributory retirement pension. 
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would be desirable, leaves important protection gaps in the social safety 
net. For example young people under 30, people over 30 years who have 
never entered the labour market, or long-term unemployed who have 
exhausted their contributory social aid. 
 
2.2. Assistance Level (Nivel Asistencial) 
 
Some of the aforementioned gaps are precariously filled by the assistance 
level in which, by constitutional mandate, the Autonomous 
Communities play a key role. The action which is developed nationally –
or by the state level- is set by the Active Insertion Income Program305 
(hereinafter AIIP). 
The Active Insertion Income is an instrument that seeks to combine 
social assistance and employment policy (both directed especially to the 
employment of the most “sensitive” unemployed cases), and uses a type 
of aid which could be described as a “third tier” within the system of 
unemployment protection, added, next to the benefits and subsidies 
described before.306 It is largely connected with the so-called “minimum 
insertion income” or “social wage” enhanced by the European 
Community since the late eighties, to fight against the situation of social 
exclusion of groups, facilitating their integration into society and the 
labour market. So far in our country, this type of welfare benefits has 
been launched, with slight variations, in the territory of most of the 
Autonomous Communities. 
The program began as a temporary annual measure subject to the 
budgetary availability, which by now has become permanent for 
providing protection to populations sectors that in its absence would be 
discovered. It consists of granting applicants for financial aid amounts to 
80% of IMME in force at the time of application and its duration is 11 
months. 
The groups addressed are part-time workers whose income does not 
exceed 75% of the IMW and unemployed older than 45 years who are 
registered as jobseekers continuously for at least 12 months before the 
                                                
305 Royal Decree 1369/2006, 24 November, published in BOE n° 290, 5 December. 
306 Final Disposition 8th, GSSL. 
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application to join the program and who have exhausted the 
contributory benefits from a later period to 6 months. To receive this 
financial aid, they should sign the commitment of activity, accept suitable 
job offers that arise during the development of the program and make a 
personalized itinerary of labour insertion of participating in promotion, 
training, retraining, or other activities to increase activity. Refusal to 
accept and participate in such actions without just cause, leads to the 
suspension or deregistration in the program, and therefore, the loss of 
the economic accompanying measure. 
 
2.3. Temporary Extraordinary Programs 
 
High levels of unemployment, their persistence over time and the 
existence of groups of citizens unprotected have led our legislator to the 
creation of so-called “extraordinary temporary activation programs for 
employment”, which will remain in force until unemployment levels are 
reduced to 18% -Article 4 RDL 1/2016.307 
Its purpose is to set up a “fourth safety net” for rescuing, in economic 
and labour terms, specific groups that are especially suffering 
unemployment since the economic and financial crisis burst. Thus these 
programs are addressed to young people under 30 who have never 
accessed the labour market and, therefore, are not entitled to social 
assistance, and the long-term unemployed, usually located between the 
group of over 45 and 55, to the extent that last longer the unemployed 
have exhausted all possible economic aid from the contributory and 
assistance level. 
In general terms, except for the subjective aspect of the specificity of the 
groups to whom they are addressed, it could be said that both programs 
are a continuation of unemployment benefits, one can expect the 
inclusion of the unemployed in activation programs as a mandatory 
preliminary step to access an economic accompanying measure. 
Therefore, the subscription commitment of activity is a prerequisite, and 
                                                
307 Royal Decree Law 1/2016, 15 April approving the extension of the Activation Plan 
for Employment, published in BOE nº 92, 16 April. 
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failure to do so will cause the disenrollment in the program and the loss 
of the economic support. 
The first of these programs, known as PREPARA,308 comprises four 
different types of performances. 
The first involves incentives for hiring young people under 30 and 
unemployed who have been registered with the employment services for 
more than two years. These include reducing corporate contributions 
Social Security for every contract signed if its duration is at least six 
months. What is bizarre though, is that, although the specific purpose of 
this measure is “to promote the transition to stable employment”, 
provides that contracts with these groups are part-time, when precisely 
the partiality of the working day does not offer stability but quite the 
opposite. These measures could be described as being insufficient to the 
extent of trying to cure a haemorrhage with a plaster. It would have been 
a completely different story if commitments to quality medium and long 
term employment had been made. However, it seems that the chosen 
option merely helps to patch up an important structural problem in a 
bad and temporary manner.  
The second action, addressed exclusively at long-term unemployed who 
have exhausted their benefits and subsidies, seeks to integrate the 
applicants in various activation measures complemented with support 
valued at 75% of the IMME and during a maximum of six months. 
These activation measures are rather general, regarding the “completion 
of the insertion itinerary and other activation actions”309 that, according 
to the needs of each applicant, will be presented by the competent 
employment service. To breach any of these actions without justified 
cause, will result in automatic unsubscribing of the program and in losing 
the accompanying support. It is necessary to note here that the norm 
does not clarify what should be understood by breaching the activation 
actions. Neither, if there is the possibility of suspension rather than the 
disenrollment of the program, and what is meant by justified cause. 
                                                
308 Royal Decree Law 1/2011, 11 February, on urgent measures to promote the 
transition to stable employment and retraining of unemployed persons, published in 
BOE n° 37, 12 February. 
309 Article 2 RDL 1/2011. 
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Those indeterminate concepts generate helplessness to these citizens 
whose survival depends only on these economic aids. 
The third and fourth measures of the program, which are addressed to 
young and unemployed over 45 years, open the possibility of integrating 
into actions of labour activation even when it is not mandatory for them, 
since they are not receiving any unemployment pension. This way these 
collectives are invited to participate in personalized insertion itineraries 
and to receive specific training courses for their professional profile, thus 
filling a possible gap protection, albeit not economic, but at least in order 
to activate them and to help them to fight unemployment. 
The second special activation program introduced by the RDL 
16/2014,310 opens the possibility that it can be requested by both, part-
time workers whose income does not exceed 75% of the IMME, and 
long-term unemployed with family responsibilities who have exhausted 
all alternatives of social protection possible without finding a new job 
opportunity. 
Specifically it does not provide any novelty on any of the actions 
contained in the contributory or assistance unemployment benefits 
presented above. It merely extend for another six months the financial 
aid replacement or supplement income, while dilates, in an equal number 
of months, the required occupationally activation. 
This one consists not only in underwriting the commitment of activity, 
but also on the accreditation of having developed at least three 
performances of job search, do the designed insertion itinerary and to 
accept any suitable job offer arising. In view of the proportionality of its 
breach –provided in the norm-, the temporary suspension or permanent 
expulsion of the program will take place, with the consequent loss of the 
economic aid. 
Therefore, as can be seen, both programs reproduce the same model of 
interaction between passive and active measures of employment. They 
are a continuation of actions of unemployment protection that exist in 
our social security system with the exception of being destined for 
specific groups, although this is not reflected in the actions that entail. It 
                                                
310 Royal Decree Law 16/2014, 19 December, published in BOE nº 307, 20 
December. 
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was hoped that these programs would take into account the existence of 
unprotected collectives – such as the young or people who never 
accessed the labour market. However, the option has been to duplicate 
measures and forward to citizens to regional employment services. The 
absence of guidelines in the Spanish activation measures regarding what 
these should be, based on deadlines that have to be implemented, of the 
assessments on its effective implementation and of the assessment of the 
degree of user satisfaction, abound in the inefficiency of a protection 
system still far from recognizing the structural and complex problem of 
unemployment. 
In conclusion, the Spanish social security system, originally designed for 
temporary financial support of unemployed citizens has been modified 
to adapt to the new social context. Its current formulation has been 
affected greatly by the market's inability to create jobs which has caused 
the configuration of programs that allow delay the perception of 
financial assistance up to a limit of uncertain time. The perception that 
this configuration may be generating is not only a waste of national 
economic funds, but a harmful tendency towards “welfarism”, which has 
led the legislator to counter this trend through the compulsory activation 
of the unemployed. In this sense it stands as indispensable requirement 
to enjoy financial support sign a commitment of activity whose failure 
causes decay entitlement to benefit. Although the causes, effects, 
offender and sanction mechanisms that make up the Spanish model of 
interaction between active and passive employment measures are briefly 
studied in paragraph 5 in this work, we would like to introduce two key 
ideas. The first is related to the philosophical approach, as indicated lines 
back, supports and feeds the active employment policies. Indeed here it 
would show that the citizen is considered solely responsible for the 
unemployment situation in which they are to such an extent that only if 
he/she proves amply wants to work will recognize the right to receive 
social assistance. The second idea put on the table the issue of job quality 
and what to do regarding the extent the freedom of citizens is curtailed 
to reject an offer that does not meet the expectations of what qualified as 
“decent work”. 
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3. Spanish Strategy for Activating the Employment 
 
A theoretical framework like this, -which aims to show the kind of 
interaction that links active and passive employment measures- implies 
to analyze the Spanish Strategy for Activating the Employment 
(hereinafter, SSAE) pointing out its content and strong and weak points. 
 
3.1. Strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy: Variations according to 
the evaluation method 
 
Determining the success or failure of active policies in Spain, it's 
necessary to observe two different analyses. One which comes from 
Europe and other carried out by national institutions themselves. 
From the European point of view, our country is experiencing, in 
general, a gradual improvement in the economy, to the extent that there 
has been a growth of 2.7% of GDP by 2016 –setting it in the fourteenth 
place in the world ranking311- and because of its aim is to create 480,000 
new jobs by the end of this year 2016. However, unemployment levels 
continue to occupy second place among the highest of unemployment in 
the entire territory of the Union. Groups that are particularly hard hit are 
young people between 26 and 30 years, the long-term unemployed, and 
those over 50 years. However, this “improvement” has neither led to a 
reduction of the rate of youngsters abandoning the studies or to increase 
the continuous vocational training of “NEET”, nor achieved the 
restructuration of our business tissue.312 Moreover, no information exists 
about the cost/benefit ratio of investment in active policies and results, 
so nothing can be argued to defend the “improvement” of the situation 
in our country. The questions in the end are: Can improvement be 
described as mere economic growth? What are the social and economic 
                                                
311 The information comes from International Monetary Fund, available on 
http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/04/15/actualidad/1429060990_1805
02.html, (accessed on 16 October 2016). 
312 EURES. European Job Mobility Portal, available on 
https://ec.europa.eu/eures/main.jsp?catId=2627&countryId=ES&acro=lmi&lang
=en&regionId=ES0&nuts2Code=%20&nuts3Code=&regionName=National%20
Level, (accessed on 16 October 2016). 
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costs of deconstruction of Labour Law through making poor of contract 
types, the increase in temporary contracts and the disappearance of job 
security? What are the social and economic costs of a completely 
unstructured business fabric, of such levels of unemployed, of 
discouraged citizens, and of a generation of youth without a future? 
On the other hand, from the Spanish point of view, the results derived 
from the implementation, in our public policies, of evaluation 
procedures; an innovation regarding to employment that is ordered in 
Article 39 of RD Law 3/2015. This assessment is expected to materialize 
through the annual publication of a report313 containing information on 
the results of active policies throughout the country. This was 
implemented for this year by Annex I of the Order ESS/1978/2015,314 
where the allocation of subsidies to the Autonomous Communities 
(hereinafter, AA.CC.) was made to depend on the compliance with the 
estimates contained in the Activation Plan for Employment (hereinafter, 
APE), as well as the degree of success of these measures. Specifically, the 
AA.CC. should315 get 60% of the subsidies only if they managed to insert 
in the labour market, recipients of financial support accompanying the 
APE, while the remaining 40% will have been granted based on a 
criterion more quantitative that qualitative, as was the number of 
potential beneficiaries Activation Program for Employment estimated to 
be attended by each region, based on the information taken into account 
when developing the Memory of Regulatory Impact Analysis of RDL 
16/2014 of 19 December. 
                                                
313 We were able to recover here the Reports that the State Agency for Evaluation of 
Public Policies issued for the years 2011, 2013 and 2014, published respectively in 
Resolution of 15th July 2015, (BOE nº 176, 24th of July), in Resolution of 27th of 
June 2014, (BOE nº 164, 7 July) and Resolution 18 December 2012, (BOE nº 1, 1st 
of January 2013). None of these reports makes allusions to active employment 
policies or the services themselves. 
314 Order ESS/1978/2015, 17 September that distributes territorially for the fiscal year 
2015 for management by the Autonomous Communities with assumed powers, 
grants workplace financed from the State Budget aimed at the implementation of 
the tasks Program Activation Employment published in BOE nº 234, 30 
September. 
315 We use a perfect future because there is no available information about it. 
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By 2016 these prognoses had suffered certain changes that, from our 
point of view, do not solve some of the major problems which thrusts 
our country into a true “culture of evaluation”316 and therefore hinder a 
deep and real analysis about successes and failures of active policies. 
So, first, it is not indicated, quantitatively or qualitatively, when we have 
a positive or negative evaluation. Specifically, paragraph 7 of the Annual 
Plan for Employment Policy (APEP, hereinafter) intended to arrange 
financing, expressly states that “the amounts provided for management 
by the Autonomous Communities are distributed in accordance with the 
approved criteria in the respective Sector Conference on Employment 
and Social Affairs”. The conference took place on April 18, 2016,317 and 
its (publicly available) report of this shows that only “30% of the funds 
to be distributed is allocated among the different Autonomous 
Communities according to their relative importance in the year 2015”. 
The remaining 70% is allocated between the different Autonomous 
Communities depending on the degree of compliance with the objectives 
set in the Annual Plan for Employment Policy 2015”. The papers do not 
offer any other indication that facilitate the understanding of these deals 
or clarify the parameters that have been reached. 
On the other hand, although Annex V of APEP itemizes the indicators 
that will guide the evaluation of each of the Plan's objectives, important 
deficiencies are perceived as a result of the ineffectiveness of the 
evaluation system. 
In this respect, although the effective employment of the job seeker is 
evaluated, it does not cover monitoring of the insertion in terms of 
quality and permanence in the workplace, so that the evaluation would 
be incomplete for the purposes of determining its quality as well as its 
                                                
316 This expression comes from the work of G. Schmid, Process Evaluation: Policy 
Formation and Implementation, in G. Schmid, J. O´Reilly, K. Schömann (Eds.) (1996), 
International Handbook of Labour Market Policy and Evaluation, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Chentelham, UK, pp. 230-232. 
317 It is possible to have access to the press new uploaded by the Employment 
Secretary on 
  http://prensa.empleo.gob.es/WebPrensa/noticias/laboral/detalle/2795 (accessed 
on 15 October 2016). 
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efficiency in cost-benefit terms, to weigh the positive effects on 
beneficiaries, and the direct and indirect costs associated. 
Similarly, the actions undertaken with the employers are not subject to 
systematic, multidimensional and efficient assessment, since the 
proposed indicators are limited to poor indicative results such as the 
number of jobs offered and applications served by the services. No 
reference has been noted to the time spent towards a candidate, the 
number of rejected candidates before the employer accepts one, 
recruitment difficulties and a long list of issues that will undoubtedly 
have a positive effect on the validity and usefulness of the evaluation. 
The public-private interaction is also expected to be under evaluation, 
but once again there are shortcomings in regards to crucial aspects such 
as how the service is provided or the results achieved, understood in 
terms of number of users served and degree of satisfaction. And the fact 
that the Placement Agencies can benefit from grants and economic 
incentives, funded by public funds, proves that they should be included 
in the evaluation process. By this, a positive evaluation is what allows 
access to said grants, which contributes to the rationalization of cost and 
efficiency of active policies. 
Finally, there are some aspects that have not received any attention by 
the evaluation procedure, although, their relevance has been recognized 
by the norm itself. This is the case of the underground economy, the 
promotion and development of entrepreneurial culture, as well as new 
emerging economic sectors. However, when it comes to creating labour 
demand, the public and employment policies cannot be left out. They 
should anticipate labour market needs and ensure the social and 
economic (re)integration of people. Some aspects which is vital to point 
out their importance, especially in times of strong economic crisis, when 
the fundamental work of public and employment policies powers, should 
be provided for the change, anticipating market needs and ensuring 
socio-professional integration of people. 
In conclusion, it might be noted that the evaluations conducted from the 
international and national level regarding the active employment policies 
in Spain continue to focus their objective of analysis in purely economic 
aspects, so that what is considered a sign of social improvement is the 
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increase in GDP, creation of jobs in quantitative terms, the number of 
workers who entered the labour market and the offers have been 
satisfied. Contradictory to the ILO conception of work, it is treated as a 
commodity, since it cannot be glimpsed between the tools and 
procedures of international and national assessment, one of them 
attending other human dimensions than the economic one. Personal 
satisfaction, environmental quality of the relationship, stability and, 
ultimately, happiness, are factors never taken into account. Thus, by 
omitting any analysis of these social variables, is suppressed any 
possibility of that active measures and consequently the passive policies 
that complement them, develop their potential to achieve not only a 
project of decent work but also a good life. 
 
3.2. Materialization of its content 
 
As it has been outlined before, one of the biggest problems of the 
Spanish labour market is related to its incapacity for creating 
employment, and consequently it is justified that the Spanish Strategy 
has been confined almost entirely to boosting employment through 
economic incentive to hiring318 since the early nineties and until almost 
the second half of the year two thousand. It is therefore not surprising 
that the activation had traditionally been identified with making the 
worker attractive to the employers, encouraged by receiving large 
amounts of money, subsidies or reducing Social Security costs. 319 
However it is fair to point out that, since the labour reform introduced 
by the Law 35/2010 of September 17th,320 this technique has been 
                                                
318  J. I. Palacio Morena, (1998), ¿Crea empleo…, op.cit., p. 41; J. A. Alujas Ruíz, (2004), 
La política de fomento del empleo: eje fundamental…, op.cit., pp. 15-16, and by the same 
author, Políticas activas de mercado de trabajo en España: Alcance y limitaciones, 
(2015) nº 14, Revista Trabajo, pp. 226-227; B. Cueto, P. Suárez, El papel de las 
políticas activas: una perspectivades desde las comunidade sautónomas, (2015) nº 
87, Ekonomiaz, p. 287; VV.AA., La política de empleo como prioridad para salir de 
la crisis, (2015) nº 30, Revista Cauces, Consejo Económico y Social, p. 35,  
 available on http://www.ces.es/web/guest/revista-cauces, (accessed on 11 October 
2016). 
319 Law 43/2006, 29 December, published in BOE nº 312, 30 December, still in force. 
320 Published in BOE nº 227, 18 September. 
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substantially reduced. Emphasizing, in return, the activation of the 
labour market itself three types of actions have been developed. They are 
aimed at: a) promoting self-employment and the business tissue; b) at 
creating micro-business projects; c) at activating the Public Employment 
Services. 
However, although we recognize the improvements achieved in the 
design of our active policies, we consider it necessary to point out here 
the way they are effectively being implemented. Specifically, the Spanish 
Strategy for Activating the Employment 2014-2016321 and the APEP that 
develops it,322 outline several axes of action comprising six groups of 
actions in which can be distinguished executives actors - that is, the 
Public Employment State Service (PESS, hereinafter) and the PEAS - 
from the beneficiaries, the final recipient of the actions contained in the 
correspondingly Axis. Thus, Axes 1 to 4 seek for the activation of 
citizens –these actions are related to Axis of guidance, Axis of training, 
Axis of employment opportunities and equal opportunities-. Only Axis 5 
aims at the activation of the labour market and Axis 6 refers to activation 
of the public employment services by enhancing the institutional 
framework. This distribution therefore shows two key features of our 
active policies. On the one hand, the emphasis on the unemployed 
person’s responsibility -given that four, even five, of the six axes are 
intended for their activation-, while scarce attention has been put on the 
necessary co-responsibility among citizen-labour market-public service as 
a whole. On the other hand, it shows the comparably meagre interest in 
other ways to improve the labour market and the employment public 
services. Regarding to these, in the single Axis intended, neither an 
increase of staff nor an increase of its material resources is mentioned. 
And, related to the promotion of the business sector, the Axis 5 referrers 
to it as an area in which to invest in strictly economic terms, either in 
subsidies or incentives, as if this were the only existing possibility. 
Below, we dedicate the following lines to a further analysis of these three 
aspects, in order to highlight what specific activation measures are 
ordered from the SSAE, although some key ideas can already be 
                                                
321 Royal Decree 751/2014, 5 September, published in BOE nº 231, 23 September. 
322 Resolution of 22 August 2016, published in BOE nº 210, 31 August. 
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anticipated. First, the absence of rules to ensure the co-responsibility in 
the division of responsibilities between the parties involved in the labour 
market to reduce unemployment; second, the lack of juridical-legal 
mechanisms that allow the unemployed to require the exercise of their 
right to work, with the consequent unemployed helplessness before 
public administrations. And third, the absence of a true purpose in the 
active policies for socio-labour integration. 
 
Activation of unemployed people 
 
In the SSAE 2014-2016, most of the performances ordered from the 
active policies focus on two specific groups323, the young people under 
thirty years old324 and long-term unemployed. This indicates a clear 
attempt to address the specific circumstances of these collectives, 
although the policies seek to mould them to the demands of the market 
and not on the other way, as would be desirable in a fair society. 
Regarding the measures to promote the activation of the unemployed, in 
particular, concerning young people, it is necessary to note here two 
milestones. The approval of the action “Your First Job EURES”325 to 
                                                
323 We would like to emphasize here that the above measures were specific ones and 
not generalized, being an exception, maintaining, therefore, the continuous line of 
subsidized employment, as shown by the provisions contained in Articles 9 to 11 of 
Royal Decree Law 4/2013, of February 22, measures to support entrepreneurs and 
to stimulate growth and job creation, published in BOE No 47 of 23 February; the 
approval of Royal Decree Law 16/2013 of 20 December on measures to promote 
stable employment and improve the employability of workers, published in BOE 
No. 305 of December 21; Royal Decree Law 3/2014 of 28 February, on urgent 
measures to promote employment and permanent contracts, published in BOE No. 
52 of March 1; Resolution of May 7, to improve the employability of young people, 
published in BOE No. 125, May 23; Chapter I of Title VI on National Youth 
Guarantee System approved by Law 18/2014 of 15 October on urgent measures 
for growth, competitiveness and efficiency, published in BOE No. 252 of October 
17; Chapter II of Law 25/2015, of 28 July, second chance mechanism, reducing the 
financial burden and other measures of social order, published in BOE No. 180 of 
29 July. 
324 In the European version of this call, the maximum age is 35 years. It is available 
onhttp://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1160&langId=es, (accessed on 15 
October 2016). 
325 Royal Decree 1674/2012, 14 December, by which the regulatory bases for granting 
public subsidies to finance the action “Your first EURES job” are established, 
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facilitate the employment326 of those who have been selected to attend 
employment vacant managed by the EURES Network in 2012. This 
action was the first of a series of measures that also includes incentives 
for youth training both for the acquisition of key competencies of those 
who have left school and for acquiring professional certificates or 
training in info-communication technologies and languages, and hiring 
by businesses where they have been trained. It consists of a series of 
economic aids financed from the European Program for Employment 
and Social Innovation that young people perceive when hiring involves a 
change of country of residence in the territory of the Union. This 
commitment aims at relieving the pressure on the Spanish labour market 
and the surplus of work by redirecting labour to places that suffer from 
labour shortages. 327  This European initiative suffers from a limited 
economic prevision, taking into account the number of potential 
beneficiaries and the number of people in need. In this sense, the 
measure does not exceed of 500 beneficiaries, while in Spain the 
unemployed young people under 25 years exceeds 775.000.328 Secondly, 
in February 2013, the Entrepreneurship and Youth Employment 
Strategy 2013-2016329 was agreed. This measure falls within the ambit of 
                                                                                                              
published in BOE n° 301, 15 December. The second edition of this action was 
approved by Royal Decree 379/2015, 14 May, published in BOE n° 138, 10 June. 
326 Article 1 RD 1674/2012, mentions youth as jobseekers and SMEs as suppliers. 
327 In this sense we mention here the work of Professor José Manuel Morales Ortega, 
(2015), La respuesta comunitaria y española a la realidad de los ninis: Los grandes damnificados 
por la crisis, Ediciones Laborum, Madrid, where the author makes a complete 
reflection, in our view, on the proposed alternatives and the real needs of a group 
identified as the “lost generation”. 
328 Data obtained from Statistic National Institute, available on 
http://www.ine.es/ss/Satellite?L=es_ES&c=INESeccion_C&cid=1259925463174
&p=1254735110672&pagename=ProductosYServicios%2FPYSLayout&param3=1
259924822888, (accessed on 15 October 2016). 
329 It is interesting to remember in this note the incidents occurred regarding the legal 
regulations of the known as Youth Guarantee. Dated 22 April 2013, the European 
Council published its recommendation on the establishment of the Youth 
Guarantee, initially designed as a continuation of the pattern of active employment 
policy based on corporate bonus for hiring young people. This initiative to combat 
youth unemployment aims to “ensure that all young people under 25, whether 
registered or not in employment services, receive a concrete and good quality offer 
within 4 months after the end of his training or the start of their period of 
unemployment. The offer should consist of a job, a traineeship, training in a 
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the European Youth Guarantee and marks the return to the traditional 
Spanish active policies, as most of the measures330 contained therein 
promote employment by encouraging the hiring of this group through 
economic incentives to the employers’ contributions to Social Security. 
The long-term unemployed and those over 45, are beneficiaries of 
measures aimed at professional training and retraining. Such is the case 
of the resolution of 19th March 2014,331 which provides, on a competitive 
basis, subsidies to entities and organizations offering training courses 
and internships in companies on “intensive use of new technologies, 
especially information and communications and the digital economy”. 
The trends highlighted above, though still in an embryonic stage 
compared to other countries, make that the Spanish active labour market 
policies, although traditionally focused on labour supply, at least pivot 
now on two legs: employment incentives and training. However 
significant gaps remain. Thus, options equally valid for the integration of 
these groups treated harshly by the crisis would consist on articulating 
mechanisms, from the quality, that equip them with skills to enter or 
remain in the labour market, and on arbitrating measures that shape the 
labour market according to the needs of young and long term 
unemployed. Such is the example of offering paid internships in public 
and private companies and institutions practices as happens in Belgium, 
making bank loans at 0% interest – such as for example in Germany - 
offering free higher education courses that allow their continuous 
recycling and updating of skills. 
 
                                                                                                              
company or a course at a school, and adapt to individual needs and situations”. The 
EU endorsed the principle of the Youth Guarantee in April 2013 and in particular 
Spain, with two months in advance, had enacted measures to develop the 
Entrepreneurship and Youth Employment Strategy, contained in Title I of Royal 
Decree Law 4/2013. The final development of the Strategy 2013-2016 did not 
occur until September 2013, when was approved the Annual Plan for Employment 
Policy 2013, (Resolution of August 28, published in BOE n° 217, 10 September). 
Finally, Law 18/2014, of October 15, cited in the previous note, contains the final 
and management currently in place National Youth Guarantee System. 
330 It must be emphasized here that, as discussed below, also some performances are 
intended to activate the labour market by encouraging entrepreneurship, although it 
is true that the least of them. 
331 Resolution of 19th March 2014, published in BOE nº 136, 5 June. 
158 
 
Activation of the labour market 
 
Even though a lot still has to be done, measures to promote labour 
market activation, have begun to receive some attention. In this sense, 
three actions may be mentioned intended to promote self-employment, 
to improve the business tissue and to develop micro-business projects. 
Far from the logical assumption that may arise from its magnanimous 
statement, actually these performances are limited to simple measures, 
consistent in providing economic incentives for newly created entities,332 
or for those who are autonomous in the special Social Security regime,333 
and the business financing facilitating the supervision of private 
insurance.334 Social Economy, meanwhile, is mentioned exclusively to 
make reductions in contributions to Social Security for those cases where 
young people are hired335 preserving or returning to the previous active 
policy model, where activation means to encourage hiring and make 
attractive the work force. With regard to generating employment, Orders 
IET/1157 and IET/1158,336 both of 2014, provide for the funding 
between 30.000 € and 500.000 €, for activities started from 31 December 
2014 to 31 December 2018. These actions should be aimed at promoting 
small business investment projects located in areas affected by the 
restructuring of coal mining and environment,337 with the ultimate aim of 
generating alternative economic activities to coal mining, with the 
consequent generation of new jobs and/or maintenance of existing ones, 
to encourage development of these areas, considering their status as 
disadvantaged regions. 
                                                
332 Article 7 of February Royal Decree Law 4/2013, 22 February, published in BOE nº 
47, 23 February. 
333 According to article first seven eight paragraphs of Law 31/2015. 
334 Article 7 of Law 31/2015. 
335 Law 31/2015, 9 September, by amending and updating rules on self-employment 
and building measures and promotion of self-employment and social economy, 
published in BOE nº 217, 10 September. 
336 Orders IET 1157 y 1158, both from the 30th June 2014, for which the regulatory 
bases for granting aid aimed at business projects that generate employment, 
promote alternative development of mining areas was approved for the period of 
2014-2018, published in the BOE nº 132, 4 July. 
337 According to Annex II of those Orders, the regions of Asturias, Huesca, Palencia, 
Teruel and Zaragoza. 
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Our country should improve some of the interesting measures adopt in 
other areas of labour inclusion as for example the ones stated in the 
Fifth Additional Provision of Royal Legislative Decree 3/2011 of 
contracts in the public sector, where a percentage of public contracts is 
reserved for social insertion companies or Special Employment Centers 
From our point of view it should be established as a conditio sine qua non 
to be beneficiary of a public contract or concession hire citizens enrolled 
as unemployed registered as unemployed in the public employment 
services. Also, other less burdensome measures could be developed and 
provided – for example wit regard to the free enterprise for hiring 
workers- as the conclusion of agreement 338  between businesses and 
public employment services. According to which these commit 
themselves to the companies to carrying out functions of intermediation 
and placement at no cost, in exchange for access to first-hand 
information about their work and professionals needs. In fact, a similar 
practice is structured in the Thirty Second Additional Disposition of 
RDL 3/2011. This provides for the possibility that the concessionaires 
companies and public employment services adopt collaborative 
framework agreements for performing tasks of intermediation. 
 
Activation of the Employment Public Services 
 
Both, the Spanish Strategy for Activating the Employment 2014-2016 
and the Annual Plan for Employment Policy establish specific economic 
tools which allow an increase of material resources, and improve human 
resources. Indeed, the most interesting fact in our opinion is the 
expansion of the term “orientation”, ranging from the simple 
intermediary role that traditionally was provided by employment 
services, to the configuration of the activation route of managing job 
offers. However, in this expansion gaps can be detected. In this regard, 
we believe that an efficient and effective National Employment System 
could and should go much further, performing tasks that go beyond the 
management of supply and demand to achieve, even anticipating the 
                                                
338 Ibidem, p. 212. 
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needs of the labour market. This aspect is crucial to prepare society for 
the rapid and profound changes that are being generated from 
digitalisation and automation. Thus it has become necessary to possess 
and to have access to labour market information through a very close 
collaboration with the businesses in exchange for a formidable service of 
placement -in quantitative, qualitative terms-. This implies the adoption 
of measures that, in the medium and long term, contribute to reorder 
outsourcing actions. Setting up a well thought and planned system of 
employment services where public and private actors interact according 
to a common pattern and a single project for the future. A true 
commitment of interactive participation will allow achieving a labour 
market and, consequently, a society, where each and every one of the 
participants assumes his share of responsibility and acts accordingly. 
It is also important to underline the democratization in the build-up of 
the Spanish active policies. On one hand because the national 
Employment Strategy is shaped in axes or orientations that must be 
developed by the Autonomous Employment Services according to the 
needs of their labour markets. On the other hand because the Strategy 
has been elaborated by the Sector Conference on Employment Labour 
Affairs and this sets the first step339 to ensure a coherent and coordinated 
National Employment System against the fragmented scenario340 that 
was created with the Law 56/2003. The presence of the Autonomous 
regions in the creation of active policies and the collaboration with the 
national level prevent that their role of active agents be relegated to 
passive, disaffected, disinterested agents. What's more, the 
acknowledgment of its responsibility in decision-making involves a 
correlative requirement results which facilitates both a true assessment of 
its viability, such as participation in designing the model of society that is 
sought. 
                                                
339 We indicate that it is only the first step because no attention has been devoted to 
local authorities or private agencies. They remain key players in the National 
Employment System, given the proximity to the unemployed and immediate 
knowledge of the possible employment areas. 
340  For the sake of completeness on this matter, Elserviciopúblico de empleo…, op.c., pp. 
200-202. 
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We deem it necessary, in this sense of participation, mentioning the 
muteness imposed on local authorities, relegated to weakened and 
almost unknown, managers in the field of employment, Article 4 RDL 
3/2015. Although its closeness with the social and economic realities of 
citizens, makes them first hand connoisseurs of the citizen needs and its 
possible solutions. This error, not fixed by the Sector Conference on 
Employment and Labour Affairs, could have been corrected if it had 
been observed the closer international reality, since countries like France, 
Germany and the UK, where the local entities are precisely the starting 
point341 in the design of active employment policies. This hiatus of 
participation generates an absence of pluralism and interest to improve 
the functioning and effectiveness of active employment policies. 
Therefore, one can conclude that although the Spanish legislator has 
been able to explore new legal avenues to improve the validity of active 
employment policies, there is still a large distance to cover, looking to 
improve not only in quantitative terms, but also in quality. Thus, against 
attempts to recognize and institutionalize the involvement of some 
participants in the labour markets, the omission of others, like the 
citizens themselves, or local authorities, reflects a biased view of the 
unemployment problem, which is the product of a lack of reflection on 
its eminently social character and not just economic and commercial 
perspective. 
 
4. The necessary activation for having access to unemployment social 
protection 
 
Although in Spain the separation between active and passive 
employment policies has never been absolute, -as can be seen from the 
adoption of the social collaboration works342 in 1982 where recipients of 
unemployment benefits were obliged to accept a job in order not to lose 
                                                
341 M. Heidenreich, Deborah Rice (2016): Integrating Social and Employment Policies in 
Europe: Active Inclusion and Challenges for Local Welfare Governance, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham, UK. 
342 Royal Decree 1445/1982, 25 June amending various measures to promote 
employment, published in BOE n° 111, 9 of May. 
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the economic aid-, it is no less true that in recent decades a significant 
increase in the interaction between unemployment benefits and labour 
activity can be acknowledged. A reflection of this can be found in Article 
36.2 of the Employment Act which introduces an explicit reference to 
the complementary nature of passive employment measures concerning 
active with which they will have to coordinate in the terms provided in 
Chapter III of the same rule. 
Specifically, it is stated in this section that coordination between active 
policies and economic protection against unemployment –never named 
passive policies- materializes by requiring the recipients of such aid to 
underwrite the “commitment of activity”, to comply with the 
requirements contained therein and specifically to accept a “suitable job 
offer”. 
Looking at the “commitment of activity”, as provided in Article 300 
GSSL, is defined as the compromise between the unemployed person as 
an autonomous being and public employment services of the Autonomy 
or on the national level that the applicant or beneficiary of social aid to 
actively seek employment, accepts a suitable job and participate in 
specific actions of motivation, information, guidance, training, retraining 
or insertion to increase the chances of getting a job. The legislator 
therefore uses that commitment to refer to the entire set of actions that 
European authorities consider essential to improve the employability of 
citizens, and creates a kind of “contract” that is not synallagmatic, but 
one-sided to the extent that its obligations arise only for one party. The 
unemployed person is obliged by the public employment services while 
no obligation is expected from them. No legal and procedural actions are 
provided that enable citizens to exercise their right to work in the case of 
eventual breaches or negligence on the side of the employment services. 
And, of course, no reference is made to companies, considered 
“untouchable” in the neoliberal Western culture. The absence of rules 
and policies that make all players participating in the labour market co-
responsible, causes not only the overhead of one of the parties, but the 
inefficiency of the whole national employment system, insofar as it 
reduces the problem and solutions to the unemployment to subjectivity 
and resources of the citizen. It would have been desirable to incorporate 
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explicit reference to the authorities’ obligations as well in order to make 
it clear to both parties – service and citizens - have responsibilities. 
Similarly commitments of activity could have been articulated for 
companies, under which - services and companies - engage to interact 
through cooperation agreements that bring advantages for both, such as 
an efficient free intermediation service, the priority in awarding public 
contracts in the case the companies hire unemployed recipients of social 
aids, facilitating information about new employment niches -on the part 
of companies- in exchange of offering training and professional courses 
to its workers by employment services or entities that collaborate with 
them. 
The concept of “suitable job” is regulated independently in Article 301 
GSSL, which offers several definitions depending on the time that the 
unemployed have been enjoying the benefit. Thus, during the first 
months an adequate job will be the one that the citizen considers and so 
has been expressed in the commitment of activity. However, after a year 
of receiving the contributory benefit or assistance without having 
accepted any of the proposed offers, the norm enables the public 
employment service to decide whether or not an offer of employment it 
is suitable. In order to establish whether an offer is considered suitable, 
art. 301 GSSL offers three criteria. The first one is related to distance, 
which means that the offered job cannot be located more than 30 
kilometres from the habitual residence of the worker. This limit will not 
be taken into account if the worker states that the minimum time for 
travelling back and forth, takes over 25 per cent of daily working hours, 
or that the travelling cost is more than 20% of the monthly salary. The 
second one refers to working conditions. Here, the employment public 
service has to take into account working hours, permanent or temporary 
duration, full or part time and the salary which must be equivalent to the 
salary provided for the same job in any other company. The last 
requirement concerns the professional and personal circumstances of the 
unemployed, and the reconciliation of their family life and work. 
Indeed, the concept of suitable job that is understood in the Spanish 
legal system tries to comply scrupulously with the provisions contained 
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in Article 6 of ILO Convention No. 88343  taking into account the 
qualifications, experience and desires of the unemployed. The 
assessment of professional and physical skills and the design an itinerary 
of insertion to facilitate their job counselling and retraining, are 
undoubtedly strong quality steps in order to improve the effectiveness of 
the national system. 
Finally, to provide a general idea of how active and passive policies 
interact in order to alleviate the situation of the unemployed, it is 
necessary to stop, briefly, the consequences derived from the 
unemployed person’s rejection to be activated. In this sense, the 
mandatory character of the activation and the fact of attaching sanctions 
to its breach, are a clear reflection of the consideration of the citizen as 
solely responsible of his unemployed situation. Concerning employment 
services and particularly business, no mechanisms exist to determine, let 
alone sanction a lack of action on their side. Consequently, when the 
unemployed person rejects an offer or refuses to participate in 
promoting, training or retraining activities, she may temporary 
suspension, the definitive loss of the benefit or the disenrollment in the 
protection program.344 Minor breaches345 are e.g. failing to appear at the 
place or date indicated in order to cover vacancies or not showing up for 
training courses or orientation guides planned within the insertion 
itinerary, although they had previously been accepted by the 
unemployed. The penalty attached to these behaviours is the suspension 
of the benefit for a month. The definitive loss of the benefit or 
disenrollment in the corresponding program without the right to reapply 
is linked with the direct refusal by the unemployed to be activated. So, 
these are considered serious offenses, such as rejecting an offer of 
suitable employment or refusal to participate in social collaboration 
work, employment programs, including employability, or promotion, 
training or retraining. 
                                                
343 This is the Convention of 1948 on Public Employment Services, ratified by Spain in 
May 30th, 1960. 
344 Article 274 GSSL. 
345 Stated in Articles 17 and 47 of RDL 5/2000 of 4 August approving the Law on 
Offences and Sanctions in the Social Order, published in BOE n° 189, 8 August. 
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However, the consequences described above do not apply in case a 
“justified cause” exists, even though the concept lacks a legal definition. 
It is clear from case law that it includes a variety of reasons that 
“exculpate” the unemployed person´s behaviour. Some examples are the 
fact of being in prison, being sick, performing union work or a part-time 
job existing prior to the application of the aid. 
Therefore, the coordination of active and passive policies in Spain 
presents techniques of protection of the unemployed that have some 
positive aspects. Amongst these are the concept of “suitable job” or the 
flexibility that the “justified cause” introduces into the sanctioning 
process of breaches of activation. However, other aspects in our view 
are less admirable. Examples are the fact that activation is a duty put 
exclusively on the unemployed by the commitment of activity, while not 
even trying to involve employment services and businesses. If this was 
changed, this would not only avoid the helplessness unemployed are 
experiencing now, but also improve the functioning of the labour market 
by remedying one of its big problems: the inability to create jobs and 
quality employment. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
High rates of unemployment suffered by the Spanish society 
intermittently since the early eighties and continuously since the outbreak 
of the crisis of 2008 have no doubt, complex and multifaceted origins at 
all depend only on the flexibility of our labour market. Proof of this are 
the poor results revealed in the latest labour survey, in spite of the strong 
reforms that have de-constructed the socio-labour guarantees of the 
citizens. In this sense, the principal change comes from the expansion of 
a philosophical impost that holds the socio-productive paradigm and 
affects especially the perception we have of employment and 
unemployment. From this ideological approach, employment is 
understood as another of the goods that co-exist in the exchange 
markets. Its abundance and scarcity depends on the rancid rules of 
supply and demand. Unemployment, therefore, is the result of this 
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mismatch. Consequently the interest of one of the parties involved in its 
reduction is enough for this to take place. 
Starting from the premise that the person who is unemployed is so 
because he/she wants to be, it is easy to explain both, the political and 
legal treatment given to active and passive employment policies, -
according to which the first contribute to reducing unemployment, while 
the latter increase it- and the tendency to invest public money in active 
policies and to tighten the conditions for access to the passive. 
Consequently, passive policies have more or less lost their autonomous 
meaning as policies and instead have become mere appendices to leave 
having entity themselves as economic support mechanisms in cases of 
unemployment to become only appendices accompanying active policies. 
This explains that in the Spanish legal system access to passive measures 
have to obligatorily pass by activation of unemployed according to the 
Article 36.2 of the Employment Act. In particular it requires recipients 
of pensions – contributory or assistance – to accept activity 
commitment, compliance with the requirements contained therein and to 
accept any suitable job offer which comes around. And the other hand, 
to such an extreme passive policies are considered a drag on 
employment that the unemployed who receive economic aids are a 
priority group for activation against other groups also unemployed and 
lack of income that are not beneficiaries of any social protection. This is 
the case of youth and people who have never worked or have worked 
but not enough time as to enjoy a social aid. 
The gaps that these vulnerable groups represented in the Spanish social 
security net affect the fragility of our labour market, characterized by 
temporality, poor working conditions and low wages. 
The active policy measures contained in the Spanish Employment 
Strategy offer actions that continue the path drawn by the European 
provisions, but have not yet managed to adapt them to the real national 
needs, identified with the creation of stable employment and quality jobs 
and with specialized attention to groups with the highest unemployment 
rates, as youth and over 55s. The measures have so far been allocated to 
them, marked by job insecurity, only result in inefficiency of the system, 
the waste of resources and despair. 
167 
 
In this aspect, the approaches presented by this article come from, on 
the one hand, the critical observation of reality, the experiences and 
failures of other countries that were hit by the 2008 crisis, but have 
managed to overcome it better than Spain. It isn't one's intention to give 
mayor importance to these measures, but at least they could inspire us to 
develop new tools which help improve the quality of our labour market. 
On the other hand, question the goodness behind the philosophical 
approach which not only torments work relations, but also human ones, 
reducing the individual as a factor of economy and material wealth. In 
this sense, some reflections have been introduced to think about which 
our idea of development is, if a human improvement or simply an 
economic one- and the true price that our societies have to pay for being 
competitive and productive. 
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The essays here presented draw a multifaceted picture of some aspects 
of the flexicurity implementation due to the differences between the 
social security systems, but also between cultural, social and political 
characteristics of the Member States under analysis. Furthermore, these 
States have been differently affected by the economic recession starting 
from the end of 2008 and some of them are still facing intensively the 
consequences. 
Notwithstanding these domestic peculiarities, it is possible to highlight 
some common aspects and tendencies, which might also depend on the 
method adopted in employment policy at the European level. 
The 1997 Luxembourg European Council (Luxembourg Process) 
launched the European Employment Policy (EES) and introduced the 
“open method of coordination” to coordinate Member States´ reforms 
in labour market and social policies. This method has provided a way to 
connect the different domestic labour market policies – nevertheless 
their peculiarities – to some common concepts to take into account by 
Member States in their employment regulation. The EES four pillars - 
improving employability, developing entrepreneurship, encouraging 
adaptability and strengthening the policies for equal opportunities – have 
started to be considered in the domestic systems configurations. 
Through the EU guidelines and the intensive debate on this topic, the 
flexicurity strategy has started to influence the Member States´ systems. 
All contributions clearly show that the flexibility side of the concept has 
been implemented to a great extent. Labour law has become more 
flexible, dismissal protection was lessened and atypical forms of 
employment have become more common. Thus, in this book is 
highlighted a tendency to achieve more flexibility goals than security 
ones.  
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The “security side” could consist of relatively generous benefits, light 
eligibility criteria as well as measures to help people back into 
employment and to help them to become employable for the labour 
market. This part of the flexicurity concept seems to be still a challenge 
for all the systems under analysis, even the more developed in this field. 
Until quite recently, passive forms of security played the more important 
role. It was important to repair the income gap but the individual was 
responsible for finding a new job. This worked as long as jobs were 
available and social security was affordable. Due to demographic and 
economic challenges such as an ageing population and high and 
persistent unemployment, the sustainability of passive policies have 
become one of the most debated issues on employment policy.  
Therefore, the focus has shifted to active labour market policies or 
activation measures. Activation measures pursue a clear aim in all the 
countries here taken into consideration, i.e. the transition from a passive 
to an active society. But it is interesting to note that in none of the 
Member States this relatively coherent approach has led to a coherent 
implementation: specific countries´ problems in this field jeopardise the 
activation policies. 
Furthermore, with what concerns the relation between active and passive 
LM policies, it is also possible to highlight a clear tendency towards a 
contractualization characterized by a punitive approach. The 
unemployed are requested to perform specific activation duties, but it 
doesn´t seem that a same compulsoriness is on charge of the State in 
providing adequate employment services. Besides, the need of “security” 
– in terms also of adequate unemployment benefits and assistance - 
remains a crucial problems in many Member States and should 
counterbalance the increasing in flexibility and deregulation adopted in 
the last decades. Moreover, this flexibility should be re-thought and 
limited in what regards the need to ensure jobs able to support the 
sustainability of the insurance unemployment benefits.  
 
 
 
 
